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Introduction: The Search for an Innocent Eye 
Our eye sees very poorly and very little – and so men conceived of the 
microscope in order to see invisible phenomena; and they discovered 
the telescope in order to see and explore distant, unknown worlds. The 
movie camera was invented in order to penetrate deeper into the visible 
world, to explore and record visual phenomena, so that we do not forget 
what happens and what the future must take into account.1  
Dziga Vertov
Alone, without being able to be addressed by the views of others, and the ability to share 
my own views with other people, I am foreign to this world. In a literal sense the image is 
an aid in this task of sharing views and because of this ability it functions as my guide in 
finding my orientation in this world, in cultivating my visual field. I might stand beside 
another person and see what she sees, but I do not necessarily know her reading of it.2 The 
image adds a dimension to this relation, since it does not only show me what somebody 
else sees. When an image works properly it also shows how that other person sees, and thus 
the image becomes an agent.
Since I am constantly surrounded by images I usually just look through them, they don’t 
exercise any particular power over me. During the occasions when images are able to address 
me in a profound way they adhere to some kind of reality that is not known to me. In these 
occasions something new is brought into my world, or to put it another way, something is 
renewed in me. What these occasions tell me is that the veracity of an image is not the same 
thing as the reality of an image. If real images would only show me objects I already know, 
things that I can verify, realism would become superfluous. The realism of an image is in 
this sense a certain behavior that helps the image to address me and make the world vibrant 
and vivid. Somewhere along the way this understanding of the image as a moral agent has 
1  Dziga Vertov, Kino-eye – The Writings of Dziga Vertov, edited by Annette Michelson (Universty of California Press 1984), p. 67.
2  Here I paraphrase Jakob Meløe, ”The Two Landscapes of Northern Norway”, in Inquiry, vol. 31, 1988, p. 400.
12
become obscured by an epistemological framework for realism. In the second part of this 
thesis I will return to this moral understanding and re-establish the images role as a device 
for sharing our views. For now, I will start by outlining the story of how the image became 
to be conceived as a device for making representations of what we see. In this reduction the 
difference between what we see and how we see was obscured. 
The three chapters in Part One are an attempt to outline a genealogy of the concept 
of image. The present work will consider the emergence of perspectivist painting and 
the rationalization of the visual field along with the idea of species, the concept for mental 
representation in medieval philosophy (chapter 1), the camera obscura as a model for vision in 
Renaissance philosophy (chapters 1 and 2) and the invention of photography and its relation 
to positivist philosophy (chapter 3). What is essential in this genealogy is the conceptual 
discussion. The status of the image is defined by how this concept is related to other concepts 
such as vision, knowledge and the self. When the image at a certain point, or more precisely at 
certain points, starts to be conceived as an indexical copy of the visual field, a visual record, 
this development does not work in isolation. Depending on how we approach the concept of 
visual record, on how we understand its idea, different associations will announce themselves. 
Whereas the technological evolution of the different means of aided vision (the telescope and 
the microscope) and the means of visual recording (camera obscura, photography and film) is 
quite transparent, the philosophical background for the emergence of aided visual observation 
and the visual record is more complex. In order to understand how visual documentation 
and recording came about I want to examine different visual metaphors that originate from 
a certain ocularcentrism3 within Western philosophy. These visual metaphors are entwined 
with changes in understanding, a cultivation of certain ideas and sensibilities, and of certain 
acts of vision itself. The connections I make have been made before and I will follow earlier 
3  This term is widely debated and to some extent problematic, but in this context it signifies a certain tendency of emphasizing 
vision and the visual within Western philosophy. The connection between the visual realm and objective knowledge is one of the 
major issues of debate for the philosophers of the modern age. As Martin Jay points out, this ”ocularcentrism” also signifies a 
certain denigration of language and the other sensual faculties that occur within the classical Greek philosophical tradition as well 
as within British empiricism and the rationalist philosophy of Descartes and his followers. See, Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes – The 
Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (University of California Press 1993), p. 33, 80. For another discussion 
on ocularcentrism see, Catherine Wilson, ” Discourses of Vision in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics”, in David Michael Levin 
(ed.), The Discursive Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy (The MIT Press 1997), p. 117-118.       
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accounts of these developments. However, it still seems to me that this kind of project has to 
be redefined again and again, since the development of the image and its supposed connection 
to objectivity is ridden with tensions and discrepancies. It is by highlighting and analyzing 
these discrepancies and tensions that I think we can achieve not so much a definition, as a 
deeper understanding of what role images and visual records have played and perhaps still 
play in our culture. It is by analyzing these discrepancies that I hope to reveal some insights 
and fresh viewpoints on a subject matter that plays a crucial role in questions concerning our 
relationship with images.
My aim with this thesis is to describe how the concepts of image, vision and the self 
evolved in relation to one another in a specialized scientific and philosophical context. 
Mainly this entailed reductionism in which “the self ” – the role of human psychology, 
our judgement, our attention and our will – was sidestepped. This development in our 
understanding is exemplified in the evolution of the pictorial arts. There is a short step taken, 
from an image as a representation of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface, 
to an understanding of image as a transparent picture, a window towards the world. By 
taking this short step we easily lose the role of the self on the way. I want to show how this 
evolution has given rise to certain misconceptions that still inhabit our discourse on images. 
One metaphor that describes these misconceptions is the idea of the image as a “view from 
nowhere”. Thomas Nagel used this expression as the title of his book on objective knowledge, 
and quite rightly he pointed out that there is a core idea within Western epistemology, an 
understanding of knowledge as something that stems directly from the natural world, 
without being filtered through, or manipulated by, human, subjective and anthropomorphous 
involvement.4 Knowledge is in this sense a kind of information that the object transmits to 
the subject that requires an innocent eye that neutrally observes the natural phenomena. 
However the metaphor, the visual aspect of it, reveals the conceptual confusion at play here. 
A view can only reside in a subject with a faculty of vision. Without eyes, consciousness, 
attention, experience, there are no views. Influenced by Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Baldwin 
makes this point explicit when he writes: “perception is the capacity whereby there is a world 
4   Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press 1986).
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it cannot be just another fact within the world”.5 The view has to reside somewhere, it has 
to be situated in a living eye with a living body with a consciousness, in order to be a view. 
An image always requires a set of eyes in order to become a view. And with the set of eyes 
come a subject and a culture of seeing persons. In this sense it is unclear what the objectivity 
of the image stands for, and what its antithesis is. A visual record or a documentary image 
cannot constitute a view from beyond the anthropomorphic, subjectively situated view of the 
eye inside a human body. Visual records and documentary images are, like all other images, 
already embedded in a culture simply because of the fact that they are images.  
We quite naturally categorize images as either fictitious or documentary, but the basis for 
this categorization is still muddled. It is hard for us to pinpoint why and how we make this 
categorization. The consequences of this difficulty are not merely theoretical. If someone, 
for example the Soviet filmmaker and theoretician Dziga Vertov in the quote above, claims 
that a certain image shows what actually is or was the case, despite what we as perceivers 
of this image think, believe or hold to be true, this gesture gives an immense power to that 
image. Such a conception of images in general, the fact that they can play such a part in our 
discourses, give an immense power to images. Can an image have such powers? Or, is it a 
certain rhetoric that gives them this kind of power? Can an image be a pure record of what 
actually occurred? When we want to answer these questions it is important to keep in mind 
that it is not nature, but the human faculty of vision, judgement and attention, the human 
eye and the human hand, that give images this power. 
There is, I claim, a certain forgetfulness in traditional epistemological philosophy 
concerning the task of the image. In order to reveal this forgetfulness I investigate how 
the faculty of vision is treated in traditional philosophy and specifically how problems arise 
when vision is primarily understood as a relation between a singular subject and an object. 
There is a constant tendency within philosophy to sidestep the fact that vision becomes 
intelligible because we share the visual world with other people. To put it bluntly we need 
not only functioning eyes, but other people in order to see. In this context the role of the 
image becomes meaningful. We share what we see in images. We do not simply share visual 
5  Thomas Baldwin in his introduction to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (Routledge 2005). p. 11.
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impressions or records of the visual, but ways of thinking about and understanding the visual: 
our focuses of attention, perspectives, judgements and emotions. 
One of my main goals is to describe certain temptations within philosophy, temptations 
to keep to certain patterns of thought even when they obviously lead astray. In philosophy 
we tend to conceive of depiction as a mimetic art form, of knowledge as domestication and of 
perception as a reception of data. Although these ways of thinking about images, understanding 
and vision are not necessarily always wrong, they tend to create confusion specially when we 
limit our concepts to these frameworks of thinking. Catherine Wilson brings up this point 
in her reading of Friedrich von Schiller: ”Schiller says, when a philosophical system is trying 
to exclude something essential, that thing will keep breaking in on it, ruining the effort 
and creating problems and inconsistencies”.6 What I find inspiring in Schiller’s point is how 
he describes the structure of certain philosophical problems. He shows how they reside in 
a certain forgetfulness or narrow-mindedness.  In my view the traditional epistemological 
philosophy is forgetful not only, in one case concerning the object, nature etc., and in the 
other case, the subject, attention, judgement, etc., but of the relations between two subjects. 
Images are a way of communicating something between human beings. In communication 
we are not dealing only with subjects and objects, but also with the other, the you, the second 
person. In Part Two of this thesis I will discuss the communicative role of images: the way 
the image caters to intersubjectivity. This will lead us to another understanding of image, 
vision and the self, in which knowledge, even the knowledge that resides in documentary 
images, is born out of dialogue. Influenced by Hannah Arendt’s philosophy, Michael D. 
Jackson describes this kind of shift of perspective in epistemology beautifully: 
Judgment presupposes our belonging to a world that is shared by many. 
Unlike pure reason, judging does not consist in silent Platonic dialogue 
between me and myself, but springs from and anticipates the presence 
of others.7 
 
6  Catherine Wilson 1997, p. 123.
7  Michael D. Jackson, “Where Thought Belongs: An Anthropological Critique of the Project of Philosophy”, in Anthropological 
Theory, Vol 9 (3), 2009, p. 220.
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Unlike classical empiricism, where the observer makes himself a tabula 
rasa in order to register his impressions of the observed, judging requires 
active engagement and conversation – allowing one’s own thoughts to be 
influenced by thoughts of others. Accordingly, judging implies a third 
position, reducible to neither one’s own nor the other’s: a view from in-
between, from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself.8
The image is not like a view from nowhere. It does not work without the influence of a subject, 
neither does it work without the influence of another subject, a subject that is not my self. The 
concept of image builds upon exactly the fact that: “ judging requires active engagement and 
conversation – allowing one’s own thoughts to be influenced by thoughts of others.” Images 
present us with a “third position, reducible to neither one’s own nor the other’s”, it offers us “a 
view from in-between, from within the shared space of intersubjectivity.” This is the meaning 
of the concept of the image that I want to bring forth in this thesis. And, as I will show, 
the concepts of visual record and the documentary image have a specific role in serving this 
purpose of the image. 
If we ask why we tend to limit our thinking into frames that exclude certain fundamental 
aspects of our concepts of image, vision and understanding, the easy answer is that we do so 
because we are indoctrinated through a long history of thought. Philosophy is, in my book, 
to turn ones attention to the familiar, without falling back on our generic lines of thought. To 
do philosophy is to step aside from the usual temptations in our thinking and observe these 
patterns of thought in order to see what they consist of and eventually to see beyond them. 
8  Michael D. Jackson 2009, p. 238.
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Overview of the Genealogy
How can we have knowledge of the world? A common answer within philosophy is; through 
representation. But, this answer does not solve anything, since if our knowledge of the world 
consists of representations, we end up in the same question; how do we have knowledge of 
the representation? The epistemological theories that claim that our knowledge comes about 
through representations entail an infinite regress, the so called homunculus fallacy9. We can 
in this way stop this discussion in its tracks, since the idea of representation as a guarantor 
of our knowledge is easily shown to be misguided. In a sense I could stop my thesis here. 
But, this answer that is commonly pointed out within epistemology is not satisfactory to 
me. It does not end the debate concerning the role of the image. In our visual culture we do 
encounter images that grant us new ways of knowing. Images are able to transform the way 
we understand the world and in this sense they are epistemological entities, not because of 
their ability to reproduce semblances of objects in the world, but because of their agency, their 
power to transform. The problem that I described above is tied up with the idea that images 
carry knowledge because of their representational task. Although I would not deny that images 
have the task of representing the world, I claim that this is not the basis for why they are able 
to give us knowledge.  
In order for an image to communicate knowledge and understanding it has to do 
something further than simply represent an object in the world. In order to find another 
understanding of the concept of image that pertains to the process of making something 
knowledgeable, I emphasize its role in focusing our attention, in cultivating our perceptions. 
At the end of Part One of this thesis I introduce the idea of a cultivation of the visual field. To 
speak of cultivation can be understood in different ways. One way to understand cultivation 
here is, according to a classical view, as a certain relation between the visual and seeing. 
In classical epistemology there is a gap between the natural and the cultural. The visual 
is conceived as natural whereas our faculty of sight is cultural. According to this view the 
9  For an account of the homunculus fallacy see, Anthony Kenny ”The Homunculus Fallacy” in John Hyman (ed.), Investigating 
Psychology, Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein (Routledge 1991), p. 156.
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image is a way of domesticating the visual field, of bringing nature into culture. But there is 
another, more precise meaning that I am after with the expression “cultivation of the visual 
field”. The cultivation that for example the impressionist painters practiced in their painting 
was not a way of domesticating the natural into something subjective and human. It was a 
way of reifying, of paying attention to certain details, it was an art of describing, an art of 
perceiving and attending to something, not primarily an art of thinking or rationalizing. The 
difference here is like the difference between discovering and creating. In order to discover 
something one needs to be attentive, to be able to grasp the ephemeral features of the visual 
world. This is not a practice of making something into something else (representation), but 
of adhering to what is. When we speak of representation, by the very definition of the term, 
it alludes to making a representation in the likeness of something else. When we talk of 
attention we do not construct a counterpart or an ersatz for an existing object in the world, 
we attend directly to that object. The different accounts that the use of these two different 
concepts (representation and attention) will give of our understanding of image, knowledge 
and the self, is an underlying narrative throughout this thesis. In order to understand this 
distinction I will start of by investigating how the image and its role as a representation 
entered epistemology. The visual record and later the documentary image are the primary 
examples in this discussion, since they allude to a neutral form of depiction. The idea of a 
pure visual record is a result of classical epistemology and by showing how this idea is put 
into play, I hope to show how certain discrepancies and tensions enter epistemology and the 
theory of perception.
It is not enough to point out the fallacy in the traditional kind of epistemological theory. 
It has to be pointed out where the temptation to think of knowledge as representation stems 
from, how it comes about. Within Western philosophy and science there is a very persistent 
idea that representation, the go-between between mind and matter, is that which grants us 
knowledge. This idea appears throughout the times and it seems hard to get rid of. In his 
book Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature Richard Rorty traces this idea to the philosophical 
development of the 17th century, to Descartes conception of the mind and Locke’s empiricist 
framework for the concept of knowledge. Rorty points out how the need for epistemology: 
a theory of knowledge, stems from the problem that occurs when we start to understand 
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knowledge as an “assemblage of representations”.10 It is this development of how the concept 
of knowledge became tied up with representation that I want to track down. In Part One 
of this thesis I pose the questions: Why does this concept of image as a go-between appear, 
how does it appear and why is it so persistent? I want to clarify why it is comprehensible, 
through showing it against different backgrounds. This does not rid the idea of the fallacy 
that I pointed out from the start, but it hopefully lets us grasp why we are inclined to fall for 
the temptation of thinking in such paths. 
This fallacy is far from an innocent mistake. It has vast consequences both for our 
concepts, our science and our technology. What I will present in the upcoming chapters is 
a very limited account of some key issues within early modern philosophy. My focus will be 
on concepts related to that of the visual record. The idea of the visual record was preceded by 
similar notions that were part of an epistemological debate about how vision and the visible 
are related to our knowledge. When the metaphysical worldview that was common for both 
Neo-Platonism and Christian theology is taken over by the mechanistic world view of science, 
the visual, the perceivable, the measurable and quantifiable announce themselves as veritable 
foundations for knowledge. It is not by chance that the visual realm becomes the foundation 
for certain knowledge for the philosophers of the 16th and 17th century and consequently it 
is not by chance that an idea of a record of the visual is conceived as an extraordinary aid 
for human understanding even before the technology of photography is completed. On the 
other hand it is not a very solid foundation. During the same period, this ocularcentric 
ideal is constantly under attack. The very same natural philosophers who introduce optical 
aids and visual observations as means of attaining objective knowledge often express their 
doubt concerning knowledge obtained through the senses. Stuart Clark writes: “between the 
Reformation and the Scientific Revolution, vision was anything but objectively established or 
secure in its supposed relationship to ‘external fact’. Many intellectuals, at least – and it is an 
intellectual history that I am proposing here – seem to have been preoccupied precisely with 
questions to do with whether human vision did give reliable access to the real world after all 
– with whether vision was indeed veridical.”11 Along the same lines I want to make clear how, 
10  Richard Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell 1980), p. 136.
11  Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye – Vision in Early modern European Culture (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 1.
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even during the beginning of what we now call the Enlightenment, the idea of an objective 
visual order is constantly scrutinized and the supposed unity, fixity and objectivity of vision 
are never actually taken for granted. In order to explain the concept of visual record I will 
look at the role of vision in this dialectic of knowledge. Its place in the dialogue between the 
natural philosophers of the 16th and 17th century will later have implications for the invention 
of the camera and its role as a recording machine. 
As Jonathan Crary points out, the invention of photography is not only a step forward in 
the venture of producing realistic images, it is also a step in the “immense social remaking of 
the observer”.12 Through its recording capacity photography enables vision in itself to become 
an object for knowledge. The photograph introduces the possibility of sharing what a certain 
person saw at a specific moment in a certain place. When Nicéphor Niépce, in the year 1827, 
manages to fixate the image inside a camera obscura on a pewter plate, a new understanding 
of representation is set on its way. During the time of its invention the philosophical discourse 
on photography will circle around questions concerning the potentially distorting vision of 
the self, about the projections of the self. The camera seems to point out that if our eyes 
necessarily are shackled by the judgment of the self, then the lens of the camera seems to 
be freer, more neutral and less prone to human error, more attentive than the human eye. 
But as in the earlier philosophical discourse concerning the certainty of knowledge obtained 
through sight, also the role of the camera as an objective renderer of the world is constantly 
contested and questioned.  
Photography inaugurates a new form of metaphysics of the self in 19th century attitudes 
towards the image. Paradoxically, photography and the idea of an image that is separated 
from the temptations and intentions inherent in human psychology, stem precisely from a 
breach with a metaphysical philosophical tradition.13 This rupture entails dissociation from 
the Enlightenment conception of seeing as a fundamental form of knowing.  Rather than 
seeing the visual as a sign language of nature, as signs produced by the metaphysical entity of 
12  Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer – On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century (The MIT Press1992), p. 4.
13  For a detailed discussion on this issue see, Marx W. Wartofksy, Models – Representation and the Scientific Understanding (D. 
Reidel Publishing Company 1939), p. 130.
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nature or God as the author of nature, questions concerning the implacable involvement of 
the psychology of the subject in perception become paramount during modernity. As Donald 
Evans points out, this modern view emphasizes the absence of human contribution to the 
image. He quotes Matisse: “The photographer must intervene as little as possible, so as not 
. . . to lose the objective charm which it naturally possesses . . . Photography should register 
and give us documents”.14 
Photography is not the starting point for this idea of image as record. But it serves as 
a convenient model for century old dreams of an image that is not determined by the will, 
actions and conceptions of man. This ideal of a dispassionate observer can be traced back to the 
beginnings of the empiricist turn within science and philosophy. It is important to note that 
this attitude also carries moral undertones. It advocates certain skepticism towards the passions 
involved in sensual perception. As vision is conceived to be affected by the passions of the 
observer the scientific observer must acquire a dispassionate stance. Pamela H. Smith writes:
But how was the philosopher to escape the havoc wreaked by the pas-
sions when he relied so heavily upon the body and the senses and was 
himself immersed in the sensory world? Natural philosophers in the 
seventeenth century sought to confront this problem by constructing 
a “dispassionate Scientia”, that is, certain knowledge based on sensory 
perception that was not adversely affected by passions. This meant that 
a new philosopher would have to construct an “objective” method of 
investigation and distinctive identity in order to remove himself from 
the dangers presented by the immersion in the senses.15 
In this way the visual was seen to be inhabited by a tension. The passions of the observer were 
conceived as something that intervened, disrupted and distorted the potentially pure visual 
information. It is in the context of this strife toward dispassionate observation and a neutral 
14  Donald Evans, “Photographs and Primitive Signs”, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1978/79, New Series – vol. LXXIX, p. 217.
15  Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan – Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (The Univeristy of Chicago Press 
2004), p. 226-228.
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form of representation that the photograph found its role during the beginning of the 19th 
century. In a peculiar way the mechanical camera that records the workings of natural light, 
was conceived to be a superior interpreter of natural phenomena due to its automatic and 
supposedly neutral way of producing images. Or to put it in another way, the supposedly pure 
observation aided by the automatic camera was a means of bringing order into a fragmented 
and hardly observable natural and social world. The chaos or confusion was conceived as 
something that resided in the subject. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison point out, this 
ideology consists of an understanding where freedom of will is sacrificed in order to establish 
a freedom from will.16 In this view, in order to understand nature one had to surpass one’s 
psychological, anthropomorphic attitude and turn oneself into an unbiased observer. This 
modern venture was an attempt to rid science (as science is the realm in which the attempts to 
make objective visual records got on its way) of subjectivity and anthropomorphism. Daston 
and Galison trace the idea of what they call noninterventionist or mechanical objectivity 
to the practices of scientists of the 19th and 20th centuries. The goal for these scientists was 
essentially, as one of the pioneers in the photography of movement, Etienne-Jules Marey 
expressed it, to create a: “wordless science that spoke instead in high-speed photographs and 
mechanically generated curves.”17 Or, as one of Marey’s contemporaries, French astronomer 
Jules Janssen, put it: “the photographic layer very soon will be the veritable retina of the 
scientist.”18 The underlying assumption here was that human language as well as human 
observation are prone to error and distortion whereas the mechanical machine effortlessly 
captures the true qualities of the visual world. This attitude that sought to eliminate suspect 
human intervention signified a striving towards a virtuous science where inward temptations, 
human judgments, theories and intentions were restrained by the automatic workings of 
different mechanical machines. As Michael Renov points out, the 100-year history of 
documentary film is deeply rooted in the modernist project that stems from the ideal of the 
dispassionate observer as a suitable attitude for extracting reliable knowledge.19 If we take 
16  Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, “The Image of Objectivity”, Representations. volume 0, Issue 40 (1992), p. 83.
17  E. J. Marey as quoted in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 1992, p. 81.
18  Jules Janssen as quoted in Christoph Hoffmann, “Representing Difference: Ernst Mach and Peter Salcher’s Ballistic-photo-
graphic Experiments”, Endeavour, volume 33, No. 1, 2009, p. 22.
19  Michael Renov, The Subject of Documentary (University of Minnesota Press 2004), p. 147.
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Renov’s account of the documentary seriously, the venture of creating visual records supports 
a skeptical attitude towards communication, dialogue and human testimony. It reflects 
an attitude in which our reliance upon another, our communication and language, and 
consequently our reliance on ourselves are brought under suspicion.  To briefly describe my 
viewpoint on this matter: the need for social control derives from distrust concerning oneself 
and, consequently, skepticism towards the other. If we take the legacy of the denigration of 
anthropomorphism, human will and subjective psychology seriously, it will introduce a need 
for objectivity and control. In order to understand how things evolved to this point in the 
first place, I want to start by looking at how the visual record was established as a scientific 
tool above others. 
I will begin this inquiry by looking at the discrepancy between the world and the self 
that announces itself in the discourses of natural philosophers and artists of the Renaissance. 
It is in this debate that we find certain theories of vision that will pave the ground for visual 
records and the practice of pure observation. If we trace this practice of observation to the 
beginning of the scientific revolution it becomes clear how it was connected to the emergence 
of a new empirical understanding of science that escalated from the Renaissance onwards. 
The advent of Keplerian optics in 1604 turned a certain understanding of vision on its head. 
Contrary to the Euclidian theory of vision20 that was paradigmatic during medieval times, 
Keplers’ theory indicated that the eye works as an image-making machine, but he also, due to 
the weight of earlier visual theory, held that the eye is a receiver of light rays that inscribe an 
image of the outer world on the retina.21 Here lies a tension between the supposed activity and 
passivity of the eye and subsequently of our mind that will form one of many philosophical 
debates during the 17th century. For the philosophers who discussed Kepler’s optics, 
knowledge seemed to consist of representations that were mediated through the human eye. 
Francis Bacon, Galileo Galilei and John Locke all had an understanding of knowledge that 
required the concept of representation. If our visual faculty, as Keplerian optics, Cartesian 
rationalism and later on Lockean empiricism seem to indicate, is constructed so that our 
20  For an account of Keplers’ theory of vision in contrast to earlier classical and medieval theories see, John Hyman, The Imitation 
of Nature (Basil Blackwell 1989), p. 1-19.
21  John Hyman 1989, p. 7. See also, Catherine Wilson 1997, p. 120.
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eyes provide our minds or souls with visual representations, what then becomes of the self, 
the agent? On the other hand what becomes of nature? Who is the producer or the author of 
these representations? It is this interaction between visual representations and the self that 
will puzzle the scientist and philosophers of the modern epoch.
Another cluster of philosophical questions that was connected to the scientific revolution 
was the discrepancy between subjective perception and the new discoveries within cosmology. 
The heliocentric worldview of Copernicus was counterintuitive. What Kepler and Galileo 
and others discovered by means of observations aided by the telescope was not the kind of 
knowledge that could be attained by the human eye. On the other hand, these discoveries 
were still dependent on visual observation, that is, they still derived from the visual. One could 
then ask: if Keplerian theory of vision is correct, that is, if our eyes serve as image-making 
machines, then what status should be given the apparatuses of telescopes, microscopes and 
the camera obscura? The instrument became paramount in this new direction in science but 
its role was problematic. Pamela H. Smith writes: 
Many natural philosophers, including René Descartes, (1596 – 1650), 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 
– 1716), believed that mathematics must be applied to knowledge gath-
ered through the senses in order to give it the certainty of logical or 
geometrical demonstration. In contrast, Robert Hooke (1635 – 1703) 
argued that because the senses were so faulty, they needed the aid of 
instruments. Hooke took instruments that had been the province of 
mathematical practitioners and claimed that they could be transformed 
into natural philosophical instruments that would help to correct the 
deficiencies of the senses and ultimately lead to certain knowledge.22 
Again there are two seemingly contradictive ideas at play here. One claims that 
knowledge  received through the senses is principally unreliable. In this view (held by 
Descartes, Leibniz and Hobbes) the knowledge of the senses must be rationalized through 
22  Pamela H. Smith  2004, p. 222.
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mathematics and geometry, i.e. the visual must be made into something non-visual 
(mathematics) in order for it to become certain knowledge. The other idea at play claims 
that the senses are too weak, that they require instruments to “see better”. The concepts of 
vision, rationality, knowledge and the instrument are then caught in the crossfire between 
these two ideas. What I want to make clear in the chapters that follow, is that vision 
became a central problem for philosophy due to the different discrepancies that seemed 
to inhabit this faculty. And furthermore, that these discrepancies occurred when vision 
was forcibly connected to different concepts of objective knowledge. This connection was 
made by reducing the subjective faculty of vision, i.e. visual experience, to something re-
presentable, to an image. I will describe this manoeuvre, how it occurs during different 
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1. The Camera Obscura and the 
 Epistemology of Enlightenment
An experiment, showing how objects transmit their images or pictures, 
intersecting within the eye in the crystalline humor. This is shown 
when images of illuminated objects penetrate into a very dark cham-
ber by some small round hole. Then, you will receive these images on 
a white paper placed within this dark room and rather near the hole, 
and you will see all the objects on the paper in their proper forms and 
colours, but much smaller; and they will be upside down by reason of 
that very intersection. These images, being transmitted from a place 
illuminated by the sun, will seem actually painted on this paper which 
must be extremely thin and looked at from behind. […] and the same 
takes place inside the pupil.23
Leonardo da Vinci 
In this chapter I will begin to describe a dynamic in an early-modern Western culture of 
thought that allows a forgetfulness concerning some aspects of visual perception to prosper. 
I will look into the writings of Leonardo da Vinci (1452 – 1519),  Francis Bacon (1561 – 
1626), Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1642), and Johannes Kepler (1571 – 1630), as they all, in their 
own way, are a part of an evolution in which the visual world is charted and  rationalized 
by the help of visual aids and geometrics. This evolution will bring about both conceptual 
and technological inventions. The camera obscura, the perspectivist painting and in the end 
23  This comparison between the camera obscura and the workings of the human eye is one of the earliest written accounts of 
the camera obscura and one of the starting points for this analogy between apparatus and the human eye. Leonardo Da Vinci, The 
Literary Works of Leonardo Da Vinci, Volume 1 (Phaidon 1979), p. 142. That is, one of the first appearances in Western literature. In 
Arabic philosophy the camera obscura had already been used and analyzed by Alhazen (c. 965-1039). The 13th-century philosopher 
Witelo picked up and commented on Alhazen’s optical theory and through him Alhazen’s optics reached the philosophers of the 
Renaissance. Later on, Kepler wrote his Optics as a commentary on Witelo’s optical theory.  See Marx W. Wartofsky, Models – 
Representation and the Scientific Understanding (D. Reidel 1979), p. 228.
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photography can be said to be consequences of this culture’s ways of thinking about vision 
and knowledge. This culture of philosophical empiricism required a concept of visual record 
and all these inventions answered to that need in slightly different ways. In investigating 
the premises for the evolution of the visual record, I want to bring about an understanding 
of both the rich, creative and prosperous scientific, artistic and philosophical revolution that 
was named the Enlightenment, and the downside of this development: a certain denigration 
of subjective experience and intersubjective communication that had its consequence in a 
confused theory of perception and epistemology. The first of the pivotal inventions of visual 
recording, the camera obscura, entered the intellectual discourse of Western philosophy 
in the writings of Leonardo and became immensely significant with Kepler, Locke and 
Descartes. The discourse around this device serves as a starting point for this genealogy of 
the concept of image. 
The camera obscura played an essential part in the artistic and scientific revolution of 
early modernity. It served as an analogy and in some cases even as a model for the workings 
of the human eye and vision. The camera obscura seemed to explain how our vision comes 
about and how our perception works. Furthermore, it became a device that served as an aid 
for observation. Already during the Renaissance, the camera obscura was used to paint or 
draw copies of projections inside its chamber. This practice was carried out by artists such 
as Leonardo da Vinci in order to discover ways of reproducing a correct representation of 
three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface. Here it is important to be specific. 
Leonardo did not use the camera obscura in order to copy the natural world. He used it as 
an instrument that helped him deconstruct the workings of perspective and light.24 It was 
a scientific practice in which the artist tried to unveil the geometrical qualities of a three 
dimensional corporeal world in order to reproduce a semblance of three-dimensionality on 
a flat surface.
The camera obscura enabled artists and scientists to isolate a piece of the world in 
order for them to observe, scrutinize and explore its visual qualities. What they actually 
observed in these kinds of cases was of course not the actual world, but images. As the 
24  Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing – Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (John Murray 1983), p. 30.
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practices of observation that were introduced in science by early empiricists such as Francis 
Bacon and Thomas Hobbes required a translation of objects and natural phenomena to a 
set of measurable and quantifiable qualities, the image inside the camera obscura served 
as a convenient aid for this kind of enterprise. It gave rise to an idea of a natural image 
that helps the scientist to focus on the significant qualities of the natural world. This 
reduction of the concept of image introduced a new set of philosophical problems. It led 
to a conceptual confusion concerning the status of the image. Images are producers of our 
experience, our concepts and our language in the sense that they help us conceptualize our 
visual world. We acquire knowledge through the workings of images. But at the same time 
images are also products of our conceptualization. Our relationship with images is a two-
way street. What the empiricist paradigm often tended to turn a blind eye to, was the way 
in which images are products of our conceptualization, our judgement and our attention. 
This confusion appeared when the reduction and abstraction of empiricism was, so to say, 
swept under the carpet. When the scientist first chose a set of qualities, usually the size 
and the shape of an object, and then made a representation of the object by emphasizing 
or extracting these measurable qualities, he sometimes mistook the result of this reduction 
for the essence of the object. In this way the confusion was in many cases connected to a 
specific kind of self-deception. As I will show, this uncertainty concerning the status of the 
image was necessarily neither more nor less confused than our contemporary conception, 
but the confusion was due to quite different factors than our present difficulties with the 
concept of image. 
The unclear status of the image emanated from classical theories of vision. The aim of 
ancient visual theory was primarily to defend a mechanical or causal theory of perception. 
As John Hyman points out, this understanding has its origin in the conceptual paradigm 
of ancient philosophy in which the tactile was regarded as the primary form of perception. 
From the beginning this was due to an understanding in which perception is impossible 
without physical contact. The fact that we, through vision, are able to discern the qualities 
of a certain object at a distance without being in actual contact with it, posed a problem for 
this theory. As vision seemed to deviate from this principle in subjective experience some 
kind of explanation was required. The most common solution was to introduce the concept 
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of the image as a mediator between the object and the perceiving subject.25 For Democritus, 
arguably the first empiricist, active during 5th and 4th century BC, objects emitted go-betweens 
that were received by our senses. The ear received sounds, the nose received smells, the 
tongue tastes and the skin heat, coldness and pressure. The go-between of vision consisted of 
a thin film of atoms arranged in the shape of the object. In this way the visual go-between 
was something that left an imprint on the eye, that is, vision was not primarily optical, but 
tactile. It was like a tablet of wax on which the objects in the world imprint their patterns via 
corporeal go-betweens. The subjective experience of vision was relegated to the status of a 
kind of phantasm, a mere appearance of the world.26 
The paradigm for this causal theory was the experience of touch. It exemplified a 
pure unmediated contact with the world in which the perceiver senses the actual object 
as it is in nature. As Giorgio de Santillana points out, Aristotle, who is later remembered 
as the philosopher who introduced logic and language as the base for understanding and 
knowledge, held that syllogisms can take us only so far. The direct contact with an object 
that is exemplified in the experience of touch, is not relative, it does not give us room for 
alternative interpretations. This characteristic of touch gives us a contact where human 
thought and the natural object of thought coincide. Heat is hot, coldness is cold, and so forth. 
In this Aristotelian view the tactile contact of touch exemplifies knowledge that goes beyond 
mere opinion. It seems to indicate a certainty of knowledge that is less evident in the words or 
signs that we use to signify things. In touch there is no affirming or denying, either we grasp 
an object or we do not, either way there seems to be no room for error or interpretation.27 
This kind of distinction can also be found in Epicurus who held that sense-input can never 
go wrong because the senses are divorced from the power of judgement that belongs to the 
soul. In this view, the errors when they occur, do not occur in the senses, but in judgement.28 
This view was adopted by Descartes, among others. One problem with this understanding of 
knowledge is that the other senses, most prominently that of sight, do not correspond to this 
25  John Hyman, The Imitation of Nature (Basil Blackwell 1989), p. xi-xii.
26   Ibid., p. 3. See also, Marx W. Wartofksy 1979, p. 109.
27  Giorgio de Santillana (ed.) in Galileo Galilei, Dialogue on the Great World Systems, (University of Chicago Press 1957), p. 114.
28  Sandra Rudnick Luft, ”Embodying the Eye of Humanism” in David Michael Levin (ed.), The Discursive Construction of Sight 
in the History of Philosophy (The MIT Press 1997), p. 173 and 176.   
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characteristic of the tactile without friction. In order to be able to keep this theory going the 
go-between of species was introduced. 
Species can be understood simply as that which is specific for a certain object. For classical 
philosophy, that which is specific for an object is represented by some kind of substance that 
passes between the perceiver and object. It is a substance that exists in the world to represent 
the object prior to human language. Contrary to the go-between of language, the species 
shares the nature of the object. It is not produced by the human intellect to signify a certain 
thing. It is produced by nature, and therefore shares the natural qualities of the object. In 
this sense, species are corporeal representations of an object attainable by the senses, but 
beyond human language. Katherine H. Tachau describes the role of species as natural signs in 
medieval philosophy as follows: 
Another way of expressing this causally determined correspondence 
between objects and these veridical mental images (a way that brings 
[Roger] Bacon back to Augustine’s and Boethius’ semantics) is to state 
that the species are “natural signs” (signa naturalia) of their objects. 
These signs can be distinguished from conventional ones established or, 
in Baconian terms, “imposed” (imposita) arbitrarily as are the particular 
significative sounds of particular languages. The distinction lies in the 
fact that, in contrast to those that signify conventionally (ad placitum), 
the relation of intention or species to its generating object is innate, by 
virtue of their shared nature. This relation of natural sign to the object 
that it “signifies” is the nexus of knowing and meaning (significatio).29 
As in the example of knowledge through touch, this theory of visual species is committed 
to explaining an objective form of knowledge. Contrary to our expressions in language, the 
visual species are natural signs, they are not culturally determined like the different languages 
of different cultures. However, here is the root to a certain conceptual confusion. While 
29  Katherine H. Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham – Optics, Epistemology and the Foundations of Semantics 
1250-1345, (E.J. Brill 1988), p. 18. 
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trying to apply the criteria of knowledge that is derived from the directness of touch on the 
sense of sight, a discrepancy occurs. The direct relation between object and perceiver that is 
found in touch has become the relation of object, sign and perceiver in the case of vision. This 
invites the question: how does the sign signify? What Tachau notes in the passage above, 
is that the species are understood as intentional expressions, as if the object communicates 
its meaning through signs. This stands in contrast to a strictly empiricist theory where the 
go-between is postulated in order to explain a spatial causal relation between object and 
perceiver, since the significance of the sign cannot be a matter of spatiality or causality. This 
muddle is one of the innate problems of the empirical or causal theory of perception and 
it will determine the philosophy of perception to come. The fact that the word likeness at 
some point becomes connected solely to visual likeness, is determined by the privileging 
of this sense above the others in Western philosophy and science. As Hyman notes: 
“What Democritus called a likeness (deikelōn) was soon called an image (eidōlōn)”.30 This 
grammatical difference indicates the shift from a tactual to an ocular paradigm of perception. 
This is one of the reasons why vision became a central problem for philosophy in the first 
place. It introduces questions about how signs can communicate knowledge. Here we are 
dealing with two very different concepts of knowledge: one that is objective and certain, the 
other that is relative and inferred. The relation between these two epistemic concepts is still a 
source for puzzlement in philosophy. I will now look at the origins of this dialectic in Francis 
Bacons philosophy.
Distance and the Abstract – The Problem of Inference
The period during which Francis Bacon writes his New Organon is one of the starting-points 
for the new hierarchy of the senses. The distance that is required for vision as well as its abstract 
character both play a part in this order since these factors serve the new scientific methods 
of observation that evolve during this time. Furthermore, the geometrical understanding 
30  John Hyman 1989, p. 3.
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of vision that is constructed in the theories of Euclid and, later, Alhazen31 serve the same 
purpose. The period of experiment and observation that gave us Copernican, Galilean and 
Keplerian cosmology was a time when the doctrine of Aristotelian logical categorizing of the 
world was tested by observations and experiments. The results inexorably indicated that the 
cosmology of the medieval Christian scholastic philosophers and of the ancient Greeks was 
inaccurate. 
The new hierarchy of the senses was based on a shift in the understanding of the relationship 
of touch and vision. The shape of an object is perceivable by both touch and vision. Therefore 
these two senses often competed over the status of the primary sense. One reason for this 
division of the five senses was that sight and touch seemed to correspond with each other, 
whereas the other senses seemed hermetically sealed from one another. Francis Bacon, who 
can be regarded as a 16th century follower of Democritus, although he advocates a completely 
conversed hierarchy of the senses, expresses this view in his New Organon.32 He writes: 
It is evident that sight holds the first place among the senses, as far as 
information is concerned; and so this is the sense for which we must 
first find aids. There appear to be three kinds of aids: either to see 
what has not been seen; or to see further; or to see more accurately or 
distinctly.33 
These factors pertain primarily to sight, and secondly to touch. These 
two senses are informative in a broad way about ordinary objects; 
whereas the other three barely give any information except directly and 
about objects peculiar to each sense.34
31  Contrary to Euclid, Alhazen’s (965-1039 AD) theory of vision postulates that the eye receives light rays that are emitted by the 
object rather than the eye sending out visual rays towards the object. This does not however constitute any fundamental difference. Al-
hazen’s account leads later on to Kepler’s optical theory. The spatial and geometrical emphasis is the same as in the theory of Euclid. 
Both accounts contribute to a rationalization of subjective perception. See John Hyman 1989, p. xii and 5-6.
32  Francis Bacon, The New Organon, (Cambridge University Press 2002), p. 45-47.
33  Ibid., p. 171.
34  Ibid., p. 173. 
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Note how Bacon emphasizes that the other senses (smell, hearing35, taste) perceive things 
directly, whereas sight and touch are senses that are informative. That is, they have access, not 
only to a direct contact with the object, but also to some kind of information about the object. 
Here the requirement of distance peculiar to sight is not considered to be a problem, but an 
advantage. To understand this correctly we have to distinguish between two different kinds 
of distance. Firstly, vision, unlike touch, is not possible without distance. Vision requires 
light and, therefore, it is the sense for which distance is essential. If we place a finger upon 
our eye we fail to perceive it visually (and begin to perceive it tactually). In this way, vision 
differs from touch as it requires distance while touch requires contact. The second point deals 
with what could be called the distance of abstraction. In Bacon’s epistemology, information is 
something that exists for both touch and vision, whereas the lower senses of smell, taste and 
hearing36 perceive things directly. In this latter case information signifies a kind of inference 
and conceptualization that can be made through vision and touch. He notes that changes 
in matter, for example that of a liquid that is vaporized, can be understood tangibly because 
of the slight loss of weight that occurs. This phenomenon is also perceived by vision, in the 
emission of fumes or similar processes. Another example is that of the rusting of metals, in 
which change in matter is perceivable both by touch and vision, since both the colour and the 
shape of the surface is altered in oxidation.37 
These two senses are capable of tracking changes in nature, therefore being of the 
utmost importance for the natural sciences. But it is important to note that for Bacon, the 
actual causes of change in nature are dependent on spirits that inhabit different materials; 
and these spirits are not visible in themselves. The change that is perceived is a clue to the 
causes that are imperceptible. In this sense, Bacon’s empiricism is dependent on sense-
experience, but sense-experience is only a means of grasping occurrences that are beyond 
the perceivable.  
35  In this passage Bacon strays from his general understanding of the senses. Usually he refers to hearing as the second sense. 
36  This is specifically a Baconian hierarchy of the senses. Other contemporaries such as Leonardo held that hearing was the other 
candidate for the higher conceptual senses together with vision, for quite understandable reasons. See, Leonardo, The Literary 
Works of Leonardo Da Vinci, vol. I, p. 367.
37  Francis Bacon 2002, p. 173.
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He distinguishes between two kinds of shortcoming in the senses. There are cases in 
which the actual occurrence is not perceptible at all, and cases in which they are perceptible, 
but the human senses are too weak to distinguish what is going on. In the latter case, different 
visual aids are prescribed in order to help us get to the core of causes in nature.38 This leaves 
in hand a world view in which a superior observer with a more powerful sense perception 
could understand the world more clearly. For example, Bacon claims that our tactile sense is 
too weak to perceive small shifts of temperature. In such cases a thermometer can show that 
the cause for the melting of a piece of wax is a slight increase in temperature, imperceptible 
to the touch of the skin.39 Due to our weakness of sensitivity, some causes in nature, although 
perceptible, are overlooked. Here a contradiction occurs, since, on one level, for Bacon, 
humans err because of the weakness of our senses, but in a more fundamental sense humans 
err because of the anthropocentrism of our way of understanding. Bacon writes: “For errors 
of the senses should be assigned to the actual investigations of senses and the sensible; with 
the exception of the great error of the senses, that they set the outlines of things by the 
pattern of man, not of the universe; which can only be corrected by universal reason and a 
universal philosophy.”40 So on one level, our shortcomings in science depend on the weakness 
of our sense perception, but on the other hand they stem from a misguided trust in sense 
perception. This latter form of deception does not derive from perception per se, but from 
human judgment that plays a necessary part in perception. Bacon sees it as a human trait to 
infer or interpret things wrongly or distortedly because of our psychological disposition to 
find order, coherence and unity in nature. He writes:
The spirit of man (being an equal and uniform substance) presupposes 
and feigns in nature a greater equality and uniformity than really is. 
Hence the fancy of mathematicians that heavenly bodies move in per-
fect circles, rejecting spiral lines.41 
38  Ibid., p. 174. 
39  Ibid., p. 125.
40  Ibid., p. 178.
41  Francis Bacon, “On the Dignity and Advancement of Learning” in Spedding, Ellis and Heath (eds.) The Works of Francis Bacon 
volume 9 of 15 (Houghton, Mifflin and Company 1882), p. 99. (Forgotten Books 2010)
<http://www.forgottenbooks.org/info/9781440040917>
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So the tension actually exists between the universe or nature, as it exists within itself, and our 
human ways of interpreting it as a union rather than as fragmentary, order rather than chaos. 
In this tension the senses play the peculiar role of the go-between. 
With this in mind Bacon, although he advocates a certain skepticism toward sense 
perception per se, still places touch and vision before the other senses. These two senses seem 
to correspond with each other in that they perceive the same aspects of the same occurrence, 
whereas the other senses cannot grasp this change that occurs in matter. The reason why 
touch in Bacon’s case is not relegated to a lower class of senses is that it shares certain qualities 
with vision. We can feel as well as see the shape of a cube, whereas we cannot smell, hear 
or taste it. This union between touch and vision is what makes the Baconian categorization 
of the senses possible. In this way, touch and vision can maintain a distance that, according 
to Bacon, is required for the understanding of change in nature through observation. The 
interaction between these two senses permits a kind of inference that seems impossible for 
the other senses. In this way, the visual faculty that was problematic for Democritus due to 
its abstractness had become virtuous for Bacon because of the same quality. 
Here we are dealing with two quite different approaches to objectivity. The first 
one considered the sense of touch as a paradigmatic example of the objective, due to its 
direct contact with the object in the world. The second account deals with quantifiability, 
measurability, observation and vision as bases for objectivity, since they differ from 
discursive, anthropomorphic, knowledge. Both can be understood as a reaction against 
the logical doctrine in Aristotelian philosophy42, but at the same time these two accounts 
of objectivity stand in contrast to one another. The rupture in the paradigm of perception 
signifies a move from emphasizing the literal likeness of object and idea in touch, to emphasis 
on the inference of vision. The confusion that occurs in theories of vision during this time 
is based on the inability to distinguish these two concepts of knowledge from each other. 
Whereas the first emphasizes the corporeality, the contact and the directness of touch, the 
second one emphasizes the abstractness, the conceptuality and the distance of vision. The 
42  Giorgio de Santillana in Galileo 1957, p. 16, n. 8.
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tactual paradigm of perceptual theory cannot explain vision at all. But Bacon’s account of 
vision, although it accepts vision as a proper or even superior form of knowledge, is still held 
down by the confused idea of sensual experience as something beyond human language and 
understanding. He writes: “And when a sharper understanding, or more careful observation, 
attempts to draw lines more in accordance with nature, words resist”.43 He expresses a certain 
skepticism towards human language, since language is distorted by judgment: by the will 
and the emotions of the subject. While words create abstract or synthetic categorizations 
of the natural world and its phenomena, vision dissects nature: “But it is better to dissect 
nature than to abstract; as the school of Democritus did, which penetrated more deeply into 
nature than the others”.44 In this sense Bacon does not know on which side of the fence he 
should stand. He wants to keep the Democritean epistemological theory going, but at the 
same time he seems to miss that however he wants to go about this issue, his understanding 
of the union between vision and touch inevitably requires human judgment. Dissection of 
nature by the means of visual observation is no less dependent on human judgment than is 
its logical categorization through language. This problem stems from the fact that neither 
the Democritean, nor the Baconian theory of vision, are actually committed to giving an 
explanation of vision. Their commitment is to objectivity, to a form of certain knowledge 
beyond human judgment. 
 
The Geometry of the Senses: The Linear Perspective
During the mediaeval period a hierarchy was established based on the classical Greek 
geometrical theory of vision. The bond between geometry and vision seemed to indicate that 
this sense had another thing going for it than did the, so called, lower senses. The question 
that appears here is, as Hyman notes; “why is there a geometry of vision, but no geometry 
of smell or taste?”45 This question arises, according to Hyman, from a confusion between 
43  Francis Bacon 2002, p. 48.
44  Ibid., p. 45.
45  John Hyman 1989, p. 66.
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vision and visibility. The Euclidian theory of vision postulates that our eyes emit (instead of 
receive) light rays in the form of a cone. Objects situated at the base of this visual cone (think 
of the light field of a flashlight) are visible whereas everything that falls outside of this circle 
remains invisible. In this way the circular visual field is projected onto the world by both eyes. 
That which is visible is in this case determined by the angle of the cone and the position of 
the perceiver, and therefore vision becomes a spatial matter. What is omitted in this theory of 
vision is judgment: the understanding and the knowledge, the memory and attention of the 
perceiver. What is gained is a completely objectified theory of vision which can be explained 
spatially and therefore geometrically.46 
The image serves as a fruitful model for this geometrical theory of vision, but not any 
kind of image will do. The linear perspective that is the basis for Euclidian theory of vision 
will also become paradigmatic for the pictorial arts during the early Renaissance. For this 
way of constructing the visual picture-plane, it is essential that the position of the eye is 
known.47 The perspectivist picture positions the viewer of the picture spatially at the point of 
the position of an imagined eye. This constructed point of view, necessary for perspectivist 
painting, is fixed in its place. It is not a moving eye in a moving body, but a single fixed eye, 
or as Svetlana Alpers interprets it, a dead eye.48 Along the same lines, Erwin Panofsky points 
out that the perspectivist painting tacitly assumes that we see with one fixed eye, and that the 
cross-section of the two-dimensional picture plane (illustration: 1.1), accurately represents 
46  Ibid., p. 67.
47  Suren Lalvani describes how this way of constructing images was put into practice as early as 1425 in Florence by Fillippo Brunel-
leschi: “On a small ‘half-braccio’ square panel, Brunnelleschi painted the Baptistery, the piazza in front of it and familiar landmarks on 
either side, from a point within the central portal of the cathedral opposite of the Baptistery. The painting itself, as Edgerton points out, 
would have been copied from a reflection on a mirror positioned in the very same place. The mirror, serving as a base to Brunelleschi’s 
“visual pyramid, would show all the lines of the piazza converging onto points identical with the optical plane, thus enabling him to 
establish the vanishing point which he then transferred in the form of a dot to the same location in the square panel. Once the paint-
ing was completed, Brunelleschi drilled a small hole through the back of the panel in the same position as the centric point. We may 
then assume that he asked volunteers to stand in the same position, within the central portal of the cathedral opposite the Baptistery, 
and instructed the volunteer to hold the painted panel in one hand, and peer in a monocular manner through the back of the panel at a 
mirror held in the other hand directly in front of the panel which reflects the painting. One may imagine that the mirror was lifted up 
or dropped down at one moment revealing the Baptistery, and at another moment the reflection, thus rendering the illusion significant 
[…] .” Suren Lalvani, Photography, Vision, and the Production of Modern Bodies, (State University of New York Press 1996), p. 3.  
48  Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 36.
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our optical impression.49 That is, if we take the perspectivist painting to be aiming at correct 
representation of how we actually see. 
1.1 Leonardo’s picture plane50
 
It may at first seem like a relatively unproblematic assumption that the Renaissance 
perspectivist painting represents quite accurately how we see the world, but if we take this 
literally it becomes a very bold reduction. Alpers points out that Kepler, who advocated such a 
reduced understanding of sight, actually constructed a de-anthropomorphized theory of vision 
in which what we see consisted of pictorial representations. She writes: “He stands aside and 
speaks of the prior world picturing itself in light and colour on the eye.”51 In this a priori 
pictorial theory of vision, the visual as it exists in subjective experience is abandoned. This 
theory cannot, for example, account for what is going on when I search for a pair of scissors 
that are in front of my eyes. My attention to certain objects, my reaction to distractions etc., 
are not dependent on my position in a certain space. The ways in which things are significant 
or meaningful is ignored in this theory of perception. How we see, the many ways in which 
we observe, view and gaze, is reduced to a question of what patterns we see. Optics becomes 
the core of visual theory. In this theory of the objective vision of the single unmoving eye, the 
camera obscura becomes an even better model of vision than the actual human eye. But to 
49  Erwin Panofsky, Perspective as Symbolic Form, (Zone Books 1991), p. 28-29.
50  Image taken from Leonardo Da Vinci, The Literary Works of Leonardo Da Vinci (Phaidon 1979).
51  Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 36.
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be fair, this geometrical theory of vision was not designed in order to explain human vision. 
It had several more specific purposes. The theory served as a foundation for perspectivist 
painting. Furthermore, it was constructed in order to help along the rationalization of visual 
space so that observations could be standardized within astronomy. 
Galileo’s and Kepler’s observations, aided by the first telescopes, gave firm evidence of 
a cosmological order that was not geocentric. Nor was it fixed and finite, but constantly 
moving and infinite. The telescope gave the observer access to things that were too distant 
to be perceived by unaided sight. Here the telescope amplified vision’s capacity to perceive at 
a distance. Galileo notes that if Aristotle had had access to a telescope he would have been 
forced to reevaluate his doctrine of logical reasoning, since: “we, by the telescope, are brought 
forty to fifty times nearer to the heavens than Aristotle ever came; so we may discover in 
them a hundred things that he did not see […].”52 This indicated that observation should be 
considered superior to inner contemplation. In this view nature (or God) has a reasoning 
of its own that is not necessarily graspable by human comprehension, but peculiarly, by 
visual observation in connection to geometry. This was not only an abstract philosophical 
conclusion. Geometry played a fundamental role during this period since it was crucial for 
the understanding of the universe. Nature, the way that it exists prior to human experience, 
was conceived as a mathematical order. Geometry was not seen as something applied onto 
the chaotic phenomena of nature or the universe. It was the language of nature that existed 
irrespectively of human involvement. Cosmology signifies precisely this, a harmonious order 
of nature that exists independently of human understanding.
We have to note that the philosophers of ancient Greece, the medieval scholastics and the 
natural philosophers at the beginning of the modern age, were all system builders. Despite 
their internal disputes and quarrels they were all committed to a common project. If we look 
at the examples of Galileo and Bacon, they were both committed to a theory of nature as 
harmonious order, a cosmology. For them nature was not a chaotic rubble of occurrences, but 
52  Galileo’s understanding is that two contradictory doctrines emanate from Aristotle; one that holds that the senses give us access 
to the correct knowledge of the world and the other that holds that reason and logic are the base for correct knowledge. Galileo 
concludes that in the light of his discoveries, the former doctrine has shown its merits whereas the latter one should be abandoned. 
Galileo Galilei 1957, p. 59 and 66.
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a system with an internal logic and with, as I explained above, a reasoning of its own. 
The threat against cosmology was an internal one. It stemmed from the empirical 
observations of the movement of the planets. The Aristotelian world view held that cosmos 
has the Earth as its centre. It is a finite order in which a finite set of planets and stars 
all orbit around one centre, the earth. This view changes radically during the 16th and 
17th centuries. What Galileo and his contemporaries discovered, was not only mistakes, 
discrepancies or distortions in the Aristotelian cosmology, but a universe that is potentially 
completely decentralized. The unnerving discovery was not only that of the sun as the centre 
of our solar system or that of earths’ roundness, but something much more frightening to 
an scientific sentiment, that there is not one, but several, possibly an infinite number of 
centres in the universe. This entails that there is no given set of directions, no given up, 
down, left and right, in the universe, since there is no given centre.53 In order for there to 
be a science at all, Galileo had to find something to latch on to, something that is constant 
and rule-governed in a potentially infinite universe. What he grasps on to is the circular 
motion of the planets. This seems to be a constant that cannot be questioned. In this way 
geometry is that which keeps a belief in a cosmology alive, since it seems to be the only 
olive branch to latch onto if all preconceived rules of previous theories have to be thrown 
out of the window due to the new discoveries.54 Later on Kepler discovers that, contrary 
to Galileo’s theory, the planets actually orbit elliptically. But in a way this still seems to 
confirm that geometry actually is the key to a cosmological understanding of the universe, 
since it is precisely with the help of geometry that Kepler could correct Galileo’s mistake.55 
The example above might seem out of place in the context of a discussion of pictures 
and artifacts. But if we want to understand why vision, objectivity and geometry were 
linked together during this period, it is important to note that this union was established 
in order to dissolve an underlying impulse towards philosophical skepticism. It is exactly 
this skepticism that Bacon grants some merit in his criticism of the human disposition of 
53  Democritus and Epicurus had already come to similar conclusions. See Giorgio de Santillana in Galileo 1957, p. 48, n. 46.
54  Giorgio de Santillana in Galileo 1957, p. 23 and 44.
55  Alexandre Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution, (Methuen 1973), p. 225.
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seeing ‘too much’ order in nature. The possibility of an open universe called for some kind of 
objective fundament. In this sense the understanding of geometry as the actual language of 
nature does not seem that far fetched. In Galileo’s view there can be no discrepancy between 
natural and human reason in mathematics.  The point where natural reason coincides with 
human understanding is in arithmetic and geometry. These certain sciences are, for him, 
objective in the sense that when one grasps a mathematical proposition this understanding is 
analogous to that of nature.56 Here we have a similar notion of knowledge as in the case of the 
objectivity of touch that Democritus advocated. For the atomists, the human idea coincides 
with the natural object in the experience of touch, whereas in Galileo’s epistemology natural 
(divine) understanding coincides with human understanding when we grasp geometry. In 
the first case the “grasp” is literal, in Galileo’s case it is abstract and metaphorical. 
The Metaphorical Eye
This heavy legacy of the unity of image, vision and objectivity is a fertile breeding ground for 
the pictorial arts. On the other hand, the emphasis on a natural order brings manufactured 
artifacts under suspicion. Galileo expresses this in a comparison between a statue by 
Michelangelo and a living man: “but what is it in comparison to a man made by nature, 
composed by so many exterior and interior members,  of so many muscles, tendons, nerves, 
bones, which serve to so many and sundry motions? But what shall we say of the senses, 
and the powers of the soul, and, lastly, of the understanding?”57 Although Galileo regards 
Michelangelo as one of the finest artists of his time, he still holds a Platonic skeptical view 
on the arts as a whole. In comparison the work of art is always inferior to the natural object. 
The arts are in this case relegated to a practice of making semblances that require no real 
knowledge or understanding of the actual objects.
One thing that still gave the pictorial arts an advantage during this period was that the 
image seemed to be a better go-between than that of language. Leonardo expresses this as 
56  Galileo 1957, p. 114.
57  Ibid., p.112.
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follows: “Now tell me which is the nearer to the actual man: the name of man, or the image 
of man. The name of man differs in different countries, but his form is never changed but 
by death.”58 Here Leonardo counters Platonic iconoclasm by pointing out that, if we have 
to deal with appearances, then the image is at least an appearance that can portray qualities 
of objects that stem from the objects themselves, whereas language is dependent on cultural 
background, dialect and human judgement. In this sense the renaissance artist was not an 
artist in the contemporary meaning of the word. To depict forms as they appear in nature was 
a scientific practice. The geometrical field of vision that was introduced by Euclid became a 
basis for this scientific practice of the artist. Erwin Panofsky describes the role of perspective 
in renaissance art: 
For not only did it elevate art to a “science” (and for the Renaissance that 
was an elevation): the subjective visual impression was indeed so far ra-
tionalized that this very impression could itself become the foundation 
for a solidly grounded and yet, in an entirely modern sense, “infinite” 
experiential world. […] The result was a translation of psychophysi-
ological space into mathematical space; in other words, an objectifica-
tion of the subjective.59
For Leonardo the concept of the image was immensely important, not only because of his 
practice as a painter, but because it seemed to explain the contact between the world and 
the subject. In his conception of vision Leonardo reveals that he is still firmly influenced by 
medieval theory in which images occur as an effect of transparent radiation that is mediated 
through the illuminated atmosphere between the object and the eye.60 Along the lines of 
Alhazen’s theory61, for Leonardo, the object projects light-rays in the formation of a pyramid 
58  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 368.
59  Erwin Panofsky 1991, p. 66.
60  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 135.
61  Alhazens work was commented upon by Witello during the 13th century. Later on Kepler based his works in optics on the work 
of Witello. See, Marx W. Wartofsky 1979, p. 228, n. 1.
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whose apex is at the iris of the eye. The iris inverts these rays so that they can form an image 
of the object inside the eye. This radiation that creates images is emitted from every object, 
even from the eye. This results in a, from a modern perspective, exotic theory in which the 
illuminated atmosphere is full of images transmitted between the objects.62 Every object that 
projects an image of itself is also able to receive images. In order to exemplify this phenomena 
Leonardo uses the analogy of two mirrors that are placed opposite of each other. The endless 
regression of images that occurs in the reflection of the mirror is an analogy for every object’s 
relationship to every other object. He writes: 
Thus, by this example [of opposite mirrors], it is clearly proved that 
every object sends its image to every spot whence the object itself can 
be seen; and the converse: That the same object may receive in itself all 
the images of the objects that are in front of it. Hence the eye transmits 
through the atmosphere its own image to all the objects that are in front 
of it and receives them into itself, that is to say, on its surface, whence 
they are taken in by the common sense, which considers them and if 
they are pleasing commits them to the memory.63 
These images that Leonardo refers to are invisible, except for certain devices like the mirror, 
the camera obscura and the human eye. Only through the workings of the visual faculty 
of our consciousness (our sense) do they appear visual. This faculty also disregards certain 
62  In his writings Galileo reveals a similar understanding of vision. He holds that the telescope actually mediates images of the 
stars to the observer. He noticed that stars, when observed at night by the naked eye, our unaided natural vision, seem proportionally 
bigger than when observed through a telescope. That is if one compares the size of the star as it should appear for the naked eye if 
one were to take into account the magnifying capacity of the telescope. Galileo explains this by holding that the impression of the 
planet in natural vision is distorted by the workings of the human eye. The moisture in the eye adds an effect to the visual impres-
sion. This distortion is neutralized by the telescope. See, Harold I. Brown, “Galileo on the Telescope and the Eye”, in Journal of 
the History of Ideas, volume 46, No. 4 1985, p. 487-510. In this comparison between the image attained by unaided vision and the 
image of the telescope, the human eye is conceived as a mechanical device, an inferior machine compared to the telescope. Another 
peculiar thing that happens in this comparison is that vision, the way we see, is reduced to images. In this case one could ask: how 
can an image occupy more or less space on the retina? We do not see images on our retinas and are not able to compare them with 
other images. Since we do not perceive the world as images the question of what space they occupy is misguided. I will discuss this 
fallacy in depth in chapter 6.
63  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, § 65, p.138.
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images that aren’t aesthetically pleasing. Here the image is understood as if it existed a 
priori in nature. A similar distinction was also part of the medieval theory of light. The 
term lumen was used to signify geometric rays that were reflected and refracted when light 
travelled between objects. This lumen existed whether it was perceived by the human eye 
or not, whereas lux was used as a term to indicate light as it appears in human vision of the 
eye. Colour was also considered to be a quality of light that was solely attainable by the 
human eye, on top of the geometrical qualities of form and outline that existed in lumen.64 
Colour was then a quality that existed only for the human eye, whereas form also existed 
for other senses and prior to human perception. This issue is complicated since again a 
confusion between human judgment and the qualities of the objects as they exist a priori 
is present. Tachau points out how this division played an essential part in the medieval 
discourse on perception. For Alhazen and Roger Bacon light (lux) and colour were the 
proper objects of vision. These two qualities were attained solely through the visual sense 
organ. Other qualities of the object – distance, position, solidity, shape, magnitude, 
discreteness, continuity, number, motion, rest roughness, smoothness, transparency, 
opacity, shadow, darkness, beauty, ugliness, etc., –required human judgment. In this 
sense, the two purely visual qualities light (lux) and colour were not inferred, but sensed 
directly. Tachau writes: 
Hence, while seemingly claiming without reservation that intentions 
are res imparted by the object, Alhazen in fact suggests at the same 
time that they are in part the conceptual result of mental operations. 
… Alhazen’s concern with describing psychological and epistemologi-
cal processes resulted in an ambiguous status for the intentio.65
What is clear here is that this muddle concerning the status of intention and object, 
judgment and perception is a consequence of the insistence of holding on to the image as 
the visual species.
64  Martin Jay 1993, p. 29.
65  Katherine H. Tachau 1988, p. 15.
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Leonardo’s writings reveal that he does not advocate a theory that requires that corporeal 
species play a part in vision. Instead he speaks of the qualities of light, of illumination and 
radiation as they have taken the place of pressure. But his paradoxical conception of images 
as invisible bears witness of a certain residue from earlier visual theories that were committed 
to the tactile paradigm.  In order to prove that illuminated objects actually project images he 
introduces the afterimage as an example of this phenomenon. He writes:
If you look at the sun or some other luminous body and then shut your 
eyes you will see it again inside your eye for a long time. This is evidence 
that images enter the eye.66 
Here the image is considered to be a trace or an imprint on the eye. For Leonardo this tactile 
aspect is metaphorical, but it still shows the persistent influence of the tactile theory of 
vision.67 The so called afterimage that appears in the eye when looking at an illuminated, or 
in the case of the sun, an illuminating object indicates for him that our eyes function much 
like the camera obscura. It is in the writing of Leonardo that this analogy finds one of its 
earliest expressions. He also notes the inversion of the image that occurs inside the chamber 
of the camera obscura that will become one of the key sources for philosophical confusion 
later on. Contrary to the camera obscura, Leonardo however concludes that our eyes invert 
the light rays emanating from luminous objects twice (illustration: 1.2). Once by the pupil 
and a second time by the crystalline lens and hence we perceive the images inside our eyes 
the right way up.68 
66  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 132. 
67  The understanding of vision as an imprint on the eye was discussed by Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, Augustine, Alhazen and 
Roger Bacon. The experiences of afterimages, dreams, delusions and optical illusions were often explained with this phenomena 
of a lasting imprint on the eye. In this way Leonardo partook in a long tradition of ancient visual theory. See, Katherine H. Tachau 
1988, p. 23.
68  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 144-145.
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1.2 Leonardo’s double inversion69
Later on the falsity of this description was revealed. As Felix Platter (1536-1614) and later 
Kepler discovered, the light rays were not inverted twice, but only once by the lens in the 
cornea. This meant that just like in the camera obscura, the image projected on the retina (the 
back of the eye) was upside down.70 Due to his mistake Leonardo was not occupied with this 
inversion to the same extent as Kepler, Descartes and other philosophers who later dealt with 
this problem. But it was not only because of his belief in the two inversions as an empirical 
fact that Leonardo discarded the problem of the discrepancy between the psychological sight 
of the subject and the a priori image that is captured by the eye. For him there was a clear 
distinction between the eye that works like an optical device and the mind which by its 
intellectual powers regards the world. He writes; “The senses are of the earth; Reason stands 
apart from them in contemplation”.71 Therefore the images inside the eye, however they may 
appear, are completely meaningless without the active contribution by reason. 
What is notable in Leonardo’s thinking is that, contrary to the philosophers that later 
adapted the camera obscura analogy, he did not confuse this device with the mind of the 
observer. Leonardo’s analogy was that of the eye and the camera obscura, not of the mind and 
the camera obscura that Kepler and Locke put forth later on. This difference will, as I will 
69  Image taken from Leonardo da Vinci, The Literary Works of Leonardo Da Vinci, Volume 1 (Phaidon 1979).
70  John Hyman 1989, p. 2-3.
71 Leonardo 1979, vol. II, p. 239.
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show, prove to be significant. For Leonardo the intellectual effort that the painter puts into the 
painting was what made the visual arts virtuous and human. Painting depended not only on 
visual observation, but on discerning, judging and deliberating. These activities depended on 
the judgment of the observer.72 The active mind did not merely observe the images inside the 
eye, it regarded and scrutinized them as well as connected them to other images and contexts. 
Due to the intellectual capacities the mind could grasp the workings of nature, its laws and 
causalities, its history. The proper painter went beyond a mere copying of the world because he 
was able to understand the causalities that constituted the workings of nature. The task for the 
painter was not to copy the objects in nature, but to imitate nature itself, to understand how 
nature produces the visual. This mainly involved two significant aspects, the laws of perspective 
and the laws of shadow and light (chiaroscuro).73 While a sculpture produces an object that takes 
advantage of the light and shade produced by natural light, the painter has to re-produce this 
phenomenon of light and shadow in the painting. While the sculptor imitates the object in 
nature, the painter imitates nature. Leonardo writes: “Painting requires more thought and skill 
and is a more marvelous art than sculpture, because the painter’s mind must of necessity enter 
into nature’s mind in order to act as an interpreter between nature and art, it must be able to 
expound the causes of the manifestations of her laws …”.74  
There are two things I want to extract from this reading of Leonardo. Firstly, he quite 
sensibly considers the camera obscura as a useful tool that helps him understand and 
reconstruct the laws of perspective. This is completely understandable because he is involved 
in the practice of making pictures. This preoccupation with the status of the image and vision 
and their relation to our understanding is logically linked to his practice.
Secondly, Leonardo is still an advocate of the ocularcentric ideology, in that he gives 
vision such an enormous role. As the empiricist scientists after him, he holds that all our 
knowledge originates from perception75 and that there is a clear hierarchy between the senses 
in which vision holds the highest status. But his understanding of vision as a causal process 
72  Ibid.
73  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 94.
74  Leonardo 1979, vol. I, p. 97-98.
75  Leonardo 1979, vol. II, p. 239.
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in which images enter the eye makes this ocularcentric ideology into a muddled theory of 
knowledge and perception. What, I claim, is problematic in this account is that the concept 
of image is redundant in an explanation of our interaction with the world. We do not perceive 
the world as images. Let’s presume that Leonardo’s account was correct: that there actually 
are images floating about in the illuminated atmosphere and that our eye actually is a device 
for capturing these images. How could this theory tell us anything about our psychological, 
subjective experience of vision? These images, whether they exist or not, are not present for 
us as images. This problem is not solved if we, instead of talking about images, use the concept 
of likeness. This would be just as absurd, since how could we determine that the species bears 
a likeness to an object if we only have access to the species (likeness)?
The point being that we are not in contact with likenesses, appearances, images, go-
betweens, ersatzes, simulacra, sensations, sense-data etc. when we are engaged with the 
world in perception, since we, as Merleau-Ponty would have it, do not look at the world, but 
in the world. He writes:
Objective thought is unaware of the subject in perception. This is be-
cause it presents itself with the world ready made, as the setting of every 
possible event, and treats perception as one of those events. For example, 
the empiricist philosopher considers a subject x in the act of perceiving 
and tries to describe what happens; there are sensations which are the 
subject’s states or manners of being and, in virtue of this, genuine men-
tal things. The perceiving subject is the place where these things occur, 
and the philosopher describes sensations and their substratum as one 
might describe the fauna of a distant land – without being aware that he 
himself perceives, that he is the perceiving subject and that perception 
as he lives it belies everything that he says of perception in general.76 
What was called species in medieval philosophy has its counterpart in what was called sensation 
in 18th and 19th century philosophy and psychology, and in that which is occasionally called 
76  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge 2007), p. 240.
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sense-data in contemporary philosophy and psychology. Here it is important to note that 
all these concept share the problematic role of a go-between between mind and matter. 
It makes no essential difference, whether the go-between is situated in the air, in the eye 
or in the brain. As Anthony Kenny puts it: “The interaction between mind and matter is 
philosophically as puzzling a few inches behind the eye as it is in the eye itself ”77.
The distinction, immensely important for my purposes, that Merleau-Ponty points 
out, runs between our actual subjective experience of perception and an objectified, 
rationalized understanding of vision in which a go-between is required. If anything it is 
this hardly articulated distinction that I want to clarify, not only here but in the following 
chapters. As I have shown, there is a very intricate way in which the concept of the go-
between enters philosophy. It is a conceptual construct that aims at explaining inferred 
knowledge, a mediator between nature and judgment. However it does not go together 
with our experience of vision without friction. It is this tension that is the key instigator 
for trouble in Renaissance understandings of nature, vision and record. Therefore this is 
the starting point for my inquiry concerning what our troubles with the concept of visual 
record consist of.
With this I do not want to denigrate the role of the image, quite the contrary. The image 
gives us an opportunity to step away and contemplate, whereas our everyday experience and 
engagement with the world makes such a perspective difficult and in some cases impossible. 
This is what the concept of image means among other things: an opportunity to look at 
the world, not in the world. It is from this circumstance that the concept of image draws 
its significance. It plays an important role in how we conceptualize. But it is not only the 
producer of our experience, our concepts, our language, it is at the same time a product 
of our conceptualization. Whether we talk about actual physical pictures like paintings, 
photographs, films etc. or about inner concepts, they emanate from us, from our actions, 
judgments and memory. The image is a way of making things into external objects for our 
observation. That is, images do not exist a priori in nature. 
77  Anthony Kenny, ”The Homunculus Fallacy”. In John Hyman (ed,) Investigating Psychology, Sciences of the Mind after Wittgen-
stein (Routledge: 1991), p. 157.
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On another level this confusion that takes form in Leonardo’s camera obscura analogy, 
is misleading even in an empirical context. The phenomenon that appears in the camera 
obscura and on the retina, although it is the same optical phenomenon, does not explain 
our visual impression accurately, since the retina is not a passive white sheet of paper but a 
concave organ.78 As Panofsky points out, the first problem, that of the purely geometrical 
discrepancy between retinal image (concave) and perspectival painting (plane surface), was 
already recognized during early renaissance.79 This discrepancy as it was purely a matter of 
the workings of the light-rays on different surfaces could be corrected trough geometrical 
calculations. The same can be said about Galileo’s conception of the telescope. Whether 
we consider the telescope to be a superior or an inferior device compared with the human 
eye, as long as we consider them both to be mechanical devices, the discrepancy between 
them is a purely pre-psychological matter. But the other fact, i.e. the fact that the concave 
surface within the retina80 consists of an organ, a moving organ, inside a living body, meant 
that the eye that Leonardo refers to in his analogy with the camera obscura is, if it has any 
relevance at all, not an actual eye. It is a metaphorical eye. A corresponding discrepancy 
between the empirical and the metaphorical can be found in Richard Rorty’s analysis of the 
Lockean concept of knowledge. Rorty shows how the problems in epistemology run deep 
in philosophy due to two competing and contradictory accounts of what knowledge consists 
of. He writes:
if (like Aristotle and Locke) one tries to model all knowledge on sense-
perception, then one will be torn between the literal way in which part 
of the body (e.g., the retina) can have the same quality as an external 
object and the metaphorical way in which the person as a whole has for 
example, froghood “in mind” if he has views about frogs.81
78  John Hyman 1989, p. 16.
79  Erwin Panofsky 1991, p. 31.
80  It would take a long while before the sensitive layer of the retina was to be thoroughly anatomically examined. From 1840 on, 
it was known that the cones and the rods within that layer react upon light. In this sense the workings of the organ of the retina are 
understood more as a photochemical process than a passive screen. See, Sarah Kofman, Camera Obscura of Ideology (The Athlon 
Press 1998), p. 49.
81 Richard Rorty 1980, p. 146.
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It is this division between knowledge of the senses and conceptual knowledge that is at play 
as a background factor in the discourse on vision and visual instruments. 
I will begin the next chapter with a discussion on John Locke’s epistemology, and 
particularly the analogy that he establishes between human understanding and the camera 
obscura. I will then move on to show how Kepler’s optics is a new starting point for a 
philosophical discourse concerning the relationship between vision and optics. In his optical 
theory of vision, Kepler continues to create theoretical problems when he fails in making 
a tenable distinction between subjective phenomenological experience of vision and the 
objective rationalization of the faculty of vision. By analyzing Kepler’s efforts I hope to show 
how problems caused by a misleading idea of objective vision run deep within philosophy 
and science. 
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2. The Self of the Obser ver and the Deception of Vision
In our study of Anatomy there is a mass of mysterious Philosophy, and 
such as reduced the very Heathens to Divinity: yet amongst all those 
rare discourses, and curious pieces I find in the Fabrick of man, I do 
not so much content my self, as in that I find not, there is no Organ or 
Instrument for the rational soul: for in the brain, which we term the 
seat of reason, there is not any thing of moment more than I can dis-
cover in the crany of a beast: and this is a sensible and no inconsiderable 
argument of the inorganity of the Soul, at least in that sense we usually 
conceive it.82 
Thomas Browne 1643
I pretend not to teach, but to inquire; and therefore cannot but confess 
here again,—that external and internal sensations are the only passages 
I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I 
can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room. 
For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly 
shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external 
visible resemblances, or ideas of things without: would the pictures 
coming into such a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be 
found upon occasion, it would very much resemble the understanding 
of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas of them.83 
John Locke 1690
Ludwig Wittgenstein points out in his Philosophical Investigations: “The concept of the 
‘inner picture’ is misleading, for this concept uses the ‘outer picture’ as a model; and yet 
the uses of the words for these concepts are no more like one another than the uses of 
82  Thomas Browne, The Works of Thomas Browne (John Grant 1927), p. 54.
83  John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Alexander Campbell Fraser (ed.) (Oxford University Press 1894), p. 
211-212.
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‘numeral’ and ‘number’.”84 It is this kind of confusion that occurs in the beginning of the 
Enlightenment in the philosophy of John Locke. It is important to note that, in the quote 
above, Locke actually talks of ideas as pictures. Whether we interpret this literally or 
metaphorically, the idea that our perception consists of pictures is here put into play and it 
becomes dominant during the times. 
What is particularly interesting for my purposes in this often quoted passage by Locke, 
is not only analogy between the camera obscura and human understanding. It is also the 
way in which Locke indicates that the only major difference between these two is that our 
understanding, that is, the empty sheet of paper that our experiences are inscribed upon, 
can fixate these images whereas the camera obscura has no such proficiency. The obvious 
connection between this passage and the photographic apparatus has been highlighted 
in several theoretical contexts. In the next chapter I will discuss this connection between 
empiricist and positivist epistemology and the invention of photography in detail. But for 
now I want to articulate the actual context in which Locke elevates the camera obscura to a 
model for our understanding.85  This is important for my question concerning the genealogy 
of the concept of visual record, since if we, like Locke, conceive the mind as a container 
of images, sensations or sense-data, then we presuppose that our knowledge consists of a 
content, an input, for example in the form of an image, and this is, as I will show, a highly 
problematic assumption. This model will always leave one crucial question unanswered. 
84  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Revised German-English Edition (Blackwell 1998), p. 196e. I will discuss 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between the inner and the outer picture in depth in chapter’s 4 and 6.
85  Locke’s camera obscura analogy is in fact a variation of Socrates’ speculative idea of the soul’s faculty of memory, as a block of 
wax. In Theaetetus, Plato writes: “SOC. Please assume, then, for the sake of argument, that there is in our souls a block of wax, in one 
case larger, in another smaller, in one case the wax is purer, in another more impure and harder, in some cases softer, and in some of 
proper quality. […] Let us, then, say that this is the gift of Memory, the mother of the Muses, and that whenever we wish to remember 
anything we see or hear or think of in our own minds, we hold this wax under the perceptions and thoughts and imprint them upon 
it, just as we make impressions from seal rings; and whatever is imprinted we remember and know as long as its image lasts, but 
whatever is rubbed out or cannot be imprinted we forget and do not know.” Plato, Plato with an English Translation II: Theaetetus, 
Sophist, translated by Harold North Fowler (William Heinemann Ltd. 1952), p. 185-187. What is interesting if we compare Locke’s 
dark room with Socrates’ block of wax is that, again, a tactile imprint has been exchanged for an optical metaphor. Furthermore it 
is important to note that, whereas Socrates’ wax analogy permits a kind of relativity and interaction, different souls contain blocks 
of wax of different size and with different qualities and the impressions are not fixed, they overlap and efface one another, Locke’s 
camera obscura model is a simplified version which indicates that basically all souls are alike, they are blank surfaces on which im-
pressions imprint themselves in the same way.  
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If our knowledge consists of images how do these images signify? Locke’s assumption 
introduces a gap that is problematic. At the same time it is an assumption that has had 
and in many peculiar ways still has a strong foothold in our culture. We still talk of 
knowledge as if it would consist of something, as if it consists of a content: impressions, 
input, information, fact, sensation or sense-data. And in some contexts this way of talking 
will prove confusing. It is this idea of knowledge as content that leads us to think of our 
experience as content, and in this reduction severe philosophical difficulties will follow. 
I will return to this issue throughout this thesis (particularly in chapters 4 and 6). What 
is important for now is to notice how Locke’s epistemology has a changed emphasis as 
compared with the classical epistemology. For Aristotle and classical epistemology in 
general, the process of sense-perception is characterized by the metaphor of an imprint on a 
piece of wax. But in the classical view our experience does not consist of an image imprinted 
in the wax, but of the effect that the external world has on the wax. i.e. the emphasis is on 
the imprint: the process of tactile pressure on our organs.86 For Aristotle the imprinting 
plays the fundamental role in the wax metaphor. Whereas for Locke the observation of 
the imprint is where the important aspect of the metaphor lies. In this way Locke invites 
the idea of a mind’s eye that observes the images in the mind. In this way representation 
becomes a key-factor in epistemology. For Aristotle the wax-tablet is not fundamentally 
a visual or optical metaphor and it does not involve images.87 This distinction reveals the 
difference between the classical paradigm with its concept of a corporeal species that inflicts 
pressure on the eye, and the early modern optical theory of vision in which the image in 
the eye is a projection of light and shadow. 
The Lockean metaphor serves as an answer to the puzzle that is expressed in the quote 
by Thomas Browne.  If we cannot find an organ or an instrument in our body for what 
we call reason, what shall we then make of this “reason”? Browne simply discards his own 
question and postulates that reason is a metaphysical entity that does not reside in the make-
up of the human body. Locke, on the other hand, takes another path and claims that our 
86  Stuart Clark, Vanities of the Eye – Vision in Early modern European Culture (Oxford University Press 2007), p. 14.
87  See, Richard Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell 1980), p. 142-144.
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understanding basically is a container for our sense perceptions. In this sense, our bodies 
contain an organ like the camera obscura. The eye is the sensory organ that most clearly 
corresponds to this analogy and in this way vision is the primary sense in epistemology. It is 
this epistemological theory that will have consequences for the concept of image. According 
to this Lockean line of thought, the state of things manifest themselves in a self portrait of 
nature, an imagined a priori, authorless, objective image that is produced by the workings of 
natural light. As if there would exist a latent, universal image-world against which all other 
images could be compared and verified. Or simply: that our knowledge consists of images. 
Martin Jay describes how this understanding of the mind will gain momentum during the 
Enlightenment. In the following passage Jay quotes Voltaire:
“What is an idea?” Voltaire asked in his Philosophical Dictionary. “It is 
an image”, he immediately replied, “that paints itself in my brain . . . . 
The most abstract ideas are the consequences of all the objects I’ve per-
ceived. . . . I’ve ideas only because I’ve images in my head.”88 
What I want to make clear in this chapter is how this supposed connection between the 
visual realm and the pictorial content of the mind was a construction that emerged with the 
help of several misleading visual theories and metaphors. To understand the central role of 
vision in early modern philosophy one has to start with the actual problems, the discomfort 
that this Lockean concept of vision introduced to philosophy. As I showed in the previous 
chapter, one of the paradigmatic problems in this philosophical discourse was concerned 
with the status of species. Although the philosophers of the 17th century for the most part 
had got rid of the idea of species, they were still stuck with the same general epistemological 
model as their predecessors and consequently with the same uncertainties and similar 
conceptual problems.89 Whether we talk about likenesses floating about in the illuminated 
88  Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes – The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (University of California Press 
1993), p. 83.
89  See, Stuart Clark 2007, p. 2.
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atmosphere or of images imprinted on the retina, the same discrepancy between the world 
and its appearance is present. Both theories conceive of perception, not as a contact between 
the perceiver and the object, but as a contact between perceiver and image, image and object. 
The difference between the theory of species and that of the retinal image is simply a question 
of where the intermediary is situated. In both cases, what I really see is produced in me by 
the influence of an intermediary object. They are foremost causal and empiricist theories 
of vision, they only differ in emphasis on different intermediaries or different stages in the 
causal chain. Both of these theories depend on the concept of mimesis, an understanding 
in which our perception of an object is dependent on a go-between that bears its likeness. 
This mimetic theory leaves out the essential part that the subject with her judgment plays 
in perception. Or more precisely, this theory creates a certain conception of the subject as a 
passive, neutral receiver of input, a dispassionate observer. The camera obscura and its place 
in Kepler’s Optics is a starting point for this kind of theory of vision within philosophy after 
its first appearance in the writings of Leonardo. This device will for different reasons serve as 
a metaphor for an empiricist understanding of knowledge. 
The epistemology of the 16th century entailed a constant quest for finding a form of 
representation that goes beyond human subjectivity and opinion. In this context the idea of 
the species plays the part of a natural sign, an image that descends from the natural object, 
not from our interpretations. As I mentioned earlier, the natural sign had not always been 
conceived as an image. For the atomists, the likeness of species was not primarily a pictorial 
likeness. It consisted of something tactile, a thin film of atoms that entered the eye, as if even 
the eye actually touched the object in nature and as if the object left a trace, an imprint on 
the organ. This theory came with slightly different focuses. Aristotle distinguished between 
form and matter by using the wax-tablet metaphor. The wax adapts the form in the imprint 
produced by the natural object. No matter travels from the object to within the eye, the 
thin film of atoms is only a medium, in-between the object and the organ.90 Furthermore, 
in Aristotle’s view, the wax-tablet is an organ that is conditioned by the medium (that is 
90  Stuart Clark 2007, p. 14.
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conditioned by the object): the organ does not observe the imprint, it (the organ) is the 
surface that is imprinted. In this sense there is no need or place for a conception of a mind’s 
eye in classical theory of perception, neither is classical epistemology concerned with images 
or representations.91 
When the wax-tablet metaphor is exchanged for the camera obscura metaphor, the 
emphasis in epistemology is altered. The camera obscura metaphor indicates that the workings 
of light produce images by themselves, that images occur as a natural phenomenon. The 
impression inside the camera obscura is not a tactile trace, but a projection of light. This new 
focus will help along optics to become the core of visual theory. The task for Galileo, Bacon 
and Kepler, among others, was to gain access to the correct descriptions of nature, Bacon 
writes: “The task and purpose of human Science is to find for a given nature its Form”.92 
They enter a philosophical debate on whether these forms are inaccessible by perception 
or whether we grasp these forms in direct perception. The camera obscura model of vision 
seems to indicate the latter. It tempts us to think of nature as a force that produces images 
of itself in our mind. What the model also brings in is the notion of a minds eye. The organ 
that sees is no longer the surface on which the impression is imprinted, but the mind’s eye 
that observes a visual projection.   
In a sense, this was a very successful model that advanced the sciences and our common 
knowledge of cosmology. The belief in nature’s capacity to present us a given order (when we 
observe it correctly) was an attitude that helped the scientists to find new methods for their 
inquiries. However, the problem with this venture was that they acted as if there were given 
correct descriptions of the world waiting to be discovered. The telescope, the microscope 
and, to some extent, the camera obscura became aids for accessing these descriptions. These 
instruments were needed in order to help natural vision along when certain objects and 
phenomena were too elusive to be grasped through observation solely by the human eye. On 
top of the amplification of the visual faculty, there was another aspect that became important. 
When one looks into a microscope or a telescope, it is as if one were looking at an image 
91  Richard Rorty 1980, p. 144.
92  Francis Bacon, The New Organon, (Cambridge University Press 2002), p. 102. 
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(while one is not). These devices fix a certain view. This is an aspect of their function. This 
is why the camera obscura played such an important role in the imagination of the natural 
philosophers, since even though it does not help one see further like the telescope or closer 
like the microscope, it shares the function of fixating with the other devices. And it is this 
aspect that will prove to be deceptive. The visual aids helped the natural philosophers to 
forget that what they actually accessed in their observation was conditioned by their devices 
and that the devices were conditioned by their inquiries.  
Isaiah Berlin describes this as a core problem for the philosophers of the Enlightenment. 
He mentions Leibniz and Condillac, who were obsessed with the idea that there is one and 
only one structure of reality and that it is a structure that can be described in a purely logical 
language. In this line of thinking there is an idea of an index to reality, a natural order, be it 
a substructure of logics and mathematics or a Platonic metaphysical superstructure. In the 
case of medieval philosophy the idea of species served as model for such an index, whereas 
for Locke the retinal picture played the same part. What is forgotten in this line of thought 
is that descriptions depend on the actual questions that one poses to the universe, that the 
answers that you get are conditioned by your questions.93 This critique will be developed 
within philosophy from Giambattista Vico onward as a countercurrent against the ideals 
of the Enlightenment.94 One of the most devastating arguments against the idea of the 
given is found in Nietzsche. He points out the paradox inherent in this idea, as follows: 
“The greatest of all fables is the one relating to knowledge. People would like to know how 
things-in-themselves are constituted; but behold, there are no things-in-themselves! But 
even supposing there were an ‘in-itself ’, an unconditional thing, it could on the very account 
not be known!”95 It is this kind of blindside in the empiricist attitude that led to a history of 
accumulation of errors within the theory of vision.96 What this theory leaves aside is that 
the likeness of images to a certain object cannot be reduced to a question of what is seen: it 
93  Isaiah Berlin, Against the Current – Essays in the History of Ideas (Oxford University Press 1981), p. 6.
94  Ibid., p. 4.
95  In this passage Nietzsche actually addresses Kant’s concept of the thing-in-itself, but Nietzsche’s point also works as a more 
general critique of a certain, frequent, misconception within philosophy. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance, 
and The Metaphysical Need.” In Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.), Immanuel Kant Critical Assessments (Routledge 1992), volume 1, p. 81.
96  John Hyman 1989, p. xiv.
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is always also a question of how we see, of how we conceive, or understand a certain thing. 
In the end, it is a question of who the observer is, what kinds of questions, goals or actions 
that guide him or her, i.e. a question concerning our relation to the world. Things are not 
like images: by definition, the thing and the image of it are distinct, and therefore the way 
in which we use images to resemble our ocularity or to remind us of it is preconditioned by 
our concepts. As in Nietzsche’s account of the idea of the thing-in-itself, an image cannot be 
unconditioned, the concept of image does not yield to such an understanding. But as I will 
show, this is exactly what Kepler and his followers constructed: an idea of an image that is 
unconditioned by the human subject. 
Kepler writes: ”Since hitherto an Image has been a Beeing of the reason, now let the 
figures of objects that really exist on paper or upon another surface be called pictures.”97 As 
often in philosophy, whether this distinction leads to clarity or obscurity, is determined by 
what we make of it.98 The problematic interpretation of this distinction will lead to an absolute 
understanding of the concept of an image (what Kepler calls picture), that is objective in the 
sense that it is not conditioned by our reason: judgement, memory, passions and subjectivity. 
Against the backdrop of the general development of perspectival painting, we can find a 
context in which this categorization makes sense.  If we look at a certain development within 
the pictorial arts during the time, we might find a clue for why he was tempted to come 
up with such a distinction. Leonardo was in no way apologetic about the dependence of 
the visual arts on human rationality. The Italian perspectival image required a thorough 
knowledge of geometry, an understanding of the correct placement of the vanishing point 
and of the picture plane as the intersection of the Euclidean visual pyramid. In this sense 
these images truly were “beings of reason”. 
The Italian Renaissance painters were not simply looking at an outside world and copying 
how it looked, they constructed a way of portraying the extended world on two-dimensional 
97  Johannes Kepler, Optics: Paralipomena to Witelo & Optical Part of Astronomy translated by William H. Donahue (Green Lion 
Press 2000), p.  210. 
98  The distinction that Kepler makes is a distinction between an internal image of reason and an external image on paper, cloth 
or other surfaces. This distinction is, as I will show, immensely important. In philosophy we need to distinguish between inner 
representations and external images, these two concepts have very different meanings. I will get back to this discussion in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy in chapter 6. 
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surfaces. In this sense the visual field was thoroughly theorized and rationalized, it was not 
something that existed there as a given, it required mastery of geometry and an understanding 
of how geometry was applicable on what one saw. Perspectival painting was constructed in 
accordance with a whole set of intricate rules and preconditions. When looking at View of 
Delft by Vermeer, one could say that every single one of these perspectival inventions is at 
play in the painting. But there is something that has shifted in its emphasis compared to the 
paintings of the Italian masters. It is evident that it is more a result of looking, observing and 
fixating a viewpoint, than of constructing, imagining and reasoning. Alpers quotes Eugène 
Fromentin’s analysis of the work of another Dutch painter: “It is the surfaces, the materials of 
the world that have caught the eye in Ter Borch. Fromentin catalogues for our eyes ‘the apparel, 
the satins, furs, stuffs, velvets, silks, felt hats, feathers, swords, the gold, the embroidery, the 
carpets, the beds with tapestry hangings, the floors so perfectly smooth, so perfectly solid’. It 
is as if visual phenomena are captured and made present without the intervention of a human 
maker.”99 That which earlier had to be constructed was later conceived of as something 
readymade. This distinction is helpful to keep in mind when one tries to understand the 
evolution, not only in the pictorial arts, but a progress of “a specific cultural ambiance – the 
empirical interest of what is commonly referred to as the age of observation.”100  When the 
visual field is properly rationalized and when the pictorial conventions of representing three-
dimensional objects on a two-dimensional surface are set, it is easy to forget about the vast 
project that lead to these developments. When the conventions of Renaissance painting have 
been at play for a longer period, it is easily forgotten that these conventions are man-made 
and not more or less natural than any other ways of depicting. In such a context it might 
seem like there is a category of images, that are “not beings of reason”, and the image in the 
camera obscura makes up for a perfect example of such an image. The renaissance project did 
not solely consist of making a new kind of images, but of making “the pictorial equivalent 
to vision”101. This development pawed the way for the idea that vision actually consists of 
pictorial content.  
99   Svetlana Alpers, The Art of Describing – Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (John Murray 1983), p. 30.
100  Ibid., p. 32.
101  Stuart Clark 2007, p. 16.
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It is against such a backdrop that the new Keplerian understanding of the concept of 
image should be understood. What Kepler calls picture, a ready-made optical image that is 
not of reason, plays an interesting mediating role in this kind of cultural transformation. But 
Kepler also does something else. At some points he uses this distinction to isolate what he 
calls picture from all that is subjective; judgement, memory, attention etc. Kepler distinguishes 
between the concepts of picture (pictura) and image (imago rerum). The latter imago rerum 
had earlier been referred to as idola, it signified the visual species that enters the eye from 
the outside world and travels onward to the seat of reason.102 On one hand this distinction 
is a way of not letting go of the idea of the natural sign, on the other hand it introduces the 
muddled concept of a picture (pictura) that is a sign without an intentional significance. It is 
as if Kepler could not decide whether nature communicates its essence through natural signs 
or whether nature essentially is beyond anything that our reason projects onto it. It is in this 
development that the camera obscura starts to have a slightly different meaning and use. It 
becomes a highly deceptive model not only for vision, but, as in the case of Locke, for our 
understanding and knowledge.103 
The Error of the Senses
I do not think we can grasp what the actual issues in a theory of vision consist of if we do 
not take into account how they interact with other issues in epistemology. The evolution of 
the theory of vision that Kepler plays a key part in is a development on many levels. The 
outset for Kepler, as for his predecessors, is a skeptical understanding of sense-perception.104 
For him vision gives us mere appearances. On the other hand he is, like Galileo, dependent 
on observation and the information that it brings. When looking at the world through a 
telescope vision is easily conceived of as a purely optical occurrence in the world. In this way 
it seems to be something different from the subjective experience of seeing. Vision becomes 
102  Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 36.
103  See, Richard Rorty 1980, p. 144.
104  Stuart Clark 2007, p. 28-29.
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observation, a specialized mode of perception. The camera obscura is a device that helps us 
conceive of vision as merely a play of optics, and I think this is why Kepler paid so much 
attention to this apparatus. It is both the actual apparatus and its role as a model for vision 
that intrigued Kepler. What it basically signifies is a pure and innocent way of perceiving, but 
it is also this conception of purity that will lead the theory of vision astray. 
During the Enlightenment the specialized perception of observation becomes elevated 
to an essential form of perception. In this development observation starts to signify a form 
of perception that goes beyond the influence of the subject with its passions, preconceptions, 
theories and idiosyncrasies. Around these times the ideal of a dispassionate observer enters the 
scientific community.105  This development is influenced by the scientific and philosophical 
evolution of the times, but it is also at play in the practices that are inspired by the invention 
and the use of the camera obscura. Henry Wotton, Francis Bacon’s biographer, who visited 
Kepler in Linz in 1620 to present him with a copy of Bacon’s The New Organon, noted 
Kepler’s use of the camera obscura. He recollects this visit in a letter to Bacon, as follows:
He hath a little black tent, exactly close and dark, save at one hole, 
about an inch and a half in the Diameter, to which he applies a long 
perspective-tube, with the convex glasses fitted to the said hole, and the 
concave taken out at the other end, through which the visible radiations 
of all the objects without are intromitted falling upon a paper, which is 
accommodated to receive them. And so he traceth them with his Pen in 
the natural appearance, turning his Tent round by degrees till he hath 
designed the whole aspect of the field.106   
These panoramic drawings by Kepler usually depicted landscapes. They were a kind of collage 
of views that gave a continuous 360 degree representation of the visual field. Wotton saw the 
potential in this technique. He thought that it would be an ideal way of drawing maps and 
105  See, Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan – Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (The Univeristy of Chicago 
Press 2004), p. 226.
106  Henry Wotton as quoted in Francis Bacon 2002, p. ix.
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harbor plans.107 These kinds of maps became common in the Netherlands during the 17th 
century, they portrayed cities viewed as a panorama, not as a birds-eye-view that later on 
became the standard. This is one use that gave the camera obscura a practical significance. 
Before this, during his stay in Prague, Kepler also used the camera obscura to create public 
spectacles. During these events he constructed a kind of camera obscura classroom. He 
sealed off all windows in a room and made a small aperture that let in the natural light. The 
wall opposite of this light source was painted white. The public entered the room while the 
aperture was covered and the show consisted of Kepler removing the cover and in this way 
activating the camera obscura. Thus the outside view was projected on the white wall inside 
the room, not unlike a cinema experience. He referred to these events as magic ceremonies.108 
The interest that Kepler had in such ceremonies was a philosophical one. They seemed 
to indicate that vision is mysterious. It is a mystery how the play of light and shadow can 
produce images that in comparison to other man-made images seem very much like our 
visual impression of the world. A similar account can be found in Leonardo’s notes, he writes:
“O marvelous necessity . . . O mighty process. Here the figures, here the colours, here all 
the images of the parts of the universe are reduced to a point . . . Forms already lost, can be 
regenerated and reconstituted”109. Leonardo’s wonder stems from the way in which the light 
that passes trough a small pinhole can reconstitute a view of the outer object inside the camera 
obscura. It is not the utility of the apparatus or the actual image that it produces that grasps 
Leonardo’s attention, but its process or the workings of nature that enables these images. 
For both Kepler and Leonardo the camera obscura escapes explanation. Of course, up to a 
certain point the contemporary optical theories could explain the processes in the camera 
obscura, and both Kepler and Leonardo were on top of these theories, but the phenomena 
itself, the way an image is created by the rays of light, was beyond theoretical explanation. 
Somehow the process in the camera obscura seemed to enable the natural world to construct 
107  Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 49-50.
108  Johannes Kepler, Kepler’s Dream – With the Full Text and Notes of Somnium, Sive Astronomia Lunaris, Joannis Kepleri, edited 
by John Lear (University of California Press 1965), p. 100. 
109  Leonardo as quoted in Martin Kemp, The Science of Art – Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat (Yale 
University Press 1990), p. 189. 
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an appearance, an image of itself, by the workings of light.110  
In this way the visual seems to consist of mere appearances. And for Kepler appearances 
are not to be trusted. This becomes clearer in another example – that of Kepler’s scientific 
project of correcting the theory of earth’s motion. Although we, if we consult our vision, 
might believe that the sun circles around the earth, astronomical observations together 
with mathematical calculations will prove otherwise. Kepler’s point here is that our visual 
impression might deceive us into drawing untruthful conclusions. This is the analogy that 
Kepler puts forth in his Somnium, a written account of a dream in which Kepler imagines 
how the inhabitants of the moon would perceive the motion of earth. To the inhabitants 
of the moon, their home planet seems to be stationary and the stars seem to circle around 
it, just like we perceive earth as stationary and the rest of the celestial bodies as if they 
would circle around earth.111 The conclusion that Kepler draws from this is that there is 
something deceptive in the visual faculty, that the direct visual experience leads us to an 
occult understanding of the world, in which phenomena occur without understandable 
causes. In this sense, vision does not permit us to understand the make-up of the world, the 
causes of phenomena. It brings us mere appearances.
Leibniz picks up this Keplerian discussion. In a letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia, 
in the year 1702, he points out that “sensible qualities are in fact occult qualities”112. Although 
the senses, according to Leibniz, allow us to know particular qualities like sounds, colours, 
odours, and flavuors, we do not comprehend the causes of these qualities. Vision alone does 
not allow us to understand how light and colour come about. Therefore science has to use some 
other means than pure sense perception in order to understand the causes in nature and our 
understanding has to consist of something beyond sense perception. There has to be some kind 
of common sense that ties together the different sense perceptions, Leibniz writes:
Therefore, since our soul compares the numbers and shapes that are in 
color, for example, with numbers and shapes that are in tactile qualities, 
110  Stuart Clark 2007, p. 29.
111  Kepler writes: “Here is the hypothesis of the whole dream: that is, an argument for the motion of earth, or rather a refutation of 
arguments constructed, on the basis of perception, against the motion of earth.”, Johannes Kepler 1965, p. 114.
112  Gottfried Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, edited and translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Gaber (Hacket 1989), p. 186.
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there must be an internal sense, in which the perceptions of these differ-
ent external senses are found united. This is called imagination, which 
contains both the notions of the particular senses, which are clear but con-
fused, and the notions of the common sense, which are clear and distinct. 
And these clear and distinct ideas, subject to imagination, are objects 
of the mathematical sciences, namely arithmetic and geometry, which are 
pure mathematical sciences, and the objects of these sciences as they are 
applied to nature, which make up applied mathematics.113 
Leibniz understands mathematics as an axiom that the human common sense applies on 
the different sense inputs. For him knowledge is dependent on “an inborn light within us”114 
(mathematics) by which we resemble God in that we do not only grasp the order in nature, 
but we are also capable of giving order to things within our grasp.115 Here Leibniz enters an 
already established discourse. As opposed to Galileo, he does not conceive mathematics as a 
pre-existing pre-psychological order that we can discover, but a power that is inherent in our 
intellect. What he claims is that human reason can give an order to nature by the workings of 
reason. Like Leonardo, he gives reason a primary status (as opposed to pure sense-perception). 
Due to its intellectual capacities, the mind can grasp the workings of nature, its laws and 
causalities, its history. Kepler’s skepticism towards direct sense-perception can be understood 
against such a rationalist understanding of the role of vision. This issue concerning the status 
of vision is a pivotal point for the philosophical discussions of Kepler and his contemporaries, 
since the evolution of astronomy and the optical aids of the times are dependent on issues 
concerning the reliability of visual observation. For Bacon, vision is a special sense since it 
is the only sense for which we can find aids that magnify, enlarge and correct the sensory 
input. Instruments like microscopes, magnifying glasses and telescopes help us interpret 
nature since they give us more accurate “presentations or exhibits”.116 In this understanding, 
these presentations are that which is prior to our interpretations of nature. The visual aids 
113  Gottfried Leibniz 1989, p. 187.
114  Ibid., p. 191.
115  Ibid., p. 192.
116  Francis Bacon 2002, p. 170. 
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help along our interpretation of natural phenomena, but the presentations themselves are not 
inferred information, but magnified or clarified sense perceptions. This is what Bacon calls 
“instances of first information” (Leibniz calls them “notions of the particular senses, which 
are clear but confused”).117 Here the discourse on vision moves in two different directions. 
One is skeptical, emphasizing that pure vision is merely appearances, and that science and 
rationality require common sense that imposes its workings on the visual sensations. The 
other direction of discourse emphasizes the power of pure sense perception or observation, 
to grant us scientific and unbiased knowledge of the world.  
Recall the quote by Bacon in the last chapter, pointing out that visual aids were helpful 
because of their ability to correct errors due to the weakness of the senses. He wrote: “For 
errors of the senses should be assigned to the actual investigations of senses and the sensible; 
with the exception of the great error of the senses, that they set the outlines of things by 
the pattern of man, not of the universe; which can only be corrected by universal reason 
and universal philosophy”.118 It is peculiar that Bacon holds that we should find aids for the 
senses, if the senses on the other hand are deceptive, as they conceive things by the patterns 
of man. He rejects Aristotelian logic and Plato’s metaphysics119 because they stand in the 
way of a pure science based on empirical observation, but he then goes on to denigrate sense 
perception. Leibniz is less apologetic about human reason’s interference with nature. For 
him, reason (the common sense, mathematics and imagination) are required in order for us 
to understand the world. But Bacon is reluctant toward this kind of philosophy. He clearly 
states that “the patterns of man”, stand in contrast to universal reason. It is as if reason resided 
in nature itself. In this debate, the status of vision becomes, once again, unstable. 
This ambiguity is evident in Kepler’s understanding of vision. Kepler makes a distinction 
between two kinds of deception in connection to vision: “deception of the sense of vision, 
arising partly from the technique of observation […] and partly from the simple sense of 
117  Ibid., p. 170. 
118  Ibid., p. 178.
119  Ibid., p. 79.
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vision itself […]”.120 In the first case questions are concerned with our failure to discern 
certain things, the way in which optical aids distort the shapes of things, i.e., weaknesses 
and distortions in the purely visual observation of the world. The latter, more fundamental 
error is based on misguided belief in knowledge obtained through the senses per se. The 
starting point for Kepler is a Platonic skeptical attitude towards sense perception. He 
claims that vision does not correspond with the actual make-up of the world, therefore 
it is deceptive. Like Bacon, Kepler seems to have two contradictory concepts of vision. 
There are two competing theories at work in this paradox, theories that can be reduced to 
something like this: 
A. Empiricism 
1. In vision, reason adds something to the visual input.
2. This addition is an error that distorts the input.
3. If the input were to be pure it would be correct.
B. Rationalism
1. Visual information is an appearance of the world. If we solely 
  consult the visual input when we want to understand the world,  
 vision will deceive us.
2. Reason is required in order to correct this confusion. 
3. Pure reason is the fundament of knowledge
On the one hand, the way in which visual aids have helped science along during this period 
seems to indicate that the natural order consists of a purely visual pattern. If our sense 
perception is acute enough – if we are able to arrive at distinct and pure visual observations 
– this will reveal the order of nature. This temptation ties science to the Empiricist theory 
frame. In this interpretation, direct experience or direct perception seems to be what gives 
120  Johannes Kepler 2000, p.  171. 
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sciences access to the natural order. The competing Rationalist assumption is that sense-
perception stands in the way of a correct understanding of the order of nature. This leads to 
emphasis on the errors that occur when we understand the world solely through our visual 
faculty. This can be exemplified by how Kepler thinks that it is actually vision (not earlier 
theories) that deceives us into believing that the sun circles around earth, that perception 
is deceptive per se. The latter understanding resonates with a heavy legacy of Platonism 
within philosophy. 
In this way, the concept of vision starts to split up. Depending on theoretical emphasis, 
the eye is conceived, either as a passive instrument that receives visual input, or an active 
organ that creates the visual input. It is then in the context of these two contradictory theories 
that we should understand Kepler’s two concepts; that of the image and that of the picture.  
During this period, there is a certain temptation to connect epistemology with optics, 
or to use optical vocabulary as metaphors in epistemological theories, as for example Locke 
does in the quote above. If optics, as the camera obscura analogy seems to point out, works in 
nature, irrespective of the workings of human reason, theories and judgements, then would 
not optics be a proper model for how we are in contact with the given nature? It is this kind of 
idea that Locke puts forward in the camera obscura analogy in An Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding that is released in 1690. When Kepler, in 1604 releases his Optics, he is much 
more uncertain of the status of vision, image and knowledge in relation to optics, than Locke 
is. Kepler is tempted by the kind of analogy that Locke put’s forth 86 years later, but he never 
actually fully arrives at such an understanding since he understands, at least to a larger extent 
than Locke does, the inherent tension in such an assumption. 
Kepler’s Image and Kepler’s Picture
What Kepler brings to the theoretical discussion is a new distinction between the concepts 
of image and picture. What Kepler calls picture entails a new kind of understanding of the 
72
images on the retina.121 These retinal pictures are not visual species received by the eye. 
Kepler acknowledges that the image inside the retina cannot have been transmitted from 
the outside through the lens of the eye: “The remaining possibility, therefore, is that what 
inheres in the eye is an image of the action and effect, not of light, but of illumination”.122 
In this sense the eye becomes an “image-making-machine” as opposed to an “organ for 
receiving images”.123 However, this is again a marginal shift in the general theory of 
vision. As in the intromissionist theory of Alhazen, Kepler’s understanding still relies 
on the image, now located on the retina, as a connecting mediator between the observer 
and the object.124 The problem for him and for the philosophers to come consists of the 
question: how are we to articulate the connection between the image on the retina and our 
experience of sight? He writes:
I say that vision occurs when an image [lat. Idolum] of the whole hemi-
sphere of the world that is before the eye, and a little more, is set up at 
the white wall, tinged with red, of the concave surface of the retina. 
How this image or picture  [my emphasis] is joined together with visual 
spirits that reside in the retina and in the nerve, and whether it is ar-
raigned within by the spirits into the caverns of the cerebrum to the 
tribunal of the soul or of the visual faculty; whether the visual faculty, 
like a magistrate given by the soul, descending from the headquarters 
of the cerebrum outside to the visual nerve itself and the retina, as to 
the lower courts, might go forth to meet the image – this, I say, I leave 
to the natural philosophers to argue about.125 
Although Kepler states that he leaves some questions to the natural philosophers, he cannot 
help but to be puzzled about why, at some point, vision escapes optical explanations.  He 
continues: “For what can be pronounced by optical laws about this hidden confluence, which, 
121  Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 36-37.
122  Johannes Kepler 2000, p.  42. 
123  John Hyman 1989, p. 70.
124  Ibid., p. 7.
125  Johannes Kepler 2000, p. 180.
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since it goes through opaque, and therefore dark, parts, and is administered by spirits, which 
differ entirely in kind from the humors and other transparent objects, has already completely 
removed itself from optical laws.”126 The actual eye can be understood as a camera obscura 
that works according to the laws of optics, whereas vision, the way in which we have visual 
impressions of the world, cannot be explained by optics. Here occurs a division between the 
visual and the optical. The former cannot be reduced to the latter.
In this development the meaning of the camera obscura analogy changes. For Leonardo 
the camera obscura received images, whereas for Kepler the camera obscura was a device that 
made pictures appear. In the first case the already existing image enters the camera obscura, in 
the second case there is no image before it is brought about in the camera obscura. This opens 
up the possibility of the interpretation that the visual impression, the way we perceive the world 
through vision, is a purely human way of knowing the world. The world by itself is then not 
visual.127 In this understanding the actual eye does not perform anything that differs from 
what a mechanical machine would perform. One might say that Kepler pushes the organ of 
vision further back into the cavities of the skull, beyond the mechanical apparatus of the eye. 
Therefore the question concerning where the actual “seer” resides, entails puzzlement for Kepler. 
Kepler does not solve the mystery of how our visual impressions are connected the picture 
on the retina, but he puts the mystery on hold and liberates the investigation of the eye from 
all non-optical factors. In his Optics Kepler is able to explain the physiology of the eye and the 
phenomena of light and colour better than anyone before him. In order to do so he is depends 
on a clear distinction between pictures painted or projected upon a surface (on the back wall 
of the camera obscura, on sheets of paper or cloth or on the concave retina) and images that 
are the human visual impressions of things. Here image signifies the world as it presents itself 
to reason. This concept of image signifies a composition of the optical picture and that which 
human reason adds on to it.
126  Johannes Kepler 2000, p. 180.
127  Descartes will later on put forth this idea, but as I have noted earlier this theory also has its roots in atomism. Epicurus, one of 
the predominant atomists held such a view. J. M. Rist writes: “There is, of course, no need to infer that for Epicurus all sensation 
is a mental operation. Indeed the opposite is true. As Lucretius tells us, the bodily organs of sense are not mere eyes of the soul. It 
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In this sense the image, for Kepler, is not purely optical. In his examination of the 
anatomy of the eye and the optic nerve he understands that vision cannot be purely optical 
since the optic nerve is not an optical device but an organ, it consists of a dark and opaque 
passage. He goes on to distinguish between the optical means of vision of the eye and the 
visual impression. The latter cannot consist of a picture, but of some kind of direct contact or 
pressure performed on the “optical” nerve. He writes:
This image, which has an existence separable from the presence of 
the object seen, is not in the humors or the tunic, as we proved above. 
Therefore, it is in the spirits, and vision occurs through this impression 
of images upon the spirits. However, the impression itself is not opti-
cal, but physical and mysterious. But this is a digression. I return to 
explaining the means of vision.128 
Kepler understands that vision is not explainable simply by optics. But, although he in 
this context talks of spirits and illumination instead of lenses and rays of light, he is still 
held back by his insistence on giving a causal explanation of how visual impressions come 
about. On this point he reveals that he is still under the influence of the atomist theory, in 
which sense perception is dependent on some kind of contact and consequently within the 
classical discourse of the theory of vision. He refers to the after-image that has been a key 
concept throughout the history of visual theory and makes a comparison between the visual 
impression and pain, the sensation of a physical blow to the body.129 For Kepler there is some 
kind of disposition in the human body for sensing the world that lies beyond the apparatus 
of the eye. In a footnote Kepler recalls an anecdote of a man who lost one of his eyes. When 
this man covered his other seeing eye and placed a shining object under his nostrils, he 
claimed that he still, although practically blind, could discriminate this shiny object. Kepler 
understands this as evidence of the activity of spirits in perception. He concludes that either 
128  Johannes Kepler 2000, p. 181.
129  Ibid., p. 42.
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the cavity of the blind eye still transmits some sort of information to the spirits that interpret 
the input, or, alternatively, the information is transmitted through the nostrils.130 
Although the example might seem quite occult and medieval, Kepler is very sensible in 
distinguishing between optics and our psychological visual impressions. He quite rightly 
points out that optics cannot explain how we see. Optics play an important role in how our 
vision comes about, but it does not function as an explanation of our subjective experience 
of vision. This far, everything is comprehensible. But he fails to understand that if this 
distinction is to be made properly, then optics, in a very distinct meaning, is completely 
beyond our sense-perception. The play of light and colour can be treated as a natural 
occurrence in the world that exists with or without our presence. On a physical level light is 
refraction and reflection. But when we see light and colour our position is different, because 
as Thomas Baldwin points out: “perception is the capacity whereby there is a world it cannot 
be just another fact within the world”.131 Therefore, the comparison that Kepler occasionally 
makes between optics and subjective experience is not viable. I will make this point clearer 
by continuing to, on the one hand, trying to understand what Kepler’s actual goal was, and 
on the other hand, by keeping in focus the error that has slipped into his theory. 
Errors in the Techniques of Observation 
The fact that different lenses and different apertures in the instruments that were used for 
astronomical observation gave different visual images entailed a problem for the practice 
of observation of the heavenly bodies. One particular event that puzzled Kepler was an 
observation that his mentor Tycho Brahe performed in Prague in the year 1600.  When 
observing a solar eclipse inside a camera obscura, because this indirect way of viewing was 
a safe way to look at the sun, he noticed that the diameter of the moon seemed smaller than 
normally. Kepler concluded that, since it is neither possible that the moon is further away 
during the eclipse, nor that its size has changed, the device has to distort the appearance of 
130  Ibid., p. 181.
131  Thomas Baldwin in his introduction to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (Routledge 2005). p. 11.
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the moon.132 In 1604, after consulting the contemporary anatomical literature on the eye, 
Kepler went even further in his skepticism towards the apparatus.  If the device of the camera 
distorts and if it works in a similar way as the human eye, then, he concluded, even the eye 
to some extent alters the dimensions of the objective world.133 Due to the supposed error the 
instrumental role of the eye was put under scrutiny. The eye started to become conceived 
more like a device, less like an organ. 
Kepler’s interest in the visual devices stemmed from a turning inward from the actual 
world toward the aids that we use to observe the world. In order to do proper observations 
in astronomy he had to rely on the telescope and the camera obscura and in the end on the 
human eye. In order to carry out correct observations, he had to understand the instruments of 
observation. In the case of the eye, the camera obscura, and the telescope, he investigated the 
distortions that these devices produce in observation. He was simply occupied with finding 
and perfecting the correct apparatus in order to make correct observations. When he wrote 
his Optics Kepler was more concerned with astronomy and cosmology than with the theory 
of vision per se. This resulted in a divided theory of vision, that on the one hand indicated 
that optics does not explain vision, but on the other hand showed that vision required optics. 
This is not necessarily a paradox, since although vision cannot be reduced to optics, there 
is something about optics that makes it fundamental for vision. As Kepler points out, this 
is proven by the fact that certain people whose vision is impaired in one way or another, 
can correct this ailment with the help of optical devices such as spectacles with concave or 
convex lenses. A convex lens that corrects vision for one man can distort it for another. In 
this sense, the power of the eye is relative to the input of light. Different eyes give different 
visual impressions.134 Another fact that proves the optical nature of vision is that vision 
requires light. We do not see in complete darkness.135 Also, a very strong light source will 
disrupt vision because it overwhelms the visual impression.136 Therefore vision seems to be 
fundamentally dependent on optics. According to Kepler, the size and shape of the refracted 
132  John Hyman 1989, p. 69 and Svetlana Alpers 1983, p. 33.
133  Johannes Kepler 2000, p.  69-70.
134  Ibid., p. 217.
135  Ibid., p. 51.
136  Ibid., p. 193.
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bundles of light rays are relative to the size and shape of the apparatus of observation. The 
optical apparatus intersects the rays and depending on its size and form, it captures and 
leaves out different pieces of optical input.137 Based on this he concluded that, depending 
on the differences in construction of the optical devices, the information also differs. For 
example, the eye differs from a camera obscura since the eye has a lens whereas the camera 
obscura of the times had a pinhole as an aperture.138 
For Kepler, the image that occurs inside the camera is then different from an image inside 
the eye in two senses. Firstly it is different because of the structural differences between the 
eye and the camera obscura. Secondly, Kepler concludes that the images differ since the eye 
is connected to the visual organ and the visual faculty in a direct way. He writes: “Briefly, 
an image is the vision of some object conjoined with an error of the faculties contributing 
to the sense of vision. Thus the image is practically nothing in itself, and should rather be 
called imagination”.139 Here Kepler does not refer to an optical distortion, but to an error that 
occurs because of what the visual faculty contributes to the image. He fails to keep a clear 
distinction between optics and epistemology. When he compares “the optical picture” with 
the “image of reason”, he makes a comparison that he himself has rejected in other passages. 
Like Locke, he compares images with our experience in a straightforward way and thus 
steps outside of the purely optical discourse. The point here is that the image of reason, if 
this concept can have any merit, cannot be another picture that differs from the picture on 
the retina. Our vision does not consist of pictures. What our mental faculties contribute to 
an image, cannot consist of a pictorial content, because thinking, judgement, interpretation, 
our concepts and experience are not correlate with pictures. 
Bacon makes a related assumption when he writes; “The human understanding is like 
137  Ibid., p. 69-70.
138  Catherine Wilson ”Discourses of Vision in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics”, in David Michael Levin (ed.), The Discursive 
Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy (The MIT Press 1997), p. 121. Wilson also notes that Leibniz, although he gener-
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an uneven mirror receiving rays from things and merging its own nature with the nature of 
things, which distorts and corrupts it”.140 If we take the analogy of human understanding as 
an uneven mirror literally, it simply means that a proper mirror would do the job correctly, 
that is, the error is due to the structural make-up of the surface. Like Kepler, he wants to 
exemplify, by analogy, how human opinion and a belief in earlier theories has distorted the 
sciences, and how the new empiricist ethos of unbiased observation has lead to a revolutionary 
step forward in the natural sciences and maybe most clearly in the new astronomy.   
Both Kepler’s and Bacon’s optical analogies invite new problems. The vocabulary of the 
optical theory often serves as metaphors for the epistemological theory. But these metaphors 
are ill fitted since there can be no error in optics. When we claim that an uneven mirror 
distorts, there is no error per se, different surfaces just reflect light in different ways. What 
is right or wrong, what is erroneous, can only come into play when we perform a certain 
task with the help of optical means, for example when we observe the motion of the planets 
through an optical telescope. In these cases the task, that which can fail or succeed, is not 
performed by the visual aids or devices, the task is performed by the observer with all faculties 
of judgement, interpretation and thinking at play. We do not see a clear fixed picture when 
we look at the world, since our eyes travel in the visual field, they attend to some things 
or aspects and disregard others, they look gaze, observe, squint and peer. The eye is not a 
machine and even if it were a machine, it would at least be much more than simply an optical 
machine. Optics cannot explain how we, in vision, attend to things, how we focus on certain 
things in the visual field, whereas other things are completely ignored. It is only in relation 
to different tasks that we can connect optics to the concept of knowledge and understanding 
(and misunderstanding), i.e. optics cannot tell us anything about attention (I will return to 
this discussion on the concept of attention in chapter 6).   
Nietzsche expresses this clearly, as follows: “There would be nothing which could be called 
knowledge if thought did not first so recreate the world into ‘things’ which are in its own image. 
It is only through thought that there is untruth.”141  What I want to pinpoint by using this quote 
is how we cannot sidestep the workings of reason and thought if we want to understand the 
140  Francis Bacon 2002, p. 41.
141  Friedrich Nietzsche In Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.) 1992 ,volume 1, p. 87.
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faculty of vision. This sidestepping does maybe help us construct a reductionist theory of vision, 
a theory that might be suitable for specific tasks, for example Kepler’s task of explaining the 
workings of optics in order to construct better visual aids for astronomical observations. But, 
when Kepler along with Bacon goes on to consult the same theoretical framework in order to 
explain our experience, our visual impressions, it will accumulate error. 
The optical analogies of Bacon, Kepler and Locke, that connect our understanding of 
the world with pictures on the retina, do exactly this. The analogies sidestep or denigrate 
the role of the self of the observer, as if the involvement of earlier knowledge, memory, 
thought, judgement or attention would ruin the objective optical information that resides 
in the retinal picture. As if a newborn child would see the world as it actually is constituted. 
The advancement in the natural sciences of the time makes these kinds of analogies potent 
and at highly deceptive at the same time. As I have showed, Kepler is not blind to these 
kinds of problems, but at times he gets carried away and makes conclusions that will 
resonate throughout the history of theory of vision. The concept of the retinal picture as a 
specific kind of image is one of these highly deceptive results of his works in optics. There 
is a general tendency within the theory of vision during the Renaissance that is shared 
by Leonardo (1452-1519), Bacon (1561-1626), Kepler (1571-1639) and Galileo (1564-
1642). They are all important participants in a venture in which a new theory of vision 
is constructed. Geometry, perspectivist painting, optics and the camera obscura serve as 
models for this theory of vision. At points these actors seem to forget that the models were 
a result of a rationalization of the visual field; that they themselves constructed a certain 
theory that required certain models. Then they proceed to take these models as accounts 
of “how we actually see”.
The Advent of the Mind’s Eye: An Accumulation of Error
In order exemplify what could be meant by the concept of visual record as an image 
unconditioned by our faculties of reason, let’s think of what it actually would mean if the 
retina could be disconnected from the visual faculty. What would be left then would be the 
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purely optical retinal picture that Kepler constructs. He writes: 
The result of this is that if it were possible for this picture on the retina 
to remain while the retina was taken out into the light, while those 
things out in front that were giving it form were removed, and if some 
person were to possess sufficient keenness of vision, that person would 
recognize the exact configuration of the hemisphere in the compass 
of the retina, small as it is. […] the fineness of this picture within the 
eye of any person you please is as great as the acuteness of vision in 
that person.142
We can maybe call this a side product of Kepler’s theory, but irrespective of whatever 
emphasis he himself put on this issue, this conception of image (as a Keplerian picture) will 
start to live a life of its own in both the philosophy of perception and the conventions of 
pictorial art. If the retinal image could be reproduced as an external picture, it would depict a 
perfect panoramic view of the hemisphere. It is exactly something like this that the inventors 
of photography thought they had achieved 200 years later. Prior to the actual technology of 
photography, this idea had already established itself firmly within the scientific discourse. 
According to this line of thought the state of things manifests itself in a self-portrait of 
nature, the imagined a priori, authorless, objective image produced by the workings of natural 
light; as if there existed a latent, universal image-world against which all other images could 
be compared and verified. The most obvious problem here is that if this were possible, then 
of course, the perfect external picture would also be distorted by the faculty of human vision 
when seen. This metaphor short-circuits itself. If we hold that there is a rift between things 
as they exist in nature and things as they exist for us in perception, we have to adhere to this 
categorical gap all the way. However, if we stick to this theoretical framework it will soon 
enough reveal itself to be incomprehensible. 
When the retinal image ceases to be a metaphor and is taken for an actual entity in the 
142  Johannes Kepler 2000, p. 181-182.
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world, a line has been crossed. The theory of species was essentially a hypostasization of an 
objective fundament for perception. When this significant building block of the theory of 
vision was tampered with by Kepler, the whole theory started to crumble. He quite rightly 
understood that the species was an unnecessary link in the theory of vision, but he did not 
completely rid his theory of this concept and he did not thoroughly analyze the consequences of 
what it would mean to erase this concept. As John Hyman points out: ”The theory of the retinal 
image answered the crucial question of medieval optics: the scaffolding had served its purpose 
and should have been dismantled. Instead, Kepler mistook it for a part of the building: what he 
constructed as a scientific problem was nothing more than the extension of a metaphor.”143 The 
idea of species, as well as the idea of the retinal image, had served as metaphors with a certain 
purpose. They played the part of explaining the connection between subject and object. 
Kepler compared two things that are not comparable: on the one hand the optical laws 
of refraction and reflection of light rays that pass from the object to the camera obscura 
and to the retina, on the other hand, the subjective visual impression, our psychological 
way of perceiving the visual. The latter does not correlate with the laws of optics in any 
straightforward way. If it did, if what we actually see were solely a question of what optics 
permits us to see, given the circumstances of light, the position of the eye in space, the 
structural qualities of our eyes etc. – then we could conclude that our vision is made up by 
objective optical information, images. But our concept of vision runs deeper than this. 
In order for us to understand how the union of objective knowledge, image and vision 
came about, it is important to understand the highly problematic evolution of this concept. 
The theory of vision was still, or maybe even more so, a muddle after Kepler’s new discoveries 
in optics. He left a problematic question to the philosophers after him. If our eyes are “image-
making machines”, then who or what perceives these images? The question that Kepler puts 
forward to the natural philosophers is confused. What occurs is an infinite regress. As if 
another set of eyes were required to look at the retinal picture (illustration 2.1). As Kepler 
himself acknowledges, this question cannot be answered by optics. The idea of an eye in the 
mind that is the consequence of Locke’s camera obscura metaphor, when it stops being a 
143  John Hyman 1989, p. 1.
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theoretical framework for epistemology and starts to become conceived as an actual entity 
in our mind, will set off philosophy on a troublesome path. Descartes brings the questions 
raised by Kepler into the mainstream of philosophy. He writes:
But now I must tell you something about the nature of the senses in 
general, the more easily to explain that of sight in particular. We al-
ready know sufficiently well that it is the mind which senses, not the 
body; for we see that when the mind is distracted by an ecstasy of deep 
contemplation, the entire body remains without sensation, even though 
it is in contact with various objects.144
What Descartes claims is that vision comes about in the mind, not in the eye. Although 
he, based on his readings and experiments, believes in the existence of the retinal image, 
he does not see it as the cause for vision (as Kepler occasionally does). Descartes points out 
that we have visual mental representations when we are sleeping145 therefore vision cannot 
be dependent on retinal pictures. Here lies an very important point, what he actually says is 
that we have mental representations and we have vision, but that these two do not correlate in 
any straightforward way. This is why the “concept of the ‘inner picture’ is misleading” when 
it uses “‘outer picture’ as a model.”146 
Descartes points out how the mimetic conception of knowledge that claims that we know 
the world through go-betweens or likenesses is inhabited by the problem of resemblance. Our 
thoughts, ideas and experiences can obviously not be explained by their resemblance with 
external objects, since this would entail an infinite regress.147 Descartes goes on to point out that 
the images that occur in the eye do stimulate our minds, but so do signs and words. The latter 
can obviously not constitute our knowledge through their likeness to the object, since words do 
not resemble. But neither do images resemble the object in all their qualities, since if they did, 
144  René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology translated by Paul J. Olscamp (Hackett Publishing 
Co. 2001), p. 87.
145  Ibid., p. 108.
146  Ludwig Wittgenstein 1998, p. 196e. 
147  René Descartes 2001, p. 101.
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then they would not be distinct from the actual objects, i. e. they would cease to be images. 
Only in shape is there a resemblance and even here there is a discrepancy since, “on a completely 
flat surface, they represent to us bodies which are of different heights and distances”.148 That an 
image resembles something means then that we already have accepted certain preconditions. 
The image is not like the object, since it is two-dimensional whereas objects are extended, they 
have a volume, etc. Here the concept of resemblance splits up. Similarity between two objects is 
not comparable to an image’s way of representing an object. In the first case, one object can be 
conceived as a copy of the other object. The important Cartesian point is that in the second case 
the image represents through signification, it is, as in the case of the relationship between word 
and object, a case of a sign that we use to signify a certain thing. This argumentation is designed 
to put an end to the idea of the species as natural signs.149 There can then be no similarity or 
likeness without the intervention of human reason. The thought or idea of an object cannot 
share the nature of the object, nor can an image do so. This cannot be the case since if we think 
about how images resemble things, this requires something more than two objects: object of 
the senses and object in nature. In order for there to be resemblance there has to be a third 
instance, human thought, judgement or understanding, what Leibniz and Descartes called the 
common sense, that sees the resemblance between object and image. Even Locke is pressed to 
draw such a conclusion, he writes:  
Every act of sensation, when duly considered, gives us an equal view of 
both parts of nature, the corporeal and the spiritual. For whilst I know, 
by seeing or hearing, &c., that here is some corporeal being without 
me, the object of that sensation, I do more certainly know, that there is 
some spiritual being within me that sees and hears. This, I must be con-
vinced, cannot be the action of bare insensible matter; nor ever could 
be, without an immaterial thinking being.150
148  René Descartes 2001, p. 90.
149  Ibid., p. 68.
150  John Locke 1894, p. 406-407. Interestingly this passage was part of an addition that was included in the second edition. 
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Here seeing signifies something beyond mere reception of visual input. Whereas Locke’s 
statement still is prone to the criticism that his model of understanding still entails an endless 
regression, it at least shows that he was not completely unaware of the mistake that a solely 
optical explanation of vision carries with it. In the statement above he does not consider 
that the so called “object of sensation” is superfluous, and furthermore, highly problematic. 
However, the important notion here is that Descartes’ catch on this issue puts forth, at 
least the possibility of a conclusion in which judgement is integrated in seeing. More clearly 
than Kepler, Locke or Leibniz, he disregards the idea of pure visual sensations. This is an 
inevitable conclusion. Although Descartes epistemology entails its own discrepancies, if we 
take into account how dominating theses ideas of “innocent perceiver”, “metaphorical eye” 
or “purely optical picture” have been, the point that Descartes makes, really rings true in the 
context. He anticipates Kant who introduces the concept of judgement as something that, 
if analyzed properly, leaves no room for conceptions of objectivity in the way that they have 
existed before. Kant writes:
For the logical form of the understanding in judgment must precede, 
and the appearances (as mere appearances) must be regarded as deter-
mined with regard to each of these forms, otherwise no experience can 
arise from them. We can also use the word “experience” in place of the 
words “object of the senses.” For we do not cognize the things in them-
selves; we can know nothing of them except all our possible experience 
of them, and only insofar as this is determined a priori by the form of 
sensibility and that of the understanding.151 
There is a certain vagueness in the quote above, but the bottom line is that the idea of object of 
the senses, that I have discussed in its many forms in the past two chapters, is something that 
inevitably will cause tension, discrepancies and confusions. This problematic idea is shared 
by what we, in hindsight, call empiricism and rationalism. And although both Descartes and 
Kant make an effort to rid philosophy of this problematic, the door is still left open. 
151  Immanuel Kant, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood 
(eds.) (Cambridge University Press 2005), p. 307.
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Conclusion: The Innocent Eye is Blind
What I have hopefully been able to articulate in these chapters is that there is something 
uncanny about the visual sense that keeps on creating confusion in philosophy. But, let us take 
a step back and think about what this actually means. In order to understand where the actual 
problem with the idea of retinal image, or its correlate, the idea of mental representations, 
resides, let us briefly consider a slightly different approach. In his essay Studying Perception 
Olli Lagerspetz considers what mental representation can mean in our subjective experience 
of vision, how we can understand this concept outside of the specialized epistemological 
discourse within philosophy. Lagerspetz writes:
Sometimes I literally think in images. I might visualize the walk from 
one part of my hometown to another. Here my mental images literally 
represent something. I am using them in planning, to stand proxy for 
real streets and buildings. But when I really walk and look around, what 
I am seeing is not images but shops, cars, people, events, and whatever 
there is for me to look at.152
Through this example we can acknowledge that our concepts and our ways of conceptualizing 
the world around us in order to orient ourselves within it can consist of representations. But 
these representations do not correlate in a straightforward way with what I see, how I look at 
things. In this case the mental representations are not a helpful part of an understanding of 
what it means to see. On the contrary, vision and seeing reveal themselves to be something 
other than mental images. This example points out in what way mental representations 
and vision are not comparable with each other. This is not to say that there are no possible 
connections between vision and mental representation. 
The theory of vision within philosophy that I have traced, and the concept of image 
that has evolved from it, is one where the visible exists regardless of human intervention. It 
152  Olli Lagerspetz, ”Studying Perception” in Philosophy, 83/2008, p. 208. 
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is a highly strained theory since, if this were to be the case, we still would not have access 
to this visual realm as it exists (looks) prior to our engagement with it through our senses. 
I have pointed out some understandable reasons for the construction of such a theory. The 
important point here is to understand that if we want to hold on to this kind of concept, we at 
least have to understand that it is a result of a highly specialized and specific discourse within 
arts and science. Pragmatically, the hypostasization of an indexical visual order that exists 
in nature, a visual self portrait of nature, has helped along science and visual arts to achieve 
some crucial goals. But when we understand this, we also understand that this concept of an 
objective visual realm does not denote nature as it exists by itself, an a priori image-world, 
perception divorced from judgement and human psychology. On the contrary objectivity and 
its union with the visible, is a highly abstract concept that has been constructed during a long 
time-frame. Objectivity cannot be discovered in nature: it has to be constructed. Observation 
is a specific action within a world of possible ways of perceiving. Our ways of perceiving the 
world are connected to our actions. Seeing in this sense consists, not of one unified task of 
distinguishing between truth and falsity, correctness and incorrectness, etc., but of different 
tasks related to our judgements, concepts and thought, as well as to the natural world. The 
ways in which we can meaningfully talk about what we see are not fixed or predetermined, 
like for example the movement of the planets in the solar system. When we look into the 
significance of vision and images, we ask questions that go beyond the dichotomy of truth 
and falsity. This puts into question the whole meaning of the concept of visual record. At 
least the visual record cannot acquire its meaning in the sense that Kepler thought it could, 
due to its detachedness from reason and the subject. The Innocent eye that Kepler and his 
contemporaries sought was, as Kant had shown, blind.
In the following chapter I will follow up how positivism, together with the invention of 
the photograph, will evoke similar problems as the retinal picture and the idea of species have 
brought up earlier.     
87
Image 2.1153




3. Photography: The Go-between of the Record 
From now on, matter would at last be mastered without any illusion of 
ruling or inherent powers, of hidden qualities.154
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer
We should not find excuses for ourselves in our good intentions; let 
us see what becomes of these once they have escaped from inside us. 
There is something healthy about this unfamiliar gaze we are suggest-
ing should be brought to bear on our species. Voltaire once imagined, in 
Micromégas, that a giant from another planet was confronted with our 
customs. These could only seem derisory to an intelligence higher than 
our own. Our era is destined to judge itself not from on high, which is 
mean and bitter, but in a certain sense from below.155
Maurice Merleau-Ponty
My starting-point for this chapter is that the status of the image as record cannot be 
dependent on the medium of depiction. Rather images become records through their use. 
It is in relation to what we do with images that they get their status. In the examples I 
have discussed, in natural science and specifically in astronomy, it was the requirement to 
establish an unbiased form of observation that gave us visual records. So far my goal has been 
to puncture all categorical statements for and against the possibility of objectivity. This is not 
to say that objectivity is a nonsensical concept. I just want to specify contexts in which the 
concept is useful and the ways in which categorical statements about objectivity – about the 
given, nature as it exists in itself, vision as a phenomenon in nature – cause problems within 
epistemology. The claim to objectivity, to have a meaningful use, requires a context. This 
is what I have articulated in my discussions of the ideas of species and of the retinal image. 
154  Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Verso 1979), p. 6.
155  Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (Routledge 2005), p. 89.
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In the context of a time-period in which metaphysics and earlier ideological doctrines (i.e. 
Christianity, Platonism) fail to serve as an explanation of the natural world, the concept of 
species and that of the retinal image, were highly useful ideas. As they indicated that the 
natural world has its own way of conditioning us in our perception, they helped science and 
philosophy to focus attention on observational and empirically founded visual phenomena. 
This change of focus had vast advantages. The concepts of species and the retinal image 
were working tools in the construction of an epistemology of the Enlightenment. In what 
follows I will show how the photograph played a similar role as a go-between between mind 
and matter. These ideas had, even before the advent of photography, in one sense already 
established the conception of a kind of image that consists of a neutral recording of the 
visual field. Furthermore, these habits of thought were connected to actual depiction in 
perspectivist painting. This being said, photography and the discourse around this medium 
hold a special place in this discussion. 
Photography has often been conceived of as an indexical picture. It has been said to be 
a trace of the object, due to the fact that it is brought about through a process in which light 
reflected from the actual object in nature inscribes its image on photographic paper.156 What 
this view entails is that only the photograph can be a proper record, since it is essentially a 
recording of or by light, whereas other forms of depiction – engravings, paintings, etc., – are 
man made reproductions of colors and forms in the visual field. Photography invites the 
temptation to think of it as something beyond an image, Roland Barthes writes: ”I wanted 
to learn at all costs what Photography was ‘in itself ’ by what essential feature it was to be 
distinguished from the community of images”157. My issue with this idea is that it sometimes 
entails that the photograph constitutes the standard for visual records, all other forms of 
depiction being essentially something else. On Barthes’ view, other forms of depiction give 
us merely images, whereas photographs are something beyond the status of image. What 
I want to make clear in this chapter is that photographs, and photography, held a similar 
position in the discourse about the epistemology of the image, as did the earlier ideas of 
156  For an elaborate example of this idea, see Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (Hill and Wang 1981), p. 80-82.
157  Ibid., p.3.
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species and of the retinal image. When photography came about it appealed to sensibilities 
of the kind Barthes is expressing when he conceives of the photograph as something beyond 
image. My point is that this idea will be inhabited by similar misconceptions as were the 
ideas of the species and of the retinal image. 
In this chapter I will be concerned with the history of the invention of photography 
and the scientific milieu around it. The invention of photography introduces a new kind 
of image, conceived to be better suited for use as record, as compared with earlier forms 
of depiction. It cannot be denied that photographs are products of an automatic process. 
However, the problematic assumption that sometimes follows from this definition is that 
they, because of their automatic origin, somehow sidestep human involvement. In this 
view the photograph becomes the non-human image. This assumption is common both 
for the inventors of photography and many of the most influential 20th century theorists. 
For example, André Bazin writes, ”For the first time an image of the world is formed 
automatically, without the creative intervention of man [...] . All the arts are based on 
the presence of man, only photography derives an advantage from his absence.”158 Here 
Bazin seems to be influenced by the mind/natural world dichotomy that I have dealt with 
in earlier chapters. This way of characterizing the photographic image begs the question: 
what could it possibly mean to sidestep human involvement? Does this sidestepping leave 
us with a pure visual record, that which is left when all human judgments and conceptions 
are left aside? As I have shown earlier, this cannot be the case since, if photographs indeed 
were all this, when seen they are nevertheless brought back into the world of human 
understanding. As Donald Evans puts it: ”If the camera is to be said to see anything at all it 
can only be said to see what the viewer of the photograph can see”159. In this sense the idea 
of a pure visual record beyond the human is misguided. The whole idea of an image that 
exists somehow beyond, or despite human perception is absurd, because it disregards the 
fundamental fact that images and photographs are vehicles of communicating something, 
not (only) between the object and the subject, but between a producer and the viewer of 
158  André Bazin, What is Cinema? (University of California Press 1997), p. 13.
159  Donald Evans, ”Photographs and Primitive Signs”, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1978/79, New Series – Vol. LXXIX, p. 217.
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the image. Of course, even the theorists who claim that the photograph is a special kind 
of image would admit that every image (and everything that can be seen) has to be seen 
by somebody in order to be acknowledged. My point here is that the categorical claim that 
the photograph is, by necessity, more objective than any other form of depiction, sidesteps 
the fact that even photography as a technique, as well as  the individual photograph, come 
about through a complex goal oriented process, a process  put into work and regulated by 
a human agent. 
However, as I have shown earlier, and as I will continue to point out in this chapter on 
photography, there is a persistent desire within Western science and philosophy to construct 
an external view on reality, a view from beyond the human. This desire is linked to a bundle 
of other pivotal philosophical questions that I have addressed earlier. Problems within the 
classical and early modern theory of vision stemmed from the fact that, in order to rationalize 
the visual field, scientists like Euclid, Al-Hazen, and Kepler, to some extent disregarded 
what can be called subjective vision. As long as this choice of focus was deliberate it did 
not necessarily entail problems. Kepler suggested that, in order to understand vision and 
observation better, it might be fruitful to see what can be said about the visual faculty without 
taking subjective experiences of vision into account. That is, he wanted to focus on what can 
be said about vision from a third person perspective, on what we still can agree upon if we 
stick strictly to this perspective on vision, conceived of as a phenomenon in nature, not 
as experience. The same line of thought was applied to science in general. The method of 
choice for the natural sciences was to figure out what science can say about objects when we 
disregard the different roles they play in our everyday life. The task of science was to construct 
an understanding of reality that was not relative to personal experiences, opinions or earlier 
theories. It is in this ideology that the idea of an image as record becomes paramount, but at 
the same time this idea carries with it a temptation to forget about the inevitable involvement 
of the self in seeing. As we get carried away by this temptation our concepts get jolted and 
unsolvable paradoxes start announcing themselves: expressions beyond language, images 
beyond human perception, a world picture as seen from the view of nowhere. These are 
conceptual failures, failures in meaningfully thinking and talking about the concepts of the 
image, record, judgement and the self. 
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It is in our thinking, in a theory of perception, not in actual perception, that we establish 
this rift between the objective and the subjective. Richard Rorty points out how the view of 
knowledge as an assemblage of representations was a product of 17th century philosophy. He 
goes on simply to point out that this theory is optional, that it is important to understand that 
it played a role in the theory of perception, in epistemology and in philosophy in general, but 
that it need not play a role in any other philosophical discourses. The theory is a helpful tool 
in some cases while in others it might prove to be incompatible.160
So, the rift between subject and object is a consequence of a theory, not an actual state. 
This line of thought is articulated by Merleau-Ponty who points out how this discrepancy 
between a certain theory, or philosophical system, and our understanding of vision in our 
subjective experience is a consequence of the presupposed rift between mind and body. 
Merleau-Ponty writes: ”Here, for the first time, we come across the idea that rather than a 
mind and a body, man is a mind with a body, a being who can only get to the truth of things 
because its body is, as it were, embedded in those things.”161 The world of perception is then 
”a world in which being is not given but rather emerges over time.”162 The theory of a rift 
between mind and body cannot account for how we, as perceiving and experiencing beings, 
are involved in the world, how this involvement is a process. The view of Merleau-Ponty 
entails that objects are not merely bundles of given qualities, forms, colours, odours, tastes 
and sounds etc. They have a meaning for us that develops over time, through our relationship 
to them and our interaction with them. The relationship between the perceiver and object is a 
dynamic one. This relation cannot be exemplified by an instantaneous snap-shot of the visual 
field as Locke or Kepler would have it. Bill Nichols points out this discrepancy: “Seeing” 
involves our experience, conception, memory and judgement. How I see something reveals 
something about who I am. But a picture cannot carry with it a theory of how it is to be 
viewed, a concept cannot be illustrated”.163 When we try to understand what it means to see, 
160  Richard Rorty, Philosophy & the Mirror of Nature (Basil Blackwell 1980), p. 136.
161  Maurice Merleau-Ponty 2005, P. 56. In this quote Merleau-Ponty refers to Malebranche’s, The Search after Truth, translated 
and edited by T. Lennon and P. Olscamp (Cambridge University Press 1997), I, ch. 7, s.5, pp.35-36.
162  Ibid., p. 54.
163  Nichols, Bill, ” ’Getting to know you . . .’: Knowledge, Power and the Body”. In Michael Renov (ed.), Theorizing Documen-
tary (Routledge 1993), p. 182.
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it becomes evident that the philosophical branch of empiricism, at least the generic form of 
it that uses the concept of image as a model for understanding, has completely missed the 
mark while trying to explain perception. The idea of record does not make sense if it is taken 
to serve as a model for how we see.  
Towards the end of this chapter I will introduce another understanding of the concept of 
visual record that is based on the recordings capacity to sharpen our focus on certain aspects 
of the visual field. The task that I see as central for recording, is the practice of cultivating our 
visual field, of highlighting, foregrounding, accentuating certain features. In this sense the 
visual record is not a copy of the external visual field, but a kind of heightened attention that 
is conditioned by our different goal oriented tasks and the different questions with which 
we address our environment. This is the key idea that I want to develop at the end of this 
chapters and in the chapters to come. That is, I do not wish to abandon the idea of visual 
record as meaningless, but as long as it is connected to a certain understanding of objectivity, 
anti-anthropomorphism and neutrality, it will cause havoc within epistemology.
Still, the construction of an ideal of objectivity as well as the practice of constructing 
new visual aids and recording technologies will continue to thrive during the beginning 
of modernity. Photography and several other technological inventions are both constructed 
and used in the practices of observation by scientists of the 19th century. During this period 
the likes of Étienne-Jules Marey, Ernst Mach, and Francis Galton, among many others, 
study a wide range of phenomena, from locomotion, cardiology, aeronautics to sociology, 
anthropology, and psychology by the means of automatic apparatus.  These scientists do not 
only use the technology of photography. They also perfect, modify and adapt the invention 
that was first set forth by Nicéphore Niépce, Fox Talbot and L. J. M. Daguerre. Marey, 
Mach and Galton not only pick up the technique, but also the expectations and predictions 
of the pioneers of photography. The photographic technique that can be used for a variety of 
different forms of depiction has a scientific aura about it that has to do with its convergence 
with an ideology that strives to find truth ”beyond the limits of the human”164. This ideology 
164  I have borrowed the expression from Germaine Dulac as quoted in Hannah Landecker, ”Microcinematography and Film 
Theory”, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Summer 2005), p. 934.
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is formalized in the new doctrine of positivism during the 1830’s. Positivism constructed a 
“view from nowhere”165 that was alien in comparison to the subjective world of perception. 
It is exactly this alien aspect that appeals and reawakens hopes and expectations of a new 
science and a new worldview. But again, the underlying assumption of a view from beyond 
the limits of the human continued to muddle 19th century understandings of vision, image, 
record, and the subject.
The View from Nowhere 
For Bacon and his contemporaries, and even for George Berkeley in the 18th century, God 
was a superior observer, because this omnipresent being was a guarantor of the existence 
of the perceivable world.166 This idea is reproduced in positivism, that is, the positivists 
understand the human senses as being far too weak, too tied up with subjective conceptions, 
or too inattentive to grasp the workings of nature. But instead of God, the positivists turned 
to the automatic machine as a superior observer. In the absence of God, the record was 
required in positivist theory to grant an external view on nature: physics, chemistry, and 
the new discipline of sociology. What these machines did was that they introduced a kind 
of ”automatic seeing”167 that could promote a scientific view on phenomena. In this sense 
positivism was purely ideological. By means of visual recording, the observational gaze of 
science was brought into a public domain by the reproductive capacity of photography, and 
later that of film. Tom Gunning brings up this relation between the invention of cinema and 
other inventions that were used, not only to record, but also to transform our understanding 
165  Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press 1986).
166  In Berkeley’s  dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, Philonous claims: ”To me it is evident, for reasons you allow of, that 
sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in mind and spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that 
seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other mind 
wherein they exist. As sure therefore as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent spirit who contains 
and supports it.” George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley Bishop of Cloyne, Volume Two, edited by A. A. Luce and T. E. 
Jessop (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. 1949), p. 212.
167  Hannah Landecker 2005, p. 926.
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of human life. He writes: ”Cinema emerged within a welter of new inventions for the 
recording or conveying of aspects of human life previously felt to be ephemeral, inaudible, 
or invisible: the telephone, the phonograph, or the X-ray are only a few examples.”168 The 
scientific method of detached observation was brought into a larger social context, and the 
recording and reproductive capacity of the camera enabled this development. In this sense 
positivism was more than only a movement within science. It was an attitude that privileged 
a scientific way of seeing. It also had an impact on how we, as perceiving subjects, understand 
the world. Jonathan Crary describes this as a part of a ”massive reorganization of knowledge 
and social practices that modified in myriad ways the productive, cognitive, and desiring 
capacities of the human subject.”169 The new machines and the doctrine of positivism 
taught us a new way of looking at things. Or, maybe more precisely, they gave us means to 
popularize a scientific view, in a way that was not possible earlier. What is interesting for my 
purposes in the transition to modernity is the shift toward an even more rigorous skepticism 
toward subjective vision. When photography and later film, along with the new doctrine of 
positivism, establish an idea of an external view upon, not only natural phenomena, but also 
human life, it is a shift towards an understanding in which the self becomes a source for 
puzzlement. As if we had not known ourselves properly before.  
A change in epistemology, a shift in the theory of knowledge, was the essential impact of 
this development. I will explain how this change also had an impact on the conception of the 
image, but in order to do that, I will first articulate how the epistemological development got 
on its way. There is a certain familiar misconception in positivism that will, on the one hand, 
cause confusions concerning the status of the image, similar to those described earlier. On the 
other hand, the positivists’ disbelief in a God-given natural order will take these confusions 
to another level. In his Positive Philosophy, Auguste Comte describes the evolution of science 
as a progression linked to the development of human intelligence. He proposes that there 
are three stages in this development of the mind: the theological, the metaphysical, and the 
positive. These three concepts signify three methods of philosophizing. He sees it as his task 
168  Tom Gunning, ”Moving Away from the Index: Cinema and the Impression of Reality”, Differences, volume 18:1 (Duke Uni-
versity Press 2007), p. 35.
169  Jonathan Crary, Techniques of the Observer – On Vision and Modernity in the 19th Century (The MIT Press1992), p. 3.
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to outline the last positive stage. In a peculiar way, questions concerning vision, observation, 
and the record are at the core of this new doctrine. Although positivism is understood 
as a novel way of philosophizing in comparison to the older metaphysical doctrines, as a 
discipline, it still requires the concept of the go-between. However, it is a new kind of go-
between. Comte writes:  
The Positive Philosophy, which has been rising since the time of Ba-
con, has now secured such a preponderance, that the metaphysicians 
themselves profess to ground their pretended science on an observation 
of facts. They talk of external and internal facts, and say that their busi-
ness is with the latter. This is much like saying that vision is explained 
by luminous objects painting their images upon the retina. To this the 
physiologists reply that another eye would be needed to see the im-
age. In the same manner, the mind may observe all phenomena but 
its own. It may be said that a man’s intellect may observe his passions, 
the seat of the reason being somewhat apart from that of the emotions 
in the brain; but there can be nothing like scientific observation of the 
passions, except from without, as the stir of the emotions disturb the 
observing faculties more or less. It is yet more out of question to make 
an intellectual observation of intellectual processes. The observing and 
observed organ are here the same, and its action cannot be pure and 
natural. In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity; 
yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot effect 
the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to 
observe.170
In this passage Comte introduces several important notions dominant in 19th century 
philosophy and science. He quite rightly criticizes the theory of the retinal picture as a source 
of our knowledge. The fact that a picture requires a set of eyes in order to be seen proves 
the incomprehensibility in the idea of the retinal picture as a model for our knowledge. On 
this point he distances himself from all the Keplerian and Lockist optical metaphors for 
170   Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, volume 1 (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. Ltd. 1893),  p. 9.
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knowledge and understanding. But in general he shares the empiricist understanding in 
which the subjective merely has a confusing effect on pure observation. That is, he understands 
the fallacy in the camera obscura metaphor for our understanding, but at the same time he 
is drawn to the core idea that it entails. Comte does not deny that there is an internal reality 
of affects or feelings171, but he claims that, due to the misconceptions of earlier metaphysical 
philosophy, the subject has not yet had proper, scientific access to it(self). Here the emphasis 
concerning knowledge is another than in Descartes’ epistemology in which ”this me – that is, 
the soul by which I am what I am – is completely distinct from the body: and is even easier 
to know than is the body; even if the body were not, the soul would not cease to be all that it 
is”.172 Again here occurs a generic philosophical pattern of a split in the concept of knowledge. 
Descartes claims that we know our soul, his dilemma is how to explain how we know the 
material extended world. Comte’s problem is the opposite, how to extract observational and 
objective knowledge of the thinking and feeling subject. The challenge for this positivist 
approach is anthropology, the science of the nature of man. How can we gain knowledge 
of human phenomena, when our point of observation is from within that which is human? 
Or as Pamela H. Smith explicates this question, as a starting point for the 17th century ideal 
of a dispassionate observer: “How was the philosopher to escape the havoc wreaked by the 
passions when he relied so heavily upon the body and the senses and was himself immersed 
in the sensory world?”173 It was out of this fear of the “distorting effects of desire”174 that the 
idea of a dispassionate observer arouse. Comte specified that this problem is particularly 
pertinent when investigating human behavior. This will become the problem that positivism 
and the era of the new empiricism will see as its task to solve. Comte’s requirement of a point 
of view beyond the human perspective is, however, problematic in exactly the same way as is 
the Cartesian rift between mind and body. They are both built on the same structure. 
When Descartes states that he can know the self completely, that the self is accessible 
for the I in a transparent way, he makes an attempt to evade the so called homunculus fallacy. 
171  Auguste Comte, System of Positive Polity, first volume (Burnt Franklin 1973), p. 9.
172  René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteorology (Hackett Publishing Co. 2001), p. 28.
173  Pamela H. Smith, The Body of the Artisan – Art and Experience in the Scientific Revolution (The Univeristy of Chicago Press 
2004), p. 226.
174  Ibid., p. 228.
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That is, he understands that if the I perceives the self, and by ’perceive’ we mean literally 
visual perception as the camera obscura model would have it, then there are already two 
perceiving instances, the I and the self. This would then again require a third and a fourth, 
etc., set of eyes, thus ending in an infinite regress175. By this Descartes does not deny that we 
can have knowledge through images, he just points out that images, the representable, is one 
form of knowledge among others and that knowledge of my own self does not adhere to this 
form of knowledge. He writes:
But what causes many people to be persuaded that there is difficulty 
in knowing this [here he refers to difficulties of understanding the im-
material; God, the rules of geometry etc.], and even also in knowing 
what their souls are, is that they never raise their minds above sensible 
things and are so accustomed to consider nothing except by forming an 
image of it, which is a particular mode of thought for material things, 
that everything for which an image cannot be formed seems unintel-
ligible to them.176
Descartes points out how the idea that everything, even the soul, could be represented by 
an image, stems from an empiricist reduction. It is this reduction that Comte presupposes 
when he ends up in the paradoxical question of how the self can know itself properly, as the 
perceiver and the perceived are the same. As if the only proper knowledge of the self in the 
end had to be something representable, an image. Descartes points out that all knowledge 
175  Anthony Kenny acknowledges Descartes as one of the first philosophers who drew attention to the homunculus fallacy. In order 
to explain the context in which Descartes arrives at the fallacy, Kenny quotes Descartes ”and when it [the picture on the retina] is thus 
transmitted to the inside of our head, the picture still retains some degree of its resemblance to the objects from which it originates”. 
More importantly, Kenny shows that Descartes warns us, not to draw the wrong conclusions from the fact that there are pictures on 
the retina. To point this out Kenny brings in another quote by Descartes: ”We must not think that it is by means of this resemblance 
that the picture makes us aware of the objects – as though we had another pair of eyes to see it, inside our brain”. Anthony Kenny 
”The Homunculus Fallacy” in John Hyman (ed.), Investigating Psychology, Sciences of the Mind after Wittgenstein (Routledge 1991), 
p. 156. The Descartes quotes used by Kenny are taken from René Descartes, ”Dioptrics”, in Philosophical Writings, trans. and ed. E. 
Anscombe and P. T. Geach (Nelson 1954), p. 244 and 245-256.
176  René Descartes 2001, p. 31.
100
cannot have this form of an image (or scent, or sound).177 Comte understands the homunculus 
fallacy, but he does not understand that he himself also invites this fallacy when supposing 
that the observational form of knowledge is the only proper knowledge. This error stems 
from the visual metaphor. When Comte talks of the impossibility of observing the self, 
because in this case the perceiver and the perceived would be the same faculty, he could 
have chosen not to accept this model of the self. But when he proceeds to take this (the 
problem of accessing the self objectively) to be a real problem and furthermore, builds up 
his epistemology and the whole science of anthropology on this dilemma, he reveals that he 
accepts the model. He really thinks that science has to find a way to access the subject from 
an objective viewpoint. However, what Comte gets wrong is that these two perspectives do 
not stand in contrast to one another. On the contrary, they consolidate the same solipsistic 
conception of the self. All discourse that understands knowledge and understanding as 
primarily in some way or another consisting of a relationship between object and subject, 
will ignore how we essentially know the world or what knowledge actually is for. That is, 
knowledge is something that exists because we share this world with other subjects, i.e it 
stems from relations between subjects. There is then nothing problematic about an intellect 
that observes passions. The only situation in which such a perspective would be impossible 
would be if we were to disconnect the presence of all other living beings in our experiential 
world. This lack of understanding of the intersubjective grounds of knowledge is what invites 
a fundamental shortcoming in positivist epistemology .178 
Although Descartes properly could analyze the problem that arises from the empiricist 
reduction, he could not grasp in what way his own standpoint also consists of a reduction. 
Like Comte, Descartes is tempted to think that knowledge, the proper form of knowledge, 
is solely a business between the subject and the object. That is, both theoretical frameworks 
overlook the social world and that the possibility for knowledge stems from the fact that we 
share this world with other subjects. While Descartes tries to widen the epistemological 
177  Ibid.
178  I will continue this discussion concerning intersubjectivity and knowledge throughout the second part of this thesis.
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frame to also include knowledge beyond the senses, he still fails to make it wide enough. 
Catherine Wilson brings up this point in her reading of Friedrich von Schiller: ”Schiller 
says, when a philosophical system is trying to exclude something essential, that thing will 
keep breaking in on it, ruining the effort and creating problems and inconsistencies”.179 Here 
Wilson and Schiller do not address the problems concerning the concept of image, but a 
similar tension that resides in, what we call rationalism, the tendency in the philosophy of 
Descartes and Leibniz, “to make matter unreal”180. However, what I think is important in 
Schiller’s point is the structure of certain philosophical problems. My point is that what is 
sidestepped in both Descartes’ and Comtes’ accounts is not only, in one case the object, nature 
etc., and in the other case, the subject, attention, judgement, etc., but the relation between 
two subjects. Images are a way of communicating something between human beings. In this 
way we are not dealing with only subjects and objects, but also the other, the you, the second 
person (I will continue this discussion on communication in chapters 5 and 6).  
My point here is not to explain the relation between the epistemologies of Descartes 
and Comte, but to point out a discrepancy that, despite Comte’s attempt to rid positivism 
of metaphysics, inhabits both his own, and his predecessor’s understanding of the thinking, 
conscious, observing subject. When Comte writes ”as the stir of the emotions disturb the 
observing faculties more or less”, he tangles himself up in a problem that he thinks he can 
solve by emphasizing the importance of scientific observation. He sets out from a paradox 
in which emotions constitute something that will soil the pure observation, taking this to 
be inevitable since the visual faculty is by necessity inhabited by these passions. This opens 
up for the requirement of a form of scientific observation that lies beyond the subject. Like 
Kepler, who talked about pictures as opposed to images, since he understood images to be 
distorted because they were a compound of the visual input and of that which reason adds 
on to this input, or like Bacon, who professed that ”the great error of the senses” stems from 
the fact ”that they set the outlines of things by the pattern of man”181, Comte also conceives 
179  Catherine Wilson, ” Discourses of Vision in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics”, in David Michael Levin (ed.), The Discursive 
Construction of Sight in the History of Philosophy (The MIT Press 1997), p. 123.
180  Catherine Wilson 1997, p. 123.
181  Francis Bacon, The New Organon (Cambridge University Press 2002), p. 178.
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of the  effect of the subject as something that distorts observation. 
But he also makes another point when he states that the intellect cannot observe itself, 
since the observer and the observed would then be the same. With no distance between 
the observer and the observed, observation is impossible. There can then be no observation 
without there being two different entities because sight requires distance. On the one hand, 
Comte sees the subjective as something that distorts pure observation, on the other hand 
he acknowledges that the subjective is an integral part in perception. Comte’s assumptions 
are paradoxical since, if the subject by necessity influences observation, it is misleading to 
conceive of observation as such as either pure or distorted.182 If ’purity’ implies perception 
unconditioned by the subject, and if we agree that this is impossible, then there will be 
neither purity nor any corresponding distortion.183 This would be a logical consequence of 
Comte’s position. But he fails to see the paradox that lies in holding both that passions thwart 
observation and that the subject with her passions is inevitably entwined in observation 
of phenomena. He makes an attempt to address this by referring to a classical distinction 
between the passions and the intellect, as if they were two different entities, but this does 
not solve the confusion. Due to this line of thinking, he constructs an intriguing paradox by 
pointing out that the intellect cannot observe itself, since in observation the observer and the 
observed cannot constitute the same entity. In this specific context it rings true that ”In order 
to observe, your intellect must pause from activity” since ”If you cannot effect the pause, you 
182  St. Augustine makes this point brilliantly, he writes: ”How could a picture of a horse be truly a picture if the horse were not 
fable? How could there be a man’s face in a glass, true as such, though not truly a man? So if a certain kind of falsity is necessary in 
order that there should be truth, why do we dread falsity and seek truth as a great boon?”. St. Augustine, The Soliloquies, in Alexan-
der Sesonske (ed.), What is Art?, Aestheric Theory from Plato to Tolstoy (Oxford University Press 1965), p. 96. 
183  This point is made by Ernst Mach, he writes: ”I enunciated this thought as follows: The expression “sense-illusion” proves that 
we are not fully conscious, or at least have not yet deemed it necessary to incorporate the fact into our ordinary language, that the 
senses represent things neither wrongly nor correctly. All that can be truly said of these sense-organs is, that, under different circum-
stances they produce different sensations and perceptions.” Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations (Dover Publications Inc. 1959), p. 
10, n. 1. Note how rigidly Mach dismisses everything that is psychological in vision. Kepler renounced all non-optical factors that are 
involved in vision, as something that philosophers can speculate about. Mach goes one step further and claims that everything beyond 
the workings of light that give different images on different surfaces, is superfluous in an explanation of vision. In this statement he 
makes a peculiar kind of error. This kind of theory seems to pull out the rug beneath science. It disrupts all prerequisites for meaning 
in perception and divorces subjective vision from the realm of science of vision. He talks of representation that is neither wrong nor 
correct, but how could it then be representation? To represent something cannot be a completely ambiguous task. If representation 
does not aspire some form of correctness in any way, then it cannot be representation. 
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cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe”. But of course this point only 
makes sense in a very specific circumstances. Only if the thing under observation is the very 
same intellect, like a camera that would try to photograph its own automatic process, does 
the point hold any ground. But even if we take this case at face value and admit that ’I cannot 
observe my self externally’, this is not a problem, it is just stating what is not possible. In order 
for seeing to be possible, the viewer and the seen cannot constitute the same entity. Note how 
the visual metaphor is the source for confusion. 
If we move away from the strictly visual discourse, it is evident that Comte’s reasoning can 
be understood in a different, but maybe even more problematic way. His assumption that the 
intellect cannot “know” itself also carries existential undertones. From an example that builds 
on the problems that we might have understanding ourselves, due to the alleged impossibility 
of the intellectual faculty to observe its own functions externally, he makes an analogy to 
how science should conquer the problem of the involvement of the self in observation. In this 
sense, Comte establishes an ideal in which scientific, observational knowledge, even when 
we are concerned with our own selves, has priority over the subjective.  However confused 
this beginning, the ethos of positivism that points out the self as the problem for scientific 
observation, will have vast consequences. For Comte the task of science is to erect an order 
and maintain that order, in an otherwise fragmented and chaotic natural world that includes 
the fragmented and chaotic psychology of the subject. He writes:
The growth of humanity is primarily spontaneous; and the basis upon 
which all wise attempts to modify it should proceed, can only be fur-
nished by an exact acquaintance with the natural process. We are, how-
ever, able to modify this process systematically; and the importance of 
this is extreme, since we can thereby greatly diminish the partial devia-
tions, the disastrous delays, and the grave inconsistencies to which so 
complex growth would be liable were it entirely left to itself.184
184  Auguste Comte 1973, p. 6.
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By “the growth of humanity”, he refers to its thought, feelings, and actions. The task of 
science becomes then not only to discover or analyze these phenomena, but to control and 
unify them. He continues: “With this object in view the philosopher endeavors to co-
ordinate the various elements of man’s existence, so that it may be conceived theoretically 
as an integral whole. His synthesis can only be valid in so far as it is an exact and complete 
representation of the relations naturally existing.”185 Here is an apparent contradiction 
at play. It is one thing to describe or re-present an order, another thing to establish one. 
Essentially Comte advocates the establishing of a totalizing model that mimics an order 
given by nature.
Francis Galton, the father of psychometrics and eugenics, expressed a similar unease 
about the discrepancy between the actual physiological states in our brain and our knowledge 
of them. He writes: “We must be content to admit that our consciousness has a very inexact 
cognizance of the physiological battles in our brain”186. By this Galton expresses a view 
according to which the subject is too inattentive and weak to understand the objective 
conditions of its self. The misconception that he claims to be common for us is that we think 
of our consciousness as involving a free will. Galton’s main argument in this particular essay 
is that a thorough systematic observation of the mind would leave us with the conviction 
that “man is little more than a conscious machine”187, and that a mature perspective on one’s 
self should reveal that humans are automata.188 The obvious problem with both Comte’s and 
Galton’s constructed scientific view is that things do not add up. If we are but automata, why 
would there then be a need to unify, rationalize or control the chaotic subject? If the will is 
not free, why does it need to be controlled? Comte fails to see the tension here. He proceeds 
to establish a view on science as a regulatory institution that should be able to construct a 
point of observation that is external to the subjective. This idea is followed by the aim to 
establish a system. He writes: “We have now to proceed to the exposition of a system; that 
is, to the determination of the universal, or encyclopedic order which must regulate the 
185  Ibid.
186  Francis Galton, ”Free-Will—Observations and Inferences”, Mind, Vol. 9, No. 35 (1884), p. 410.
187  Ibid., p. 412.
188  Ibid., p. 408.
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different classes of natural phenomena”189. In this case “natural phenomena” also includes 
human actions and human psychology. Positivism is then not only a new, empiricist method 
for science. Comte also inaugurates a system of control of the self. In order to perceive the 
natural order as fixed, one’s ways of observation must be fixed. In order to achieve this, 
the positivist must understand the workings of his consciousness objectively. This view is 
connected to a major change in the understanding of vision that can be said to mark the step 
into modernity. Jonathan Crary writes: 
The virtual instantaneity of optical transmission (whether intromission 
or extromission) was an unquestioned foundation of classical optics and 
theories of perception from Aristotle to Locke. And the simultane-
ity of the camera obscura image with its exterior object was not ques-
tioned. But as observation is increasingly tied to the body in the early 
nineteenth century, temporality and vision become inseparable. The 
shifting processes of one’s own subjectivity experienced in time became 
synonymous with the act of seeing, dissolving the cartesian ideal of an 
observer completely focused on an object.190 
It is also this understanding of the subject as shifting or unstable as opposed to the fixed 
container-like subject of Locke, that evoked new concerns about the accountability of the 
subject that I mentioned earlier. Crary describes how, from the perspective of 19th century 
science, the former philosophy with its camera obscura metaphor for understanding, naively 
conceived the relation between the observer and the observed as a stable state, in which 
vision signified the capability of the eyes to present the soul with a copy of the outer object. 
From Kant onward, this view was no longer viable. In the time of Comte, the mind could 
no longer be conceived as a container of readymade sensations, but an active force that 
organized the different fragmented experiences into a comprehensible order.191 Comte seems 
189  Auguste Comte 1893, p. 14.
190  Jonathan Crary 1992, p. 98.
191  Ibid. p. 100.
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to understand the inevitable involvement of human judgement in observation that Kant had 
articulated. Comte writes: “In a word, every phenomenon supposes a spectator: since the 
word phenomenon implies a definitive relation between an object and a subject”192. In this 
sense we have no access to natural phenomena beyond the human ways of understanding 
them. Comte does not, however, seem to be able to grasp how this assumption stands in 
contrast to his own requirement of a form of scientific observation that grants an external 
view on human phenomena.   
Despite its internal contradictions, or maybe even due to them, positivism came to have 
a vast impact on the overall epistemological framework during the 19th century. The shift in 
focus from an epistemology, constituted on an idea of a fixed natural order, to positivism based 
on an idea of nature as an assemblage of temporal and dynamic phenomena, is expressed in 
Comte’s declaration: “the mind has given over the vain search after Absolute notions, the 
origin and destination of the universe, and the causes of phenomena, and applies itself to 
the study of their laws,—that is, their invariable relations of succession and resemblance”193. 
Only through unification of the practices of observation will this ordering be possible. In this 
shift, mathematics becomes “the most powerful instrument that the human mind can employ 
in the investigation of the laws of natural phenomena.”194 In this sense, mathematics is not 
part of the fabric of nature. It is not the order of nature, but an instrument that the intellect 
uses to establish an order in nature and society. This shift will, as I will show later, determine 
different uses of photography, because the shift in emphasis will also have consequences for 
the concept of the image. The go-between for positivism is not a readymade representation or 
a copy of external objects, but a logical and classificatory mathematical method that unifies 
observation. It is not then an image or even representable by images, since axioms and rules 
are not visible. 
In one sense, there is nothing new at all in Comte’s positivism. He continues, although 
reluctantly or even unwittingly, the metaphysical path that Descartes, Leibniz, and even 
Plato have set out before him. The result is a science that seeks to standardize by looking 
192  Auguste Comte 1973, p. 356.
193  Auguste Comte 1893, p. 2.
194  Ibid., p. 26.
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for common denominators.195 The requirement of an external view is then not actually tied 
to the visual per se, not to the actual eye of the observer, but to the mind’s eye that can 
supposedly categorize and rationalize the visual data. But, in a peculiar way, the visual record 
still has an important role in this venture. Visual data will become the raw material for this 
categorization. 
The reason why I give so much space to scrutinizing the obscurities in Comte’s views 
above is that I think they serve as an outline for the mentality within science and philosophy 
at the time of the invention of photography. During the first half of the 19th century, 
photography lands in the tension of this dialectic between the fixed objective and dynamic 
subjective views on vision. This tension creates a new kind of uncertainty concerning the 
status of the image. Beyond the more commonly acknowledged uses of photography – 
portraiture, journalism, art-photography etc., – the aspect of it as record is what initiates 
this technology to its age. It is not photography per se that evokes the ideal of an objective 
encyclopedic compartmentalization of the world. Rather it is its adaptability for a certain 
use, a standardization of the means of representation, that suits the positivistic ideology that 
requires an externalized view. 
This point is important for the present work since, from the start, photography acquired 
its role as a record due to its proficiency in producing fixed visual representations. Later on it 
also proved to carry a proficiency due to which it was suited as an instrument in the venture 
of ordering and standardizing a form of representation. This proficiency for standardization 
was not primarily due to the photograph being a visual image, it was due to the fact that 
photography was a result of a somewhat unified, optical and chemical, automatic process. 
These two uses of photography correlate with the earlier epistemological model of the 
Enlightenment and with the positivist ethos. Photography granted the scientists both a 
means of making visual records, and a way of standardizing information. But, my main point 
is that as long as the fundamental role of the image, the role that it has in communicating 
something between persons, gets lost in the theories of the photograph as either a visual copy or 
195  Let’s bear in mind that at this stage perspectival depiction and the rationalization of the visual field are already finished 
projects. Comte and his contemporaries already have a standardized model of the visual field to work with.
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a trace of an external object, or as the standard for visual recording, the theory of knowledge 
in relation to images will produce misconceptions.  
Fixing the Image – The Indexical Relation
I shall go further. I shall fix permanently these fugitive images!196
L. J. M. Daguerre
How charming it would be if it were possible to cause these natural im-
ages to imprint themselves durably and remain fixed upon the paper.197
Fox Talbot
This is not one of my recent results but dates from last spring; since 
then I have been diverted from my researches by other matters. I shall 
resume them today, now that the country is in full splendour, and shall 
devote myself exclusively to copying views from nature.198
Nicéphore Niépce
196  Helmut and Alison Gernsheim, L.J.M Daguerre – The History of the Diorama and the Daguerrotype (Dover Publications Inc. 
1968), p. 48. Daguerre, who is commonly conceived to be the inventor of photography (although this is a quite inaccurate statement), 
was claimed to have uttered these words after attending a public lecture by Professor Jacques Charles. Charles is said to have been 
able to make profile portraits on silver chloride paper. This was an early attempt on making photographs, however, Charles portraits 
were unfixed. Daguerre seemed to have understood that there was an immense importance in completing this technique by figuring 
out how these images, made by natural light, could be permanently fixed.
197  Quote from Fox Talbot’s The Pencil of Nature as quoted in Helmut and Alison Gernsheim 1968, p. 49. Fox Talbot, Daguerre’s 
main contender for the title of primary inventor of photography, expressed his ambition to capture the image inside the camera obscura 
in the year 1833.
198  Niépce as quoted in Helmut and Alison Gernsheim 1968, p. 56. If anyone can rightfully be titled the true inventor of photography, 
it should have to be Nicéphore Niépce. The quote above is taken from a letter addressed to Daguerre in 1827. The correspondence 
between Niépce and Daguerre is maybe one of the most important factors that led to the invention of photography.
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The idea of species constituted an understanding of knowledge as a fixed index199. Through 
species we receive impressions that are natural signs, signs that communicate how nature is 
constituted. In this sense the signs are essentially natural because they are created by the 
processes and the powers of nature. The same kind of idea is present during the invention of 
photography. Photography is conceived to carry a trace of the natural object, to be, due to 
its emergence from natural light, an image authored by nature. This understanding is still 
at the core of many prominent theories on photography. André Bazin, Susan Sontag and 
Roland Barthes have all pointed toward the indexical nature of photography as the aspect 
that defines it and supposedly makes it unique compared to other forms of depiction. I think 
this is correct if we take this point as a description or an articulation of the idea that gave 
photography its significance during its early years. However, I want to show that this idea was 
ridden with problems from the start. It is one thing to talk about the photographic process 
as a natural optical process. Of course this is undisputable in the sense that the workings of 
light permit photography to exist. Without the natural camera obscura effect, there would 
be no photography. But when this process is used in order to produce pictures that show the 
perceiver something or other, it is already part of a conditioning or a cultivation of a certain 
natural process. Consider the quote above by Fox Talbot: “How charming it would be if it 
were possible to cause these natural images to imprint themselves durably and remain fixed 
upon the paper”. Talbot’s concern is primarily the process of photography, he wishes he could 
improve it so that the images would stay fixed on the photographic paper. But the wording 
in the quote also echoes of Lockean epistemology: “Would the pictures coming into such 
a dark room but stay there, and lie so orderly as to be found upon occasion, it would very 
much resemble the understanding of a man, in reference to all objects of sight, and the ideas 
199  The concept of index and its relation to photography originates from the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. It carries the 
same problematic tension as does the concept of species. Mary-Ann Doane writes: “The index, as defined by Charles Sanders 
Peirce, occupies an uncomfortable position in the complex taxonomy of signs he elaborated in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. […] On the one hand, the term seems to specify signs on the order of the trace – the footprint, the death mask, the photograph 
(where the object leaves its imprint on a light-sensitive surface). This type of index partakes because the sign resembles the object. 
On the other hand, Peirce emphasizes that the shifter in language – a category including pronouns such as “this”, “now”, “I”, “here” 
– is an exemplary form of the index. In this case, the index partakes of the symbolic. In both these instances, the index is defined by 
its physical, material connection to its object.” Mary-Ann Doane, “Indexicality: Trace and Sign”, in Differences, volume 18:1 (Duke 
University Press 2007), p. 2.
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of them.”200 The key concept in this comparison is “natural image”. Talbot talks of natural 
images, as if images existed prior to the photographic process. The process becomes then 
simply a task of capturing the already existing image. The ambivalence of this statement is 
interesting, since it wrongly alludes to the process as simply one of capturing the image. But 
images do not exist there in order to be captured, they come about through a process, i.e. there 
is no picture before it is brought about through a series of optical and chemical processes. 
To call this process natural is pure rhetoric. If we look at the efforts involved in producing 
what would be called the first photographs, they surely did not occur naturally. If nature 
does not consist of a fixed given order, then the index of nature will always be a construction, 
not a copy of something fixed and already existing, but an attempt to construct a framework 
for the understanding of the dynamic and temporal natural occurrences. It is this shift in 
epistemology that is evident in Comte’s writings on positivism and it will have recoil on the 
way that photography was used. 
There were two challenges involved in the venture of making images in the camera 
obscura. Firstly one had to figure out how to get light to inscribe or imprint, not only 
project, an image on a surface. This was achieved as early as 1802 by Tom Wedgewood 
who accomplished an early form of the photographic process by using silver nitrate on 
white paper or white leather. The light-sensitive quality of silver nitrate, the fact that its 
monochromatic color-tone is altered by light, was known throughout the 18th century. 
Wedgewood used this knowledge to make primitive photographs by using glass-paintings. 
He exposed photosensitive paper infused with silver nitrate to light, and obstructed the 
light by placing the painted glass pane between the photographic paper and the light-
source.201 The shadow of the obscuring painted glass left a trace on the paper. The other 
significant obstacle was to get the image to stay fixed permanently on the surface. The 
impact of Wedgewood’s early primitive photographic experiments was very modest 
because of the ephemeral nature of the images. As soon as they were exposed to light they 
200  John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Alexander Campbell Fraser (ed.) (Oxford University Press 1894), 
p. 211-212.
201  Geoffrey Batchen, Burning With Desire – The Conception of Photography (MIT press 1997), p. 27-28.
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decayed and quite soon the trace of light was dissolved. This was the problem that Niépce, 
Daguerre and Talbot tackled three decades later.   
Among the above quoted inventors of photography, Fox Talbot’s first attempts on 
fixating an image projected by light on prepared light sensitive paper, were simply a process 
of placing objects on the paper so that they would leave an imprint on the surface, so called 
photograms.202 In this sense, photography was first achieved through actual contact between 
the photosensitive surface and the object. Not unlike Wedgewood’s early attempts, Talbot’s 
first experiments consisted of placing a piece of lace on the photographic paper and exposing 
both lace and paper to light (image 3.1). The only significant difference between Talbot’s and 
Wedgewood’s processes was that Talbot was able to fix the image on the paper. Geoffrey 
Batchen describes this process: “The image is physically caused by, is even directly touched 
by, the thing to which it will subsequently refer. This indexical type of relationship gives 
photography much of its distinction as a compelling mode of representation”.203 As I have 
mentioned earlier, this idea of an indexical relation between image and nature had a far-
reaching history within philosophy. Another factor that relates to the previous chapters is 
that the tactile, causal process of photography corresponds to the classical paradigmatic 
theory of sense-perception as primarily tactile. The tactile theory of perception was based on 
the assumption that touch or contact lacks the element of interpretation, it is not a “reading”. 
This idea is articulated by Susan Sontag. According to her photography is: “not only an image 
(as a painting is an image), an interpretation of the real; it is also a trace, something directly 
stenciled off the real, like a footprint or a death mask”204.
 Talbot understood the photogram as a form of depiction that sidestepped the artist, it 
was a “picture which makes itself ”.205 In this context it is highly interesting that the first 
attempts on photography were based on actual contact between the light sensitive surface 
and object. Later on, the need of actual contact was overcome by Niépce and Daguerre, and 
it became possible to make pictures of distant objects, but the idea of the tactile connection 
202  Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, Objectivity (Zone Books 2010), p. 128.
203  Geoffrey Batchen, William Henry Fox Talbot (Phaidon 2008), p. 13.
204  Susan Sontag “Image-World”, as quoted in Peter Geimer in “Image as Trace: Speculations about an Undead Paradigm” ”, Dif-
ferences, volume 18:1 (Duke University Press 2007), p. 7.
205  Fox Talbot as quoted in Geoffrey Batchen 2008, p. 13.
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of object and picture lived on as an analogy in the discourse on photography. It corresponds 
to what can be called an indexical relationship in which the sign is naturally caused by 
the object, an actual trace of the object. In this sense, new metaphors appear that refer 
to the classical idea of species. But the same discrepancy that was inherent for the classical 
theories of sense perception is apparent in the discourse on photography as trace. Vision 
is not primarily tactile, but an optical sense that requires distance. Neither vision nor 
photography could then rightfully be described by the metaphors of footprint, fingerprint or 
death mask since neither the eye, nor the photograph are actually touched by the object in 
nature.206 The photogram, an image that actually is created by a tactile contact, could perhaps 
more rightfully be described as an indexical trace of the object, but we do not typically give 
photograms a specific epistemic value (perhaps because in this case the relation between the 
original and the copy is so obvious). Then the reason why photography received its specific 
epistemic status cannot be dependent on this issue. I will return to this point later, and show 
how the idea of photography as a tool for science actually depended on its ability to capture 
views that the eye could not see. It did not gain its epistemic value, because of its ability to 
copy what we see, but because of its ability to establish a picture of something unseen. In this 
sense, the idea of trace or index prevailed. Photography seemed to bring us views that were 
alien, and at the same time supposedly natural. Here a breach between what we can see and 
how nature supposedly looks starts to occur.  
206  This point is made by Peter Geimer, “Image as Trace: Speculations about an Undead Paradigm”, in Differences, volume 18:1 
(Duke University Press 2007), p. 8-9.
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Image 3.1, William Henry Fox Talbot: Wrack, Photogenic drawing, 1839. 207 
In between the experiments of Wedgewood and Talbot, across the English Channel, 
two French scientists tried to complete the same technique of photographic depiction. In 
June 1827 Nicéphore Niépce was moderately successful in capturing the view from his 
studio window on a pewter plate coated with a light-sensitive bitumen solution, in a camera 
obscura. The result was a barely recognizable view of houses, rooftops and a tree against a 
horizon. (image 3.2) Niépce called his technique heliography, a concept that again refers to 
an inscription, a trace of light. This was a result of a long period of experimentation. Already 
in 1816, Niépce had made his first experiments with paper soaked in silver chloride.208 
During the same time another inventor and stage designer Louis Daguerre had made similar 
experiments. Daguerre and Niépce started a correspondence and eventually a partnership, 
but due to Niépce’s death in 1833, Daguerre continued his work on his own. One important 
change that Daguerre made was to use iodized silver plates instead of the bitumen-coated 
207  Image taken from <http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/282756?rpp=30&pg=1&ft=
Talbot+Fox&pos=3>
208  Geoffrey Batchen 2008, p. 33.
114
plates that Niépce had used. This reduced the exposure-time, from the eight hours that it 
took for Niépce’s pewter plate to be exposed in 1827, to six minutes in 1839 (image 3.3).209 
Image 3.2, Joseph Nicéphore Niépce, Oil-treated bitumen, 1826 or 1827210 
Image 3.3, Louis Daguerre, Boulevard du Temple, Daguerreotype, 1838 or 1839211 
209  Suren Lalvani, Photography, Vision, and the Production of Modern Bodies (State University of New York Press 1996), p. 15.  
210  Image taken from <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Niepce_1826.jpg.>
211  Image taken from <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:France_bulvar_1838-39_by_Daguerre_L.jpg>
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Up to the point when Daguerre started to get close to completing the invention of photography, 
he had dedicated his work to perfecting different techniques of trompe l ’oeil depiction. For 
him photography contained a greater goal. It was a way of bringing the techniques of realistic 
representation from the realm of art into the realm of science. The diorama, the camera 
obscura pictures and the perspectivist painting had served successfully as techniques of 
deceiving the human eye into perceiving the two dimensional surface, not as a surface, but as 
a window, or an opening. What the pioneers of photography actually wanted to achieve was 
something else. A very simple, but at the same time revolutionary feat: to fixate the images 
caused by natural light inside the camera obscura. Instead of making drawings or paintings 
that would appear to be views of nature, the pioneers wanted to make visual records of nature 
by the means of the workings of light. After perfecting the photographic process, Daguerre 
describes his (and Niépce’s) invention not only as an image, but as a process that grants 
nature a way of reproducing herself. He writes: “the DAGUERROTYPE is not merely 
an instrument which serves to draw nature; on the contrary it is a chemical and physical 
process which gives her power to reproduce herself.”212 When uttering words like these, 
Daguerre must have had some understanding of their recoil on certain scientific ideals. But 
perhaps not an understanding of the inherent problem with this kind of metaphors. These 
kinds of expressions point at a way of transcending the image’s fate of being merely an image, 
a manmade representation of nature. Even primitive recordings of natural light on metal 
plates or prepared light-sensitive papers, were considered to perform something completely 
different than realistic painting, engraving, linotype etc. This idea is also at the core of André 
Bazin’s ontology of photography, he writes:
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the 
conditions of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, dis-
torted, or discoloured, no matter how lacking in documentary value the 
image may be, it shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, 
the being of the model of which it is the reproduction; It is the model.213
212  Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre in Classical Essays on Photography, edited by Alan Trachtenberg (Leete’s Island Books 
1980), p. 13.
213  André Bazin 1997, p. 14.There is an ongoing discussion about how this passage should be interpreted. One thing that compli-
cates this issue is variations in different translations. For a discussion on this see Tom Gunning 2007, p. 32 and n. 4.
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Bazin takes this idea of an image transcending its status as image to its extreme. But, as I said 
earlier, the description is not all that far of the mark as a description of the attitudes that the 
inventors of photography actually had. Right from the start, photography gains a reputation 
as the realistic medium, before others. 
As in the case of perspectivist painting coinciding with the new direction within 
natural philosophy, the photographic apparatus similarly shared its place in history with 
the new direction of positivist philosophy. As a consequence of its professed dissociation 
from metaphysics, the scientific attitude of the 1830’s paid attention to describing the 
visual, instead of advancing interpretations. Scientists influenced by positivism believed they 
needed pure records of the visual to sidestep human judgment, earlier theories and subjective 
interpretations. The automatic and mechanized way of depicting was seen as the preferred 
method for scientific ordering and classification. This practice was not solely connected to 
photography. It came about in connection with earlier methods of depiction, such as tracing 
and wood-engraving. As Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison point out, while photography 
did not give rise to the new classificatory epistemology of science, it did fit the needs of 
this approach. In this way photography and positivism should be seen as two separate 
developments with strong ties.214 Daston and Galison proceed to define three reasons for why 
photography fit the preconditions of objectivist science. Firstly, the reproducibility of the 
photograph, the possibility of making identical copies of pictures, fit a standardization of the 
ways of observing. Secondly, the machine was considered to be more attentive, more honest 
than the human agent. The camera was conceived to be a superior observer in comparison 
to the easily distracted human eye. And thirdly, the machine seemed to offer an image 
uncontaminated by interpretation, a picture with an indexical relation to the natural world.215 
However, the originators of the many inventions required to complete the technique 
of photography were not exclusively influenced by positivism. The photograph and its way 
of capturing nature by the means of the workings of natural light also corresponded with 
romantic sensibilities. As early as 1840, the Finnish landscape painter Magnus von Wright 
214  Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 2010, p. 138.
215  Ibid., p. 139.
117
noted in his diary his amazement, after he for the first time saw a daguerreotype of a view 
in Paris, exhibited in a gallery in Helsinki. He writes: “this was thus a copy made by nature 
of itself ”216. What this example reveals is the rapid speed with which the photograph was 
spread, even to the peripheral town of Helsinki, then the Western fringe of the Russian 
empire. It was only in the summer of 1839 that Daguerre had made his invention public and 
during this time the first exhibitions of daguerrotypes were held in Paris.217 Furthermore 
it also exemplifies how the rhetoric that was connected to photography followed with the 
invention. The utterance “a copy made by nature of itself ”, when it is picked apart, seems 
to refer to two quite different ideas. In one sense it means an image, the actual photograph, 
conceived as a natural sign, a trace of nature. But it also refers to the actual process, nature’s 
ability to create images of herself, by herself. 
From Trace to Encyclopedic Order
As I mentioned earlier, the idea of photography as a tool for science actually depended on 
its ability to capture views that the eye could not see. Photography seemed to bring us views 
that were alien, and at the same time supposedly natural. The gap between what we can see 
and how nature supposedly looks seemed to indicate that the natural world is not properly 
accessible through sense perception. To articulate this point I want to bring in another thread 
in the history of photography from the later half of the 19th century, in which photography is 
established as a common tool in scientific experiments. 
Beside the obstacles of successfully fixating the projection of light upon the photographic 
paper there was one more issue that could be described as fixing the image in time. The qualities 
of the film and the shutter-speed determined what could be photographed. Photography 
of moving objects required faster exposure-times and faster shutters. Therefore speed and 
temporality entailed another obstacle for the technology of the camera and film. The early 
216  My translation, Magnus von Wright, Konstnärsbröderna von Wrights dagböcker 2, Magnus von Wright, Dagbok 1835-1840. 
(Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 1997), p. 428.
217  Helmut and Alison Gernsheim 1968, p. 95-96.
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photographs required very long exposure. From the 1860’s onward there occurred a rapid 
progress in perfecting faster, more light-sensitive film and faster shutters for cameras. This 
made photography of moving objects possible. Donald Evans points out how the technology 
of high speed photography also brought something new into our visual realm. He writes: 
“Figures were now frozen by the camera in apparently inconceivable positions quite alien to 
our customary manner of seeing with the naked eye.”218 High speed photography was able to 
present us views that could not be seen by the human eye. It indicated that the instantaneous 
snapshot of the world, the ideal of Locke, when finally realized in high-speed photography, 
actually looked nothing like our subjective psychological visual realm. It also meant that the 
“machinic speeds”219 that high speed shutters together with high speed film could achieve 
showed how temporality, the freezing of a moment by limiting the recording of light during 
different intervals, played a part in how things look. This was a factor that the Lockean 
visual theory had completely ignored. Time and temporality cannot, without friction, be 
represented in an image. A snapshot, how it looks and what it reveals, is dependent on the 
exposure time in relation to the quality of film, lenses, the apparatus and the development 
process, printing, etc. In other words, there is no given standard for how things look: also 
photography is a result of processes of standardization, which are in turn dependent on the 
different particular requirements made by different uses of depiction. 
If the emphasis is put on how our psychological subjective vision actually works it 
seems apparent that with the advent of high-speed photography, the Lockean static camera 
obscura model of perception had played out its role. The snapshot captures the kinds of 
views the camera obscura model should offer, and when what it offers is revealed to look 
nothing like continuous, dynamic, temporal subjective vision, the model evidently reveals 
its shortcomings. But another aspect of the new technology that still kept an inkling of 
the original empiricist notions alive was the fact that the mechanical process of the camera 
granted, in some cases, views that revealed facts about natural phenomena not perceivable 
by the naked human eye. On this level, the alien images given by high-speed photography 
218  Donald Evans 1978, p. 229.
219  Jonathan Crary, Suspension of Perception – Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture (MIT Press 2001), p.  142.
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seemed to correlate with the earlier epistemological doctrine of the Enlightenment that 
claimed that the subjects’ involvement in vision thwarted pure perception. This view was 
supported by the epistemological status that photography had achieved through its supposed 
indexical relation to the objective world. This mismatch between photography as a visual index 
of the external objective world and our psychological way of seeing the world complicated 
things further. Or, more correctly, the misguided interpretation of this as a mismatch kept 
the troublesome theory of a non-anthropomorphic view afloat. In this context, high-speed 
photography seemed fit to serve as a model for the neutral, unbiased, and objective view upon 
nature, or even the view of nature. But again, what is forgotten is the fact that in order for 
the photograph to tell us anything it had to be viewed by someone. Only through somebody 
seeing it, can it reveal anything about nature; the photograph becomes true through a subject.
One of the key figures in this development was the French physiologist, engineer, and 
inventor Étienne-Jules Marey, also known as one of the inventors of cinematography. His 
interest in high speed photography and chronophotography, the assembly of photographs 
into one single representation of the different sequences in movement, derived from his 
interest in medicine, physiology and the natural sciences as a whole. In the spirit of Comte, 
Marey saw the history of science as deterministic progress. In 1866 Marey wrote: 
Science has two obstacles that block its advance […] first the defective 
capacity of our senses for discovering truths, and then the insufficiency 
of language for expressing and transmitting those we have acquired. 
The aim of scientific methods is to remove these obstacles.220  
Marey was occupied with what Marta Braun describes as the ephemeral: “the lawlike 
relations between observable magnitudes that cannot be experienced through the senses 
but are established by observation and experimentation”221. If these statements are to be 
220  E. J. Marey as quoted in Marta Braun, Picturing Time – The Work of Etienne-Jules Marey (1830-1904), (The University of 
Chicago Press 1992), p. 12-13.
221  Marta Braun 1992, p. 13.
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taken at face value they disqualify both sense perception and human language as bases for 
our knowledge. Instead Marey, like Comte, believes in scientific methods, observation and 
experimentation as the paths to true knowledge. But the very obvious conceptual problem 
here is that there cannot be observation without sense-perception. This paradox is again a 
result of a confused epistemological theory, but to show at least how Marey could come to 
such a conclusion I want to bring up some examples of his work. 
Marey believed in a special kind of universality. When the basic natural laws were 
established by science, he assumed that the same patterns can be detected in widely different 
phenomena. This meant a thoroughly mechanistic world view in which physiology is based 
on the same principles as physics and chemistry. Earlier views in which the human body 
was conceived as a static machine driven by a metaphysical vital force was now overtaken 
by a doctrine that held that bodies, animate as well as inanimate, were inhabited by energy 
governed by the laws of electricity, light and heat.222 The old philosophical debate concerning 
the categorical difference between animate and inanimate bodies was in this way surmounted. 
For this scientific doctrine, the movement of a body, organic or inorganic, dead or alive, 
was governed by the same principles of energy. The reduction of the psychological into the 
physiological that the likes of Comte and in particular, Francis Galton advocated, was highly 
influential for Marey’s experiments. 
One of Marey’s key interests was the study of movement. Movement, because he 
believed it to be an expression of energy; and energy was linked to the pivotal principle 
of 19th century science – the first law of thermodynamics – stating that energy never 
vanishes but simply changes form. This was a natural law that seemed to determine the 
whole of nature. The appeal that Marey found in the study of movement was based on 
movements’ dependence on energy. While we can see movement, we cannot see the energy 
that makes things move. By visual observation, recording and mathematical translation, 
Marey thought he could extract facts about energy. Something invisible was believed to 
become graspable by this translation.223 In this sense, visual recordings of movement were 
222  Marta Braun 1992, p. 14.
223  Ibid., p. 13-15.
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translated into mathematical and quantifiable data. In the spirit of Bacon and Kepler, 
Marey searched for visual aids to interpret nature. In this case the visual aids were not 
there to aid sense perception, like the telescope or the microscope, but instead they made 
the translation of phenomena into mathematical axioms possible. In other words, this 
was not a case of “seeing better”. It was a case of using machines, graphs and measuring 
equipment as aids for translating the visual into a formal language of mathematics, i.e. 
to translate something visual to something non-visual. The point of these observations 
was not to produce static images or pictures. Rather it was the assemblage of data that 
was derived from different mechanic recording machines, the recording process and the 
scientific method, that became the go-between between mind and matter.
Marey’s first inventions were quite simple devices, like his first graphic instrument 
the sphygmograph. It was a pulse writer that was applied to the wrist, like a wristwatch. 
It consisted of a lever that was resting on the pulse point on the wrist and connected to 
a stylus. In addition there was a clockwork mechanism that moved a paper blackened 
by smoke, under the stylus. The apparatus produced a drawn graph that correlated with 
the rate and regularity of the heart’s pulse (image 3.4). What made this tool extremely 
important and successful for cardiology was its recording capacity. The process of 
measuring the heart beat had earlier been dependent on the touch of the physicist. The 
physicist felt the pulse of his patient by touching the pulse point on the wrist with his 
fingers and then calculating the rate by looking at a watch. The sphygmograf sidestepped 
all dependence on direct sense perception. It made possible a translation of the information 
to permanent, graphic representations that could be viewed by one or several scientists at 
the same time. These records could be compared to other records of the same standard. In 
this way the invention, quite modest at first glance, had a wide applicability. Furthermore, 
it fit the ideals of a doctrine that saw objectifying of an earlier subjective sensuous form of 
observation as its task.224 
224  Marta Braun 1992, p. 18-19.
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Image 3.4, Marey’s sphygmograph225
Another, perhaps more eccentric, interest of Marey’s was the study of the movement of 
the wings of birds and insects. His motivation for these kinds of studies was his belief that, 
if one could understand the muscles, motions, and aerodynamics of the wings of a flying 
animal, perhaps this information would amount to an understanding of how to reproduce 
this mechanically. The study of flight was aimed at “making visible the mysteries of nature” 
so that perhaps “humans could imitate and reproduce them”226. 
A detail worth mentioning is that Marey, although he probably caused some amount 
of stress to the animals in his experiments, was opposed to vivisection. This was not only a 
moral concern, it also constituted a difference in methodological approach. Marey held that 
the dissection and study of dead matter fundamentally altered the observed phenomena. For 
him vivisection only revealed the static perceivable facts that were already available for human 
perception.227 In the same way, but for different reasons than the earlier naturalists, Marey 
understood subjective human vision as presenting science with mere appearances, whereas 
the objective recording method gave us facts.228 The facts, in the sense that Marey talks about 
them, are not “given” in perception. They stem from the systematic form of representation 
that the automatic recording machines are conditioned to establish. 
Based on these kinds of experiment Marey moved on to using the camera to record 
data. He continued his work on recording the movement of birds and other animals by 
225  Image taken from  <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marey_Sphygmograph.jpg>
226  Marta Braun 1992, p. 35.
227  Ibid., p. 38.
228  Ibid., p. 30.
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photographing the different sequences in the movement of bodies with high-speed cameras. 
Initially it was not the prospect of getting access to the visual per se that attracted Marey 
towards photography. On the contrary, he had worked under the assumption that sense 
perception somehow had to be sidestepped in order for the scientist to get in touch with the 
true fabric of nature. In this sense the epistemic status of the visual world was ambiguous 
for Marey. But when the high-speed camera offered another, alien, but yet visual world, it 
corresponded to his scientific doctrine that was skeptical towards the senses.   From being 
conceived to be an image of nature, photography, the way in which Marey used it, became 
a recording device that helped translate natural phenomena into quantifiable, standardized 
data. Here the photograph is not indexical in the sense that it was before. It is not a trace of 
nature, a natural sign. It is part of a man made index, a standardized way of presenting data. 
Here the meaning of ’index’ has shifted. From signifying a natural trace, it has become an 
archive of systematized data, an encyclopedic, man-made world order. 
Recording Life 
One example that became paramount for the supposed mismatch between subjective 
vision and scientific objective observation derived from Eadweard Muybridge and Marey’s 
experiments with photographic recording of the movement of the legs of horses during the 
1870’s. In a letter to the editor of La Nature, Gaston Tissandier, Marey expresses his hopes 
for what the photographic image can bring to the natural sciences. He writes:
And then what beautiful zoetropes he will be able to give us: in them 
we will see all imaginable animals in their true paces, it will be animat-
ed zoology. As for artists, it is a revolution, since they will be provided 
with the true attitudes of movement, those positions of the body in 
unstable balance for which no model can pose. You see, my dear friend, 
my enthusiasm is boundless.229
229  E. J. Marey as quoted in Marta Braun 1992, p. 47.
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In this letter Marey refers to the artist and inventor Eadweard Muybridge who, like Marey, 
was a pioneer of experiments of photographing moving objects. They had similar goals but 
slightly different techniques. They both attempted to record movement, which also required 
that they figure out how to represent temporality in photographic pictures. Muybridge solved 
this by making series of photographs that captured different sequences of the movement of 
a horse. The result was then a series of different pictures where each picture was a frozen 
moment in the sequel of a horse in gallop (image 3.5).230 Marey established another technique 
in which the moments were captured on one photographic negative, so the same negative 
had several exposures with the different sequences of the movement of the galloping horse 
(image 3.6).231 The extraordinary thing that Muybridge’s horse images revealed was that they 
discredited earlier conventions within painting. In naturalistic paintings a horse in gallop was 
usually depicted differently compared to Muybridge’s photographs. The differences were quite 
minute details concerned with the postures of the legs in gallop. 
However this became a big issue due to the supposed epistemic superiority of photography 
that these kinds of examples seemed to reveal. Muybridge writes: “So it is with the galloping 
horse; we have become so accustomed to see it in art that it has imperceptibly dominated 
our understanding, and we think the representation to be unimpeachable, until we throw all 
our preconceived impressions on one side, and seek the truth by independent observation from 
nature herself.”232 In this case the horse image seems to indicate that there actually exists a 
visual realm that is alien to our anthropomorphic understanding of it. 
230  Marta Braun 1992, p. 52. This procedure is described in 1881 in the Paris based newspaper Le Globe (quoted in Braun 1992), 
as follows: “[...] Before this arrangement of apparatus ranged along like canons, 24 in number, the animal passes along on a track, 
beyond which is a white wall which furnishes an appropriate background for the photography. At each step, the animal breaks a 
thread, which brings an instrument into play, so that at each stage of its passage no matter how rapid, there remains to us an image.
231  Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time, Modernity, Contingency, the Archive (Harvard University Press 2002), p.49.
232  (Emphasis by Muybridge) Muybridge as quoted in Donald Evans 1978, p. 230.
125
Image 3.5, Eadweard Muybridge, The Horse in Motion, Chronophotography, 1878233
Image 3.6, Étienne-Jules Marey, Arab Horse Gallup, Gelatin silver print, 1887 234
Another more refined example that evoked the idea of the photographs superiority in 
relation to painting and other forms of depiction, was Ernst Mach’s235 1880’s photograph 
of a bullet in flight (image 3.7). The image not only shows the bullet frozen in time, it also 
233  Image taken from <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Horse_in_Motion.jpg>
234  Image taken from <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%C3%89tienne-Jules_Marey_-_Arab_Horse_Gallup_-_Google_
Art_Project.jpg?uselang=en-gb>
235  To be precise the original photographic plates where taken by Mach’s collaborator Peter Salcher.  Christoph Hoffmann, “Repre-
senting Difference: Ernst Mach and Peter Salcher’s Ballistic-photographic Experiments”, Endeavour, volume 33, No. 1, 2009, p. 18.
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reveals that at such speeds (supersonic speed of 520 meters per second)236 the bullet will 
cause shockwaves in front of it. Mach’s picture seems to show that the physical world is 
unfamiliar to us, and that the go-between of photography will introduce us to this alien 
world of natural phenomena.237 
Image 3.7, Ernst Mach, Photography of bow shock waves around a brass bullet, 
Schlieren photography, 1888238
Now one could think that perhaps photography eradicates all ways of looking at things, 
that it shows how something looks despite our ways of seeing, that the shockwaves are in 
the picture, not because conventions of representation, pre-conceptions or earlier knowledge 
would require them to be there, but because photography records natural phenomena. It is 
something like this that Mach’s, Muybridge’s and Marey’s photographs seem to tell us. And 
this assumption is what makes photography the superior methodology of the times. But 
suppose we turn around the question and ask: ’Why does Mach’s bullet image reveal the 
shockwave?’ It is not enough to say that it does so because it is a photograph, because not 
any photograph would reveal this. If we examine the process behind the bullet-photograph 
closely the role of the record becomes clearer. Mach did not discover shock-waves solely 
because of this photograph.  The important fact that often is forgotten when one points at 
this case as an argument for the objective role of photography is that Mach, during the time 
236  Jonathan Crary  2001, p.  144
237  Ibid., 142. 
238  Image taken from <http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Supersonic_Bullet.jpg>
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of the shot, was not clear about if what he saw in the picture, was what he had expected. The 
image, by itself, had a very vague epistemological status. Later on it became an illustration of, 
and even the proof for sound-waves, but at the moment of the shot and for some time after 
that, it was an enigmatic image for Mach. Christoph Hoffman writes:
But the reproductions buried in the Mach archive, although just 9 mm 
in diameter, do make one thing abundantly clear. So dark, hazy and 
abstract are these miniature images that there is no simple way they 
could have led Mach to his ‘expected result’.
In addition, the text of Mach’s notice provide further evidence that 
he did not yet fully understand the phenomena captured in the photo-
graphs. For according to the title of his message, it is clear he thought 
he had photographed a ‘mass of air’ but by the time it came to the for-
mal  publication in 1887, Mach and Salcher wrote not of ‘mass of air’ 
but of ‘kind of stationary sound wave’ or a ‘stationary flow of air. 
[…] Initially, Mach was not even able to distinguish between the top 
and the bottom of the photographs because he knew neither the posi-
tion of the plates in the camera nor the bullet’s orientation.239
Evidently the photograph did not primarily have an epistemic role in Mach’s research, but it 
did grant a certain advantage, since:  “photography allowed the phenomena in question to be 
recorded.”240 It was the “persistence of impression”241 in photography that was of importance, 
photography’s capability of fixing an ephemeral moment, under highly specialized 
experimental circumstances, and, photography’s proficiency for the standardization of visual 
information. Hoffmann continues: “the photographically fixed image of air around the 
travelling bullet could be studied while the observer was at rest. Moreover, several images 
could be easily compared to each other. […] In this way, it was possible to achieve a stable 
setup, stable production of the phenomena and stable examination of the photograph.”242
239  Christoph Hoffmann 2009, p. 18, 20.
240  Ibid.,p. 18.
241  Ibid.
242  Christoph Hoffmann 2009,  p. 19.
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For Mach it was this photograph, among a set of other photographs from the same 
experiment that was able to capture the shockwave, due to specific experimental and 
technological circumstances; just any photograph or camera would not have performed the 
task. In this way, we cannot say that this photograph would eradicate all ways of seeing, since it 
is conditioned in a certain way and this conditioning enabled the capturing of the shockwaves 
on a photographic plate. This observation was not possible because of the absence of a human 
way of seeing, but because of a conditioning and a cultivation of a certain human way of 
fixating, standardizing and rationalizing the practice of visual recording. This conditioning 
presupposes assumptions, theories and knowledge of the phenomena beforehand. This 
does not mean that the photograph always gives us an image that is preconceived. Through 
a certain use of photography the phenomena can reveal other visual qualities than those 
that were expected. This possibility gives the record an advantage. Here it is important to 
understand the reciprocity at play. In order for nature to reveal its secrets, our ways of seeing 
have to be conditioned to do so. 
Here the correct emphasis is crucial: the photograph does not eradicate all ways of seeing, 
but prioritizes or allows us to focus on a way of seeing. The important point here is to articulate 
what the photograph actually does in this context. My claim is that it simply does what images 
usually do: it cultivates a way of seeing. It stresses a certain aspect more significantly than 
others. It is true that, in this example, the visual information on record corresponds to a fact. 
The image does not create the shock-wave, the wave is there regardless of the representation. 
The shockwave is then a part of nature, not something added on to nature in the process of 
producing the photograph. But in order to get the camera to record this phenomenon, the 
technological/chemical process has to be carefully manipulated to do so. 
On the epistemological level we have to agree that shockwaves exist and horse-legs are 
jackknifed in the way that high-speed photographs indicate, whether we see this or not with 
our bare eyes.  But this does not prove the ambiguity of the epistemological status of subjective 
vision, since these photographs do not contradict what I or anybody else actually can see. 
What they contradict is not the visual data of subjective vision, but earlier conceptions, 
theories and knowledge. The fact that we cannot discern bullets in flight or shockwaves with 
our eyes, if it is considered to be a shortcoming, is not an epistemic shortcoming. What would 
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make it an epistemic shortcoming, a deficiency in our knowledge, is if these photographs 
contradict or change our previous understanding of things. In this case the contradiction 
does not stand between subjective vision and objective visual data, but between Mach’s, and 
previous scientists, preconceptions and what the visual data reveals. What it reveals, is in this 
case not simply a copy of the exterior phenomena – shockwaves – since a mere copy would 
not reveal anything. As Donald Evans points out: ”However accurate the copy it is only 
understood if what it is a copy of is itself understood”243. In this way the record cannot and 
should not help us surpass our subjective actions of interpretation, reading, judgement and 
attention. On the contrary, the record requires a subject that can interpret it, since it does 
not by itself show what place it occupies in the visual world. In the Mach case the specific 
photograph was a result of a comparison between a whole array of pictures:  “It was not a 
single spectacular picture that – simply by looking at it – provided the central insight, but 
rather the laborious process of discerning and comparing minutes from about 70 or 80 very 
tiny recorded images.”244
When we look into the meaning of phenomena, we ask questions that go beyond the 
dichotomy of truth and falsity. Only when there is a tension between, as in this case, what 
the photograph reveals and what Mach earlier had seen in other representations, the question 
concerning truth and falsity, reality and appearance will arise. Truths or the need to assess what 
is true and false rise from tensions. If we interpret the examples of Mach’s bullet-photograph 
and Muybridge’s horse photographs in the generic empiricist way, the examples indicate that 
the tension resides between the subject and the object. But the tension can only constitute a 
tension within a subject or a community of subjects. For something to be knowledge is for it to 
be included in a realm of questions and answers about reality. As long as the fact that horse-
legs are jackknifed in a certain way under the horse in gallop, or the fact that projectiles with a 
supersonic velocity produce shockwaves, are not brought into our human realm of knowledge 
they cannot constitute any knowledge. It is only when these facts are brought into our system 
of knowledge by our attention, into the world as we know it, that they become truths. Truths 
243  Donald Evans 1978, p. 220.
244  Christoph Hoffmann 2009, p. 18.
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are related to the questions we pose to the world, not copies of a world as it exists by itself. In 
this sense representations or even visual records are never neutral. It is not the neutrality or 
objectivity of Mach’s bullet photograph that makes it significant, but its function as evidence 
in relation to one understanding of hydrodynamics as opposed to another (understanding of 
hydrodynamics). The facts are then facts because of their relation to an understanding, or as 
Nietzsche would have it “It is only through thought that there is untruth.”245
Conclusion: Cultivation of the Visual Field
In this chapter I have dealt with two pivotal ideas concerning the concept of photography. 
The first one is the idea of the photograph as trace, the idea of an image as a natural sign. The 
second one is the idea of photography as a tool in the assemblage of data or photography as the 
natural standard for visual recording in the venture of erecting a scientific encyclopedic world 
order. My worry with both these understandings is that they, in a problematic way, point 
towards nature as a force that constitutes the visible world, beyond or without the attention, 
judgement and experience of the perceiving subject.  In this sense they share the problems 
of the camera obscura model for perception. Jonathan Crary notes how the analogy between 
the camera obscura and the eye is finally and devastatingly confronted by Kant’s Copernican 
revolution within epistemology. He quotes Kant: “our representations of things, as they are 
given, does not conform to these things as they are in themselves, but that these objects as 
appearances conform to our mode of representation.”246 The image is in this Kantian sense 
not a copy that reproduces the qualities of the outer object. Rather the image brings the 
natural into an anthropomorphic order. It is hard to articulate this point, because Kant’s 
formulation of it is not unproblematic, but at least it disqualifies rigorously all attempts to 
make sense of representations as “copies made by nature” or processes that give nature the 
power “to reproduce herself ”. 
245  Friedrich Nietzsche In Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.)1992 ,volume 1, p. 87.
246  Immanuel Kant as quoted in Jonathan Crary 1992, p. 69-70.
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What I want to articulate with the help of Crary’s analysis is not primarily a historical 
point, but more accurately a point about the paradox at hand. The idea of photography as 
index (and in this context ‘index’ refers both to the concept of natural sign and to the concept 
of the natural encyclopedic order) stands in contrast to the idea of photography as a process 
that translates the dynamic temporal phenomena of nature into an anthropomorphic order, 
into a system of signs. On the first understanding, the photograph is a copy of the visual 
field, an index, or even a tactile trace. In the second case, it is reorganization of the visual 
world into, not a copy, but a cultivation of the visual field. The latter meaning recognizes the 
inevitable status of the image. In the image, nature is brought into culture: attention and 
judgment are focused on certain aspects of reality. The idea that photography, as opposed 
to other images, has a special indexical power to reproduce the visual world is at the core 
of the problem. Since images and, along with them, photographs do not copy ready-made 
views of nature, but rather construct these views, these views do not exist before they become 
photographs or paintings, engravings, films etc. It is not nature, but the human mind and 
attention, the human eye and the human hand that gives images this power. 
To make this point clearer let us consider a thought experiment that is presented 
in Oscar Wilde’s essay The Decay of Lying. In a polemical remark, Wilde writes about 
impressionist painting:
Where, if not from the impressionists, do we get those wonderful brown 
fogs that come creeping down our streets, blurring the gas-lamps and 
changing the houses into monstrous shadows? […] Things are because 
we see them, and what we see, and how we see it, depends on the Arts 
that have influenced us. To look at a thing is very different from seeing 
a thing. […] There may have been fogs for centuries in London. I dare 
say there were. But no one saw them, and so we do not know anything 
about them. They did not exist till Art had invented them.247  
247  Oscar Wilde, The Writings of Oscar Wilde edited by Isobel Murray (Oxford University Press 1989), p. 232-233.
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This can be read as the antithesis of the idea the natural sign. If we, for a moment, sidestep 
the obvious consciously embraced paradox in Wilde’s quote – the fact that he refers to art as 
a way of creating natural phenomena – there is still something that rings true in this idea of 
how art influences our ways of seeing. The impressionist turn in painting meant the cultivation 
of attention on the qualities of light. The impressionists tried to paint the qualities of light in 
a more accurate way than the academic painters of the time had done. We could, without a 
stretch, call this practice a recording of light. Not that light would inscribe itself on the canvas 
like it does in photography. In this case, “recording” does not refer to mechanical process, but 
to heightened awareness of, or concentrated attention to, certain aspects of the visual field. It 
brings out the meaning of recording as a task. Not as the indexical copying of appearances in 
the world, but as a cultivation of the visual. What the Oscar Wilde quote highlights is that this 
way of cultivating some aspects of the visual field revealed things that had slipped from the 
earlier painters’ attention. The point is not whether the late 19th century city dwellers actually 
had seen fog or not. It is not an factual question of whether the fog was there or not. The point is 
to articulate how the visual is, by necessity, entwined with our attention, on what is articulated, 
foregrounded and forgotten in our visual field. Of how depiction and its conventions are a 
cultivation of different ways of attending to the visual world. 
If some form of depiction actually were to ‘stand closer to nature’ than others, in an 
absolute sense, it would require there to exist a given image in nature. When we admit 
that this is not the case, we also admit that there is no given natural standard for depiction. 
All forms of depiction stand at the same starting line. Here it is also important to add that 
different forms of depiction may stand close to nature in different ways. In a certain context 
we can acknowledge that photography indeed is closer to nature than painting, since it stems 
from an automatic process. In another context the black and white photographs of the 19th 
century did not tell us much about colours in nature. So, if the right colour was taken to be a 
criterion for realism, photographs had no naturalistic merit at all. In this context, we can say 
that impressionist painting stood closer to nature, as the impressionists worked out a superior 
technique in order to capture the temporality of light. When we admit that there is no given 
standard, no absolute likeness, but rather different preconceived ideas of what it is for an 
image to be a good likeness, we also admit that there can be no form of depiction that stands 
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out as a pure record among mere images. As my colleague Hugo Strandberg has articulated 
this point: ”The problem is not that one takes one perspective as foundational and not the 
other; the problem is to believe that there is a foundational perspective.”248
In order to find an alternative way of understanding these questions, I propose a slightly 
different interpretation of the concept of visual record. The fact that the photograph evokes 
ideas of a natural sign can also be connected to the way in which it feeds on our desire to see 
reality with uncontaminated, innocent eyes. One expression of this desire can be found in 
Bazin’s thoughts on photography. Bazin writes: 
Only the impassive lens, stripping its object of all those ways of seeing 
it, those piled-up preconceptions, that spiritual dust and grime with 
which my eyes have covered it, is able to present it in all its virginal 
purity to my attention and consequently to my love. By the power of 
photography, the natural image of a world that we neither know nor can 
see, nature at last does more than imitate art: she imitates the artist.249 
Here Bazin, if we read him correctly, makes a very important statement. Photography evokes 
in him an experience of seeing something for the first time, without any of his knowledge, 
preconceptions and psychological baggage. Now we cannot deprive Bazin, or anybody else of 
having this kind of relationship with photography. This is a role that photography sometimes 
has within a culture. But the simple reason for this is that we have given photography this 
role. It does not carry this role by itself.  The actual appeal of the scientific view is then 
perhaps not scientific at all, but rather existential: a need to transcend dogmatism, opinions, 
judgement, in order to reawaken us to an interest in the world of perception. When the actual 
world starts to appear thoroughly conditioned and designed by human mind and human 
hand, perhaps a need to reestablish a kind of wonder towards the objects in the world is 
248  Hugo Strandberg, On “The Freedom of Will” (Unpublished). This working paper was presented at the research seminar at the 
Department of Philosophy, Åbo Akademi University, 12 of September 2011.
249  André Bazin, What is Cinema? (University of California Press 1997), p. 15.
134
awakened. Stanley Cavell describes this as an attempt to: “free the object from me, to give 
new ground for its autonomy”.250 I think this is a sensible understanding of the context in 
which the concept of record can find its home. In this sense the record, be it a painting, an 
engraving or a photograph, has a distinct place within the world of images, since it signifies 
an external view. 
What can we then say about the meaning of the concept of visual record? What is present 
in the views that I have scrutinized in this chapter as well as the former chapters is a certain 
need to establish an external view on nature and the human being. Due to its alien appeal, 
high speed photography grants a view that fits the characteristics of a non-human, external 
view upon nature and man. This externality should not be confused with something beyond 
the human. On the contrary it is at the core of the existential, very human desire to understand 
the world beyond what we have made of it. It stands for the hope of an understanding beyond 
a fixed and indexical order. I think it is something like this that Bazin and the early inventors 
of photography find attractive in the new medium. But this should be understood exactly as 
a countercurrent to the rationalization and standardization, the encyclopedic ordering of the 
world that gave momentum to the invention of photography.















Towards a Common Sense
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Introduction to Part II
One realization that has pushed me to write this thesis is born out of occasions when 
rationality and objectivity, some of the most basic concepts of Western philosophy, stand 
in the way for our understanding of the world. It is this voice of reason that sometimes 
becomes monolithic, it leaves out emotion, engagement and adversity, and therefore 
everything that is important for an understanding. This monolithic voice also drowns all 
other voices, all conflicting views, and alternative interpretations. It is this comfortable 
detachment provided by rationality that makes it such an attractive attribute. What I have 
described in the first part of this thesis is an evolution in which the concept of image 
was developed into a tool for this kind of rationality, due to the distance and detachment 
that the image presumably grants the viewer. This was done due to the belief that our 
passions, our subjective experience and the conflicting voices of different ideologies and 
sentimentalities stand in the way of an objective, visual and rational understanding of 
the world. The image and especially the photograph were designed to become carriers of 
a rational monolithic voice, through a long development in science, philosophy and arts.
In the second part I will continue to show how this rationalization and the ideal of 
objectivity, obscures our understanding of how images work and of our relationship with 
reality. The realistic image carries a power to make something present for me251 and because 
of this ability it is also able to show me a world that is not known to me, that is beyond my 
preconceptions and expectations. Here I am faced with the uncanny status of the image. 
How is it able to make something present for me? The answer that I will outline to this 
question is that it does so through aligning my views with the views of other people. The 
realistic image is able to engage me in a negotiation concerning what my relation to this 
world actually is. In this sense it does not only make objects in the world present for me it 
reengages me, it makes me more present in this world. 
As I have shown, by the end of the 19th century it was evident that the notion of visual 
record contained an inherent tension. On the one hand, the visual record was a building 
251  Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (Harvard University Press 1979), p. 20.
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block in the rationalization of the visual field, the compartmentalization of the world into 
an encyclopedic indexical visual order. The meaning of the index was to fix knowledge. It 
stood as an answer book for supposedly all things and all phenomena in order to ensure that 
we see and know the same thing when we observe them. This aspect of the visual record 
was related to the domestication of the natural world that the ideas of the Enlightenment 
entailed. On the other hand, the visual record was a concept that pointed away from the 
conditioned and readily interpreted visual world toward the ephemeral nature as it exists 
within itself. This idea of the unconditioned natural world was another consequence of 
the Enlightenment. This problematic dialectic between the rationalized visual order and 
an image beyond human conditioning will play various roles in the following chapters. 
I will continue by focusing on the concepts of visual record, photography, film and the 
documentary. And I will continue to show how this tension between a rationalized 
anthropomorphic visual order and an ephemeral and contingent natural world, created by 
the idea of an image as a neutral record, will reveal itself in discourses on the documentary 
image and realism, from the beginning of the 20th century to the present. However, I will 
not continue with a genealogical approach. The reason for dividing this thesis into two 
parts is for me to be able to change gear. 
In the following chapters I will concentrate on contemporary questions concerning 
the philosophy of the documentary image, vision, knowledge, the self and the other. I will 
continue with the conceptual analysis that I started in part One, but from now on the 
focus is not on chronology or history of ideas, but on the dynamics and the interactions 
of the concepts in our contemporary understanding. I am not aiming for a comprehensive 
theory on documentary images, because I do not treat the documentary as a formal or 
epistemological category, but an attitude, a way of behaving in the world and attending 
to the world. In asking philosophical questions concerning the actions involved in seeing, 
depicting and viewing images, I position the discussion concerning the documentary 
in a context of moral philosophy. I claim that the tension between a rationalized and 
predetermined visual order and an ephemeral and unconditioned natural world is something 
that is required for our knowledge of the world. It is not a paradoxical relation, but a 
necessary dynamic in the process of knowledge. In extension this process of knowledge is 
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dependent on other dynamics between thought and perception, rationality and attention, 
and most importantly, between my views and another person’s views. 
The aim of this change of perspective is to reorganize the playing field. It is easy to 
claim that I hope to liberate the concepts of knowledge, vision, image, self and other, from 
the clutches of the dialectics between empiricism and rationalism, since it is quite easy to 
scrutinize and pinpoint where these theories go wrong. But this scrutiny is useless unless 
an alternative understanding can be offered. Philosophers, myself included, are tempted 
to play the role of the umpire that steps into the middle of an argument and decides which 
side was right and which side was wrong. This temptation often leads to bad philosophy. 
My aim is to present another alternative to the polarized discussion, but this will include 
stepping in and out of the earlier discussions, because empiricism has not got everything 
wrong, nor has rationalism (nor even positivism). There is a sense in which both theories 
describe a part of the process of acquiring knowledge quite correctly, but the proper step 
would be to continue by taking further steps to include other descriptions of other parts of 
the process of knowledge and reconcile them with discussions of aesthetics and ethics. This 
is something that I try to do, but the result will not be a new theory of knowledge, vision 
and self. Rather, I would describe it as a change of emphasis and a change of focus. These 
attempts are bound to produce only small pieces of an evolving and self-transforming 
puzzle.  
In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I discuss the communicative role of images. With “communication” 
I do not mean that a certain content is communicated from me to another person via a 
mediating image, but that we share a certain view in looking at a picture, communicating 
is like taking “communion”. In this way the image caters to intersubjectivity. This will lead 
us to a revised understanding of image, vision and understanding, in which knowledge, 
even the knowledge that resides in documentary images, is born out of dialogue and 
intersubjectivity. I claim that the traditional epistemological philosophy is forgetful not only, 
in one case (empiricism), concerning subjectivity, attention and judgement, and in the other 
case (rationalism), concerning objectivity, observation and neutrality, but of the relations 
between two subjects. This discussion is a result of my readings of pivotal work by Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno and Ludwig 
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Wittgenstein. Their accounts of image, vision, knowledge and the self will help along my 
shift of perspective in the epistemology of the image, from a fixed dialectic of subject and 
object, to a dynamic relation of intersubjectivity. And, as I will show, the concepts of visual 
record and documentary image have a specific role to play in this change of perspective. 
Within traditional philosophy, the idea of the visual record has served as a model for a go-
between in the empiricist notion of a pure unbiased relation between subject and object as a 
basis for true knowledge. As an alternative to this model, I will show how the visual record 
serves as an aid in the sticky relations between subject and subject.  
When I see an image that I trust as a real depiction of the realities of contemporary life, 
I also approve that that image depicts reality for another viewer of that image. The image 
stands in this case as trustworthy go-between, between my view and the other person’s view. 
What I want to make clear here is that realism consists of this relation of trust; this is the 
moral aspect of depiction that grants the image veracity. I do not claim that this aspect of 
communication solely adheres to what we call the documentary. The documentary is a sub-
category of realism and because of this, the element of trust is also an essential building stone 
for the documentary. 
In chapter 4 I will pick up the discussion from the end of part one. I will discuss 
examples of documentary depiction, focusing on how the documentary can be understood 
as an image that points toward the ephemeral and the contingent. It makes way for 
the human desire to understand the world beyond what we have made of it. The role of 
documentary images that I want to highlight here is the way in which they stand in contrast 
to our predetermined ways of seeing, how they resist and challenge the rationalization 
and standardization of the image world, an encyclopedic ordering of the world. In this 
discussion I will argue that the documentary is not primarily a form of representation. 
Instead I propose that it is an art of attention. The task of the documentary film-camera 
is not primarily to make an account of every verifiable fact in the world rather it is to help 
us in focusing our attention on that which is relevant in our visual field. As expressed by 
Cavell: “A camera is an opening in a box; that is the best emblem of the fact that a camera 
holding on an object is holding the rest of the world away. The camera has been praised for 
extending the senses; it may, as the world goes, deserve more praise for confining them, 
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leaving room for thought.”252
An underlying narrative in this chapter deals with novel knowledge. How is it possible 
for us to understand something that we have never seen before? How can an image show 
me the never-before-seen? What happens when we encounter something never-before-
seen? These questions are problematic in the classical epistemological discourse. The 
positivistic theory of knowledge makes the direction in the process of knowledge one-
sided. Positivism claims that the process of knowledge is human projection on the natural 
world, i.e. knowledge is domestication. The blind side in this understanding is that it 
cannot account for instances of wonder. There are occasions in which we encounter things 
we do not know. To say that in these cases we just project a meaning on the unknown does 
not make sense. Our encounters with the unknown do not lead to knowledge, if we solely 
domesticate that unknown through our projections. Quite the contrary, projections only 
repeat what we already know. I claim that it is these kinds of instances of wonder that our 
knowledge requires in order to keep our understanding vigilant and fresh. 
My starting point in chapter 5 is that to attend to something or to describe something is 
neither an act of domestication nor an act of neutral observation. In order for us to understand 
a world or a being that is unknown to us, we need to engage with them, we need to attend 
to them. When we honestly involve ourselves in the process of engagement and attention we 
will encounter many different views and voices. Instead of treating this situation as a problem 
to be resolved by unifying all these different views and voices into a fixed representation 
(like the positivists do), I claim that the subject can and ought to be able to maintain several, 
occasionally conflicting views, and that this dialogue is helpful for our moral judgement. In 
accepting that there sometimes exists a tension between my perception and what the world 
reveals to me, between my perception and my thinking, and between my view and the views 
of others, I remain engaged and attentive in this world. It is such an attitude and behaviour 
that I ascribe to the action of producing documentary images.
In chapter 6 I tackle iconoclasm. In philosophy, iconoclasm is in a sense the standard 
position. From Plato onward, philosophy has dealt with images as inherently untrustworthy. 
252  Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (Harvard University Press 1979), p. 24.
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Instead of seeing images as a possibility to gain knowledge of the world, iconoclasm claims 
that they obstruct our understanding of the world. I turn this argument on its head by showing 
that our distrust in the world is something that stems out of our trust or distrust toward our 
historical situation and other people. Distrusting images stems from a more general disbelief 
in what is communicated to us. And, on the other hand, in trusting images we trust each other 
and are able to share each other’s views. Images that we grant a status of veracity are moral 
building blocks in an effort to reach a common understanding, what I call a common sense.   
In order to sum up this idea of the image as a common sense, consider this quote by 
Norwegian philosopher Jakob Meløe: 
I was once a school teacher on one of the outer islands, with the chil-
dren coming from several of a cluster of islands. When we had drawing 
lessons […] the boys would draw one thing, boats, boats cutting the 
waves, boats fishing, boats at anchor, etc. They would criticize each 
other’s drawings and be very knowledgeable about the design of a boat, 
and of each of its parts. ‘The wheelhouse is too far aft’, Why is there no 
mizzen mast?’, etc. […] In drawing boats and criticizing each other’s 
drawings, the boys taught themselves and each other to become better 
observers of boats.253 
What the acts of drawing, showing and viewing establish here is something that could be 
called a common sense. The practice of depiction is a way of aligning different views with 
each other. This process does not entail observing, viewing or seeing alone, it also requires 
discussion, argumentation and even disputes. The common goal of this exercise is to establish 
a view upon the world that can be trusted by everybody in the community. Here the disputes 
involved are not attempts to distance the viewers from each other, but attempts to arrive at a 
visual knowledge that everybody in the community can trust. This is not the same thing as 
a monolithic view that obscures all other views, a common view has to be able to maintain 
many looks and voices.    
253  Jakob Meløe, ”The Two Landscapes of Northern Norway”, in Inquiry, vol. 31, 1988, p. 389.
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4. On Seeing the not-before-seen 
The picture is there; and I do not dispute its correctness. But what is its 
application?254 
Ludwig Wittgenstein
In this chapter I examine the role of attention as a defining aspect of visual recording, 
photography and the documentary image. When we pay attention to how the world looks, 
it might sometimes surprise us. It might perhaps show us that we are too set in our ways of 
seeing and that the world can reveal things unknown. This is, I claim, the task in which the 
documentary image can guide us. In order to arrive at this conclusion I will start by explaining 
how the image adheres to knowledge, without falling back on the generic epistemological 
framework that I dealt with in the first part. I will continue my discussion on Nietzsche’s 
revision of the concept of knowledge (a discussion that I started in chapter 2). And I proceed 
with the reading of Wittgenstein’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of perception, in which 
the role of attention becomes paramount. Two examples will serve as a backdrop for this 
discussion. The ending scene from Werner Herzog’s film Echoes from a Sombre Empire255 will 
function as an example of the reciprocal dynamics of knowledge that Nietzsche advocates. 
The second example is Alfred Stieglitz’s classical photograph The Steerage that helps us 
understand the role of attention in documentary photography. 
We do things with images. Images gain, as Wittgenstein points out in the quote above, 
their meanings in relation to different actions and practices. In this sense the meaning of 
an image is in “the becoming”, its significance is put into play in the specific practice and 
use in which it plays a part. Despite the stubborn attempts within philosophy to establish 
a form of image as a view from nowhere, visual records, photography and documentary 
254  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Revised German-English Edition (Blackwell 1998), §424, p. 126e. 
255  Echos aus einem düsteren Reich, France 1990.
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images are also included in our different practices with images. This acknowledgement 
demands a change in emphasis concerning the documentary. We have to move, from the 
epistemological framework that entails the mimetic copying of the visual world, the likeness 
between representation and object, toward a relational framework that acknowledges the 
production, the actions involved in making images, and the uses and practices involved in 
viewing, interpreting and utilizing images. When we grant that the term “documentary” is 
also defined by the uses of an image, by the actions involved in making the image, we enter 
an ethical realm, insofar as ethics and moral philosophy are fundamentally concerned with 
how we act.  
I will expand on this idea of the morality of realism in the chapters to come. Towards the 
end of this thesis the apparent moral questions concerning our relationships with images will 
become more focused. The important distinction lies in emphasizing the images’ relation to 
action and engagement in the world, rather than their epistemological, mimetic and neutral 
re-presenting of the world. In her dissertation Soul of the Documentary Ilona Hongisto makes 
a related distinction as she writes:
Writing as a system of expression is not representative of a reality – it 
has to do with expressing a reality that is yet to come. Paraphrasing 
Deleuze and Guattari, documentary filmmaking would thus be less 
about the real than an operation in the real. A new materialist concep-
tualization of the documentary suggests that the documentary is not 
separate from the material plane of the real – and thus operative on a 
plane of significance – but partakes in the processes in which the real 
takes form.256
Instead of the epistemological framework that consists of mimesis, likeness and re-
presentation, Hongisto highlights the action, the process and the partaking in the world 
that the production of images entails. This is what I, under the influence of Wittgenstein, 
256  Ilona Hongisto, Soul of the Documentary (University of Turku press 2011), p. 14. 
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call the use of the image. The realness that the term documentary stands for is in this sense 
to be understood as an achievement that is the result of engagement with the world, not 
through an objective distancing (neutrality) from the world. Contrary to an understanding 
of the language of images as a form of representation, the emphasis in Hongisto’s reading 
of Deleuze’s, Guattari’s, and in my reading of Nietzsche’s philosophy of knowledge and 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language, is on the way in which meanings are in the becoming 
through processes of their use. 
However, it is important not to make this into a question of “either/or”. Written language, 
and perhaps more poignantly images, do aim at fixating their object, they do make use of 
representation, but here it is important to understand what we mean by representation. It is 
not possible for an image to signify something solely through re-presenting this something. 
In this context a mere representation of an object would simply be a copy of this object, one 
more of the same kind. The role of language is obviously not to make copies of objects. A 
written word does not resemble the object that it represents. Perhaps we could instead say 
that we use words and images as “stand-ins” for objects. Instead of the actual object we have a 
word or an image. But this understanding of what representation means does not explain how 
words and images become meaningful, how they latch on to reality. The question concerning 
how words and images become meaningful is not a question about representation. When we 
express something we do something with words or images, we use them to signify, and how 
we use them will determine their meaning. Ludwig Wittgenstein points out: “Every sign 
by itself seems dead. What gives it life?—In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?—Or 
is the use its life?”257 Influenced by Wittgenstein, Alva Noë continues along the same lines, 
when he writes:
The question what our words mean is not something settled before we 
put language to use. It is not antecedent to the application of language 
to the problems that interest us. Shaping meaning, clarifying what we 
are talking about, fixing subject matter, this is just one of the things we 
use language to do. Meanings are not fixed by practice-independent 
257  Ludwig Wittgenstein 1998, §432, p. 128e.
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relations between words and things. Nor do we need to step outside of 
language—as it were to call a “time out”—in order to address questions 
of reference and meaning that may arise. As if that were possible!258 
As Noë points out, primarily, language does not grant us knowledge through paring up the 
right object with the correct word, image, concept or thought. A word, an image or sign, 
becomes significant through its use. In this sense words and images as systems of expression 
are not primarily “representative of a reality”259 their meaning lies in the way they establish a 
reality in the becoming. 
As I have shown earlier, Western philosophy has invested heavily in the idea of knowledge 
as something representational, but this theoretical framework entails philosophical problems. 
In a sense this epistemological framework, or the aesthetics of mimesis that follows from it, 
cannot deal with the uncertainty and the relational aspect that the element of action brings 
into the equation. “Knowing”, Nietzsche writes: “means: ‘to place one’s self in relation with 
something’, to feel one’s self conditioned by something and one’s self conditioning it – 
under all circumstances, then, it is a process of making stable or fixed, of defining, of making 
conditions conscious (not a process of sounding things, creatures or objects ‘in-themselves’)”.260 
In this sense, there is no knowledge without participation and engagement in the world. The 
making of an image is by necessity already a way of conditioning something in the world 
and, what might be easily forgotten, a result of permitting oneself to be conditioned by that 
something.261 It is in this process, as a part of an action, that signs become significant. Words 
258  Alva Noë, Varieties of Presence (Harvard University Press 2012) p. 40.
259  Ilona Hongisto 2011, p. 14. 
260  Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Thing-in-Itself and Appearance, and The Metaphysical Need.” In Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.), Immanuel 
Kant Critical Assessments (Routledge 1992), volume 1, p. 81.
261  Perception and the action of seeing are then a reciprocal process. Merleau-Ponty exemplifies this by describing the experi-
ence of touching honey, he writes: “Indeed our experience contains numerous qualities that would be almost devoid of meaning 
if considered separately from the reactions they provoke in our bodies. This is the case with the quality of being honeyed. Honey 
is a slow-moving liquid; while it undoubtedly has a certain consistency and allows itself to be grasped. It soon creeps slyly from 
the fingers and returns to where it started from. It comes apart as soon as it has been given a particular shape and, what is more, it 
reverses the roles by grasping the hands of whoever would take hold of it. The living exploring, hand which thought it could master 
this thing instead discovers that it is embroiled in a sticky external object. […] Honey is a particular way the world has of acting on 
me and my body.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The World of Perception (Routledge 2005), p. 60-62.
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and images are results of us partaking in the world, and in this sense they are not solely 
representative of reality, they are our ways of acting within that reality.  
The Reading Image
One example of the documentary’s reconciliation of creative transformation of perception 
and visual recording that made a significant impact on me, is the ending of Werner Herzog’s 
film Echoes from a Sombre Empire. The film follows journalist Michael Goldsmith in the 
Central African Republic. Goldsmith had earlier spent time in the region during the rule 
of notorious dictator Jean-Bédel Bokassa. The idea with the film is to track down memories 
and historical facts about the Bokassa regime with Goldsmith as a guide. The film ends in 
a rundown zoo in the Central African Republic. One of the animals in the zoo that catches 
Herzog’s attention is a monkey addicted to nicotine. It is not only the actual scene that 
fascinates me, but also what Herzog tells us about the scene and what his commentary tells 
us about documentary depiction. In the interview book Herzog on Herzog, he writes: 
In the decrepit zoo we found one of the saddest things I have ever 
seen: a monkey addicted to cigarettes thanks to the drunken soldiers 
who had taught it to smoke. Michael Goldsmith looks at the ape and 
says something like, ‘I can’t take this any longer’ and tells me I should 
turn the camera off. I answer back from behind the camera, ‘Michael, 
I think this is one of the shots I should hold.’ He replies, ‘Only if you 
promise this will be the last shot of the film.’ While this dialogue and 
my use [my emphasis] of the animal was a completely scripted invention, 
the nicotine-addicted monkey itself was not. There was something mo-
mentous and mysterious about the creature, and filming it in the way 
I did brought the film to a deeper level of truth, even if I did not stick 
entirely to the facts. To call Echoes from a Sombre Empire a ‘documen-
tary’ is like saying that Warhol’s painting of Campbell’s soup cans is a 
document about tomato soup.262
 
262  Werner Herzog and Paul Cronin (ed.), Herzog on Herzog (Faber and Faber 2002), p. 242.
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The quote above describes the actions that are involved in making documentary images. 
Herzog has to make an effort in order to portray what he sees as momentous with the 
smoking monkey. It is through these efforts that the scene is made to address me. When 
I see the smoking monkey in a rundown zoo in Herzog’s film, I have no similar earlier 
image or understanding to fall back on. The film sequence takes me to a place and presents 
me with a situation that I could not imagine. It is not clear to me what this image means. 
But it does mean something because it feels like something, it has an impact on me, it 
is unnerving, provocative, it makes me uncomfortable and sad, it reads me, it puts me in 
place, precisely because it shows something unknown to me. It tells me something new 
and because of this it is able to engage me. These reactions that I have concerning the scene 
are hard to articulate, but there is one common feature in them that needs to be analyzed 
further. It becomes evident that the practice of seeing images is not only a relation in 
which I stand before an image and interpret it. The image does some work as well. When 
I write; ”the image reads me”, I indicate that the direction that we often presuppose when 
we talk about interpretation, a one-sided relation in which the subject interprets the image, 
is turned around, the image interprets me. The scene with the smoking monkey tells me 
something about myself that I perhaps did not know from before. It reveals something of 
the world regardless of my projections and interpretations. 
In the essay What Photography Calls Thinking, Stanley Cavell explores the way in which 
photographs evoke uneasiness in us due to their ability to show us the unexpected, that 
which we do not know how it should be understood. He writes: 
To say that photographs lie implies that they might tell the truth; but 
the beauty of their nature is exactly to say nothing, neither lie or not to. 
[…] I believe the motto [photographs lie] serves to cover an impressive 
range of anxieties centered on, or symptomatized by, our sense of how 
little we know about what our relation to reality is, our complicity in it [my 
emphasis]; that we do not know what to feel about those events, that 
we do not understand the specific transformative powers of the camera, 
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what I have called its original violence; that we cannot anticipate what 
it will know of us – or show us. […] It may help to say that by wording 
my intuition in the form “what the text knows of me” I do not first of 
all suppose this to denote anything personal.263  
Based on Herzog’s commentary, the smoking monkey seems to evoke exactly this kind of 
ambivalent reaction in him during their encounter. It reminds Herzog of “how little we 
know about our relation to reality” and “our complicity in it” at the same time. The encounter 
changes Herzog’s perception about the film. The monkey and the sad fact that it has picked 
up the habit of smoking, changes something within Herzog; it reads him and informs him 
about something concerning himself. Although Herzog constructs the scene and heavily 
influences what we see and what we hear, he is still drawn to the monkey exactly because 
it is beyond his interpretations and inventions. When Herzog talks about the scene in the 
interview book, he reveals that it was scripted through and through. The commentary in the 
scene that seems spontaneous and casual is predetermined and so is the editing with close-up 
shots of the monkeys hand and the Schubert soundtrack that is added on to the scene. But 
there is something that is not scripted or created. The smoking monkey is there to be seen and 
it tells us something that goes beyond Herzog’s deliberate and scripted interventions. Herzog 
himself is reluctant towards calling this film a documentary. His reluctance here is to be 
understood against the backdrop of a certain tradition within documentary film. He speaks 
of cinema vérité264 as the “accountant’s truth” and continues: “Through invention, through 
263  Stanley Cavell, “What Photography Calls Thinking” in William Rothman (ed.), Cavell on Film (State of New York Press 2005), 
p. 116-117.
264  What Herzog refers to here is perhaps a bit confusing since cinema verité is in itself a term that is often used confusedly. 
Herzog’s use of the term is one example of this confusion. In order to understand Herzog’s polemic remark Bill Nichols explana-
tion of what he calls the observational mode of documentary film is helpful. Nichols writes: “The observational mode stresses the 
nonintervention of the filmmaker. Such films cede “control” over the events that occur in front of the camera more than any other 
mode. Rather than constructing a temporal framework, or rhythm, from the process of editing as in Night Mail or Listen to Britain, 
observational films rely on editing to enhance the impression of lived or real time. In its purest form, voice-over commentary, music 
external to the observed scene, intertitles, reenactments, and even interviews are completely eschewed. [Erik] Barnouw summarizes 
the mode helpfully when he distinguishes direct cinema (observational filmmaking) from Rouch’s style of cinema verité.” Bill 
Nichols, Representing Reality (Indiana University Press1991), p. 38. The confusion concerning cinema verité has in this sense to do 
with a discourse between different movements within documentary cinema. Diane Scheinman explains how cinema verité, a style  
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imagination, through fabrication, I become more truthful than the little bureaucrats”265. This 
statement expresses how the truth of the documentary is achieved through intervention, 
rather than dispassionate observation.
I believe Herzog is on to something when he makes this distinction. But I do not see 
this as a split between two traditions within documentary film, but rather like Cavell, as a 
tension within the documentary image itself. Through the interventions, through editing 
and dramatization the scene draws our attention to the element that is there independently 
of any manufacturing. The question concerning what is there prior to Herzog’s intervention 
and what is there in the scene because of it arises. He understands that the line between 
the discovered and the invented is blurred, therefore he makes it into his method to actively 
emphasize the distinction between scripted and unscripted, for example by adding an 
apparently dramatic soundtrack to a scene that does not seem dramatized from the start. 
These interventions are put into use in order for the un-scripted features in the encounter to 
become more apparent. The intentional play with the differences between the scripted and 
un-scripted makes the difference more apparent, it permits the un-scripted to stand out. I do 
not agree when Herzog says that his film is not a documentary. On the contrary, the scene 
and his comments about the scene capture something that is at the core of the documentary. 
To capture or tease out that which is out there despite our preconceptions is, in my view, a 
thoroughly documentaristic attitude toward depiction. What is to be gained by this kind of 
strategy is hopefully new perspectives and knowledge. When the ephemeral – the world as it 
is despite the directors’ intervention – is made conspicuous, it engages us to revise and revive 
our attention and our conceptions. It is this documentary practice that I want to harbour. 
 
of documentary filmmaking invented by French filmmaker Jean Rouch, actually came about as a criticism of the idea of “neutral” 
documentation. In his filmmaking Rouch acknowledges that the camera’s presence entails a transformation of any given situation. 
In this sense Rouch also acknowledged that the camera is never neutral, its presence always has an influence on the subjects in the 
scene. Scheinman describes the context in which the term cinema verité gained it’s significance, she writes: ”Stylistically, the film 
[Jean Rouch’s, Chronique d’un été, France 1960] was inspired by the ideas of Russian filmmaker Dziga Vertov who, in the 1920s, 
wrote about kino pravda  (film truth), suggesting that the camera recorded life and therefore led to a ‘cinema of truth’. Rouch in con-
trast, felt the camera provoked the behaviour of those in front of the lens, resulting in a ‘truth of cinema’.” Diane Scheinman, “The 
Dialogic Imagination of Jean Rouch: Covert Conversations in Les Maîtres Fous”, in Barry Keith Grant and Jeanette Sloniowsky 
(eds.), Documenting the Documentary: Close Readings of Documentary Film and Video. (Wayne State University press 1993), p. 
194.
265  Werner Herzog and Paul Cronin (ed.) 2002, p. 240.
153
In my view, and I think Herzog would agree with me on this, the documentary image 
builds upon an idea that emphasizes our engagement in actively re-establishing our ways of 
seeing and knowing, beyond our fixed and predetermined knowledge. The smoking monkey 
in Echoes from a Sombre Empire, does exactly this. The scene shows me something I have not 
seen and tells me something I did not know. Although I know that the scene is scripted, 
that it is made possible through the interventions, the editing and the manipulation that 
Herzog does when he makes the scene, it is still able to show me something beyond the 
manufactured. This could be understood as a paradox. If we think of the essence of the 
documentary as a kind of mold in which more intervention means less neutrality (less realism) 
and less intervention means more neutrality (more realism), it will be hard to comprehend 
what goes on in the example with the smoking monkey. This is what the example actually 
tells us: there is little room for neutrality in this discussion. Herzog’s interventions are not 
neutral; they are fabrications, even deceptions. As for the smoking monkey, it is not a figment 
of Herzog’s mind, but neither is it a neutral object. It is not neutral exactly because it acts 
upon the viewer. For Herzog it is bewildering to encounter the monkey, and the presence 
of this bewilderment engages my perception of the scene. Or, to make this point stronger: 
precisely because I get the sense that this certain element of the scene cannot be made up, it 
appeals to me and engages me. The smoking monkey does not address me in a neutral way; 
if it were neutral it would not address me at all. Neutrality does not fit in as a concept to 
describe what makes this scene documentary, rather I suggest that this documentary appeal 
of the scene has to do with a change in direction between the subject and object/interpreter 
and the interpreted. Suddenly the gaze is turned on Herzog, and through him on us. This 
reminder of the reciprocity in our ways of knowing is significant for the concept of realism 
and the documentary. Here we arrive at a genuine difficulty when we try to understand what 
the term “documentary” stands for. My proposition is that it stands for images that bring out 
the contingent and ephemeral, the world as it is independent of our preconceptions. Here we 
are at the core of this difficulty, since the world never is “independent of our preconceptions”. 
Our conceptions give form to the world, and yet, without our gaze it is not formless. This is 
the point where our concept of knowledge starts to invite the difficult questions: how should 
we describe the processes of knowledge and perception? 
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Knowledge as Domestication and Knowledge as Wonder
The difficulty concerning the concept of “the documentary” that I describe above is linked to 
a more specific problem concerning the concept of knowledge within philosophy that builds 
upon juxtaposition between fixed knowledge and an ephemeral contingent visual world. 
Nietzsche describes this juxtaposition when he writes: 
The nature of our psychology is determined by the fact (1) That commu-
nication is necessary, and that for communication to be possible some-
thing must be stable, simplified and capable of being stated precisely 
(above all, in the so-called identical case). In order that it may be com-
municable, it must be felt as something adjusted, as recognizable. The 
material of the senses, arranged by the senses, reduced to coarse leading 
features, made similar to other things, and classified with its like. Thus: 
the indefiniteness and the chaos of sense-impressions are, as it were, 
made logical. (2) The phenomenal world is the adjusted world which we 
believe to be real. Its ‘reality’ lies in the constant return of similar, famil-
iar and related things, in their rationalized character and in the belief 
that we are here able to reckon and determine. (3) The opposite of this 
phenomenal world is not ‘the real world’, but the amorphous and unad-
justable world of the chaos of sensations – that is to say, another kind of 
phenomenal world, a world which to us is ‘unknowable’.266 
The view that Nietzsche describes here is in a nutshell the bases for an empiricist understanding 
of the concept of knowledge. Or, to be more precise, what Nietzsche describes here is the 
dialectic between empiricism and rationalism or their modern counterparts realism and 
idealism. There is something in this duality that builds upon the juxtaposition between the 
fixed or adjusted world and the chaotic world of sensations, that leads us astray according 
to Nietzsche. If we think of knowledge as a product of domestication, then the real world, 
the world as it is prior to our conceptions of it, becomes essentially an un-intelligible world 
266  Friedrich Nietzsche in Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.) 1992, p. 85-86.
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of chaos. That is, if we think that domestication is, and this is the key here, the only way to 
knowledge, then this understanding presupposes that the real phenomenal world of “the 
material of the senses” is in itself un-intelligible. In the passage above Nietzsche points at the 
flaw in this positivistic understanding. In order for us to surpass this misunderstanding we 
have to acknowledge that there are other ways through which we acquire knowledge, or more 
precisely, that knowledge is a more complicated process than simply domestication.  We have 
to understand that the direction between the subject and the object can be turned around, 
that “the other” also acts upon us.267 
Standardization, rationalization and fixating are certain ways through which we 
require knowledge. In making things knowledgeable we do organize and rationalize our 
sense impressions into categories, we create order in the ephemeral world of sensations. The 
practice of making images has, as I have pointed out throughout the first part of this thesis, 
often had this role of organizing sense impressions into a unified fixed picture. A film can for 
example describe the change of the seasons from winter to spring by reducing this event into 
a two hour assemblage of sounds and images. A film is in this sense a reduction by necessity 
since it rearranges sense impressions into a reductive formalization of the actual event.268 
This is one way to understand how knowledge comes about. In this sense knowledge is a 
way of domesticating the chaotic world of phenomena and experience, of making it into an 
anthropomorphic order, through interpretation, rationalization and representation. However 
this is not, as Nietzsche points out, the only way through which we have knowledge and it is 
not a very fruitful theory to start with, since it produces a very narrow understanding of both, 
what we call knowledge and what we call sense-experience. In this dialectics of empiricism-
rationalism our knowledge becomes a process of transformation in which the real always has 
to be transformed into something else, the object has to be transformed into ideas. Sartre 
describes this as a process like digestion, when he writes: “We have all believed that the spidery 
mind trapped things in its web, covered them with white spit and slowly swallowed them, 
reducing them to its own substance. What is a table, a rock, a house? A certain assemblage of 
267  Friedrich Nietzsche in Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.) 1992, p. 86.
268  Compare, Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed (Harvard University Press 1979), p. 24.
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“contents of consciousness”, a class of such contents”.269 Both Nietzsche and Sartre reveal a 
certain temptation to understand knowledge as domestication, whereas this is just one aspect 
of how we require knowledge. And if it were the only way to describe how knowledge comes 
about, it would mean that the real would always be a result of how we construct an order 
through domestication, that knowledge would always be “what we have made of the world”. 
Wonder, re-assessment and engagement are another set of ways by means of which we 
acquire knowledge. The difference here, compared to knowledge as a form of domestication, 
is that I cannot intentionally choose to experience wonder. It is something that happens to 
me, not something that I intentionally can put into play or construct. I cannot choose to be 
surprised or astonished. When it happens it is as if the world tells me something. In such 
instances I can react as if the world were chaotic, I can feel that the world does not make 
sense. But I can also see these instances as openings towards revising my ideas. Wonder 
can change the way in which I think and what I know. In this sense the ideas cannot be 
changed by ideas alone. Sense-perception stands in this way as an opponent to my thinking. 
What I want to indicate here is that without these kinds of experiences of wonder it would 
be hard to understand the proper role of knowledge. These categories of fixing the world 
(domestication) and permitting oneself to be conditioned by the world (wonder) complement 
each other. There is no conflict or actual paradox between fixating and re-assessing per se, 
as the juxtaposition between realism and idealism would have it, they are both important 
aspects of knowledge.  
This is one important starting-point when we are concerned with the puzzling character 
of the term “documentary”. We have to understand that it does not adhere to any clear-cut 
division between images that are fabricated and images that are neutral reflections of what 
is in front of the camera at any given time. As I mentioned in the first chapter of this thesis: 
“the image is not only the producer of our experience, our concepts, our language, it is at 
the same time a product of our conceptualization.” This reciprocity is often forgotten. The 
scene from Echoes from a Sombre Empire does not hide the fact that it is dramatized, that it 
269  Jean-Paul Sartre, “Intentionality a Fundamental Idea of Husserl’s Phenomenology”, in Dermot Moran and Timothy Mooney 
(eds.), The Phenomenology Reader (Routledge 2002), p. 382. 
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is an intervention in the real world that guides our way of understanding the subject of the 
smoking monkey. It is through Herzog’s arrangement of the shot, his actions and his use of 
the smoking monkey in it, that the non-scripted, unconditioned features in the scene are 
captured. It is these contingent and ephemeral features that are unnerving, that make us 
uneasy, because they conflict with our predetermined understanding of the world. This is 
neither achieved through neutrality nor through domestication, but through engagement: 
the reciprocity that the encounter with the other demands.270 
The Art of Attention 
So far I have shown that the clear cut dichotomy of knowledge as discovery or invention does 
not take us all the way, we have to start looking for alternative descriptions of the process 
of perception and knowledge in order to understand our life with images. One fundamental 
aspect of visual perception that does not follow the grammar of the dichotomy discovery/
invention is the concept of attention. To attend to something is to focus ones attention. It 
is not a process of neutral observation, neither is it a process of domestication. To attend to 
something requires “an attitude to one’s natural and social environment and to other people 
and other things that does not compel this otherness to be under one’s own will.”271 In order 
to explain this faculty, I will analyse an example from the early years of art photography. 
Alfred Stieglitz’s photograph The Steerage (image 4.1) is significant in a historical 
context, since he writes and photographs in a period during which photography is still 
270  This aspect of the documentary image is close to the notion of performative documentary that has become important within 
documentary film theory. Stella Bruzzi introduces this concept in her book New Documentary. Bruzzi shows how the realization 
that the presence of the film-camera always, in one way or another, alters the situation which is filmed, has put in question earlier 
understandings of the authenticity and objectivity of documentary film. Bruzzi also makes an important distinction between a clas-
sical tradition of realism within documentary film that hides the performance and actions of the author, and a (new) documentary 
practice that make the performative aspects, actions and processes of production, known to the viewer. Stella Bruzzi, New Docu-
mentary (Routledge 2006), p. 185-187. I will discuss the moral implications of this distinction in the next chapter. However, I do not 
see this performativity as a quality that stands behind a certain category of documentary films, rather it is an aspect within each and 
every image. To some extent every image is a result of the actions of its author.
271  Hauke Brunkhorst, Adorno and Critical Theory. (University of Wales Press 1999), p. 62. 
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considered to be something less than art. His efforts and intentions with this picture were 
part of a struggle to make photography into a proper art form, to enable it to transcend 
mere copying of the natural world and express emotion, judgment and understanding. 
Stieglitz took the picture when he was travelling in Europe on a ship in 1907 and was 
highly conscious of the class-based division between first and second class passengers. His 
feeling manifested itself urgently in a certain view, Stieglitz writes: “Could I photograph 
what I felt, looking and looking and still looking? I saw shapes related to each other. I saw 
a picture of shapes and underlying that the feeling I had about life.”272 In the picture we 
see the two decks of the steamship SS Kaiser Wilhelm II. The lower deck, referred to as “the 
steerage” at the time, is mostly occupied by women and children who are scattered around 
the space with their clothes and belongings spread around them. On the upper deck we 
mostly see properly dressed men who are occupied with watching the seascape. Some of 
them gaze down at the lower deck. The composition of the picture is refined. It captures 
the structure of the ship, as if it was the two decks of the ship by which the division 
between the different social classes was put into play. This division is emphasized by the 
gangplank that divides the pictorial space.   
  
272  Stieglitz as quoted in Donald Evans, “Photographs and Primitive Signs”, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1978/79, New Series 
– Vol. LXXIX (The Compton Press 1977), p. 233.
159
Alfred Stieglitz: The Steerage, Photogravure, 1907273
273  Image taken from <http://www.metmuseum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/267836?rpp=30&pg=1&ft=Stieglitz&
pos=2>
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According to his account, in fact written long after the photograph was taken – this extract 
from his notebooks was published in 1942274 – Stieglitz not only wanted to mediate what 
he saw, what objects, shapes, etc. he encountered, but how he saw, how the view revealed 
something about his experience of life. He writes: 
On the upper deck, looking over the railing, there was a young man 
with a straw hat. The shape of the hat was round. He was watching 
the men, the women and children on the lower steerage deck. Only 
men were on the upper deck. The whole scene fascinated me. I longed to 
escape from my surroundings and join these people. . . . I saw shapes related 
to each other. I saw a picture of shapes and underlying that the feeling I had 
about life. And as I was deciding, should I try to put down this seemingly 
new vision that held me – people, the common people, the feeling of ship and 
ocean and sky and the feeling of release that I was away from the mob called 
the rich – Rembrandt came to my mind and I wondered would he have felt 
as I was feeling.275
The emphasis in Stieglitz’s comment is interesting. He describes a situation where he 
encountered something ephemeral, something that he needed to capture, since he felt that 
he saw something never-before-depicted. At the same time, the scene awoke something 
familiar within him. It showed him something he felt that he already knew. It is obvious, 
for example, that he knew that there were two economically defined classes of passengers 
on the boat when he bought first class tickets for himself and his wife.  The novelty of the 
view is something different from new factual knowledge. The view evokes an experience in 
him: the understanding of a difference between the life-worlds of the two classes. What he 
already knew (that there are first- and second class passengers) gains a more fundamental 
meaning through the focus of attention in his perception. Here, attention reveals itself to 
be a faculty that does not transform the optical view, but it focuses perception and enables 
274  Allan Sekula, “On the Invention of Photographic Meaning” in Thinking Photography, Victor Burgin (ed.), London: Macmillan 
Education 1987, p. 98.
275  Alfred Stieglitz, quoted in Allan Sekula 1987, p. 98-99.
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it to perceive the meaningful features within that view. Merleau-Ponty writes: “Since in 
attention I experience an elucidation of the object, the perceived object must already contain 
the intelligible structure which it reveals”276 and “attention, then, creates nothing, and it is 
a natural miracle”277. The novelty that is inherent to the concept of attention has then two 
distinct meanings. Not-before-seen views are prone to awaken our attention, as I pointed 
out in the case of Herzog’s scene with the smoking monkey. But attention is not an act that 
depends on new visual information. It establishes a new focus both within a novel and a 
familiar visual field. 
What Stieglitz felt when he discovered the structural division that the first and second 
class deck signifies on the ship was a reaction on a certain social structure that was manifested 
in the architectural (visual) qualities of the ship, but the feeling was also a reaction on his 
own position among the first class travelers. The view told him something, not only about 
ships, social class and maritime life, but about himself, how he felt and what he was thinking. 
He describes this view as a “seemingly [my emphasis] new vision that held me”. The newness 
of the view is manifested in the way Stieglitz feels (“the feeling of release”). In this way the 
novelty in the scene does not consist of a new fact within the world, he does not learn that 
social classes exist due to his encounter with the view. More precisely, this is an occasion of 
seeing something in a new light, a changing and/or focusing of attention.
The way in which Stieglitz understands the world is awakened by the actual visual view. 
He sees what he already knows in a different light. But it is not his understanding of class that 
is projected onto the visual view. It is the visual view that revitalizes his thinking concerning 
class. The view tells him how he feels about something he is already familiar with. In this 
sense, through attention, the view, a meaningful visual assemblage, already exists before him 
before it is captured by the camera. He writes:  
I had but one plate holder with one unexposed plate. Would I get what 
I saw, what I felt? Finally I released the shutter. My heart thumping, 
I had never heard my heart thump before. Had I gotten my picture? 
276  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge 2007), p. 31.
277  Ibid., p. 30.
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I knew if I had, another milestone in photography would have been 
reached, related to the milestone of my ‘Car Horses’ made in 1892, 
and my ‘Hand of Man’ made in 1902, which had opened up a new era 
of photography, of seeing. In a sense it would go beyond them, for here 
would be a picture based on related shapes and on the deepest human feeling, 
a step in my own evolution, a spontaneous discovery.278
He encounters something familiar, perhaps too familiar to catch his attention, and in this 
way documentary photography aids him in re-establishing or re-evaluating phenomena 
constantly in front of his eyes. The documentary image works in this way like philosophy; 
it helps Stieglitz understand what he already knows in a different light. The documentary 
image does this primarily by cultivating his visual perception. By “cultivating” I do not 
refer to a form of domestication (transforming something natural into something cultural, 
perception into thinking). In documentary depiction features are not primarily transformed 
or reproduced, they are attended to.    
We perhaps usually suppose that what is seen in a picture is there due to the intentions of 
the artist.279 But on another level, we have to acknowledge that attention is not a faculty that 
is completely ruled by our intentions and our will, attention is not primarily a domesticating 
faculty. Merleau-Ponty writes: “Since ‘bemerken’ or taking notice is not an efficient cause of 
the ideas which this act arouses, it is the same in all acts of attention, just as the searchlight’s 
beam is the same whatever landscape be illuminated. Attention is therefore a general 
and unconditioned [my emphasis] power in the sense that at any moment it can be applied 
indifferently to any content of consciousness.”280 In the same spirit Alva Nöe writes on the 
attentive aspect of perception: “Perceptual experiences are ways of coming into contact with 
the world, not ways of building up or constructing representations of ways things are or 
278  Alfred Stieglitz, quoted in Sekula 1987, p. 98-99.
279  I think this is a very common idea within aesthetics. For example Roger Scruton builds the whole of his theory of photography on 
the idea that photography, in contrast to painting, does not carry the intentions of the artist, since it comes about through an automatic 
causal process. For a brief description of Scrutons theory see for example, Mikael Pettersson, Seeing What Is Not There – Essays on 
Pictures and Photographs (Stockholm University 2011), p. 37-38.
280  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 2007, p. 31.
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might be. Perception is, in this sense, a nonintentional relation to the world.”281 As with the 
visual realm, the photograph does not yield to our intentions, through and through. 
Wittgenstein writes about this discrepancy: ”Seeing an aspect and imagining are subject 
to the will. There is such an order as ’Imagine this’; and also ’Now see the figure like this’; but 
not: ’Now see this leaf green’.”282 The distinction here is important. It has the same dynamics 
as my earlier discussion about knowledge, as both a way of fixing the object in the world 
(domestication: see it like this), and a result of permitting oneself to be conditioned by the 
world (wonder: the leaf is green despite my intentions).  Perception corresponds with thought 
in different ways, it sometimes provokes us to reassess how we think, but ordinarily it confirms 
what we think, there is a complex dynamic here. In the case of Stieglitz photograph, I can 
point out to you that in order for you to understand what Stieglitz meant with this picture – 
what his thoughts and intentions were – you have to pay attention to the composition. Look 
at the structural divide between the two decks and the differences in the appearances of the 
people on the upper and the lower deck. This suggestion might help you understand what 
the picture means. If you consider my suggestion, it might help you comprehend, not only 
the picture, but also the mindset of Stieglitz, his place in his contemporary world, and more 
generally, what kind of experience it was to be on a ship in 1907. This situation in which I 
guide you in understanding Stieglitz intentions with the photograph, is however not the 
same, and in a sense not even similar to, the occasion in which Stieglitz is faced with the view 
over the steerage. In the original setting thought is awakened by the attention in Stieglitz’ 
perception. When I guide you in your interpretation of the photograph the direction of the 
process is the opposite: I hope to awaken your attention through thought. 
Merleau-Ponty makes a similar distinction when he writes: “The real has to be described, 
not constructed or formed. Which means that I cannot put perception into the same category 
as the syntheses represented by judgements, acts or predications.”283 I would disagree with 
Merleau-Ponty here on the last few words, since “to describe” is also an act. But let’s put this 
281  Alva Noë 2012, p. 73.
282  Ludwig Wittgenstein 1998, p. 213e. 
283  Maurice Merleau-Ponty 2007, p. xi.
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aside for a moment and consider what describing means. Describing is not necessarily the 
same act as representing, since representation means literally that I construct something in 
the likeness of something else, whereas, for example saying “that leaf is green” or “on the 
upper deck, looking over the railing, there was a young man with a straw hat. The shape of 
the hat was round. He was watching the men, the women and children on the lower steerage 
deck.” are not ways of re-construing that something. The statements point at the greenness of 
the leaf or at the shape of the straw hat. The same can be said about photographic depiction in 
general. Roland Barthes highlights this function of photography when he compares it with 
the Sanskrit concept tat, he writes: “tat means that in Sanskrit and suggests the gesture of the 
child pointing his finger at something and saying; that, there it is, lo! but says nothing else; a 
photograph cannot be transformed (spoken) philosophically, it is the weightless, transparent 
envelope.”284 In this understanding of photographic depiction, the photograph is a kind of 
picture that is designed to point at the objects in the world. The photograph does not re-
create or re-construct. The way in which it shows me the world is not through copying or 
reproducing the objects in the world, it is not a model or an ersatz for the real object, but a 
description that points at the qualities of the objects in the world, it attends to the world. It is 
this attentive quality of photography that accommodates documentary depiction.
In this way description and documentation differs from a more common understanding 
of how art functions. Donald Evans writes: “In art the natural objects which serve as 
correspondences are replaced by manufactured ones. We create rather than select correlates to 
our inner experience.”285 If we stick to Stieglitz’ own account of how The Steerage came about, 
this is not the case. Stieglitz does not create the objects that correlate with his experience, he 
discovers them and attends to them. The experience is not inner, it is not an event happening 
inside of Stieglitz that domesticates or defines the outer view, the experience is in the view. 
The meaning of the picture is established through an event in the world, an encounter in the 
world. The Steerage gains its importance from the situation in which it belongs. 
This being said, I still want to point out that the distinctions that I have established 
throughout this chapter between intention and attention, knowledge as domestication and 
284  Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida –Reflections on Photography (Hill and Wang 1981), p.  5.
285  Donald Evans 1977, p. 236.
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knowledge as wonder, the epistemological and representational framework for knowledge 
and a relational and moral understanding of knowledge, are not to be understood as clear-
cut categories. The aim of the discussion above is to underline some different aspects that are 
at play when we try to understand the concepts of knowledge, perception, attention, image 
and the documentary. These aspects do overlap, but it is important that we acknowledge the 
diversity of these issues and in order to do that we have to understand the similarities as well 
as the differences between certain concepts. 
To bring in one more fundamental difference in order to exemplify what I mean here, let 
us look at the distinction between thought and perception ones more. There are tendencies 
within philosophy that tempt us to make a clear distinction between these two concepts, 
to describe this distinction very bluntly, we could say that thought is usually understood as 
something inner, whereas perception is, or at least adheres to something external. Much of 
what I have tried to explain above could be understood within this dialectic. And this is not 
a completely incomprehensible way of trying to make sense of our faculties of thinking and 
perceiving. But at the same time, when we make this distinction into something definitive, we 
will encounter problems. Nietzsche can be said to invite this kind of philosophical problem, 
when he writes: “There would be nothing which could be called knowledge if thought did not 
first so recreate the world into ‘things’ which are in its own image. It is only through thought that 
there is untruth.”286 This is a view in which knowledge is conceived as domestication (and, as I 
pointed out earlier Nietzsche himself criticizes this view in other passages). What the Stieglitz 
example shows is that there is something misguided in this conception of knowledge. To be 
precise, Nietzsche actually misunderstands the role of thinking here, since he understands 
thinking as a way of reproducing the outer object into an inner ersatz, an image, of the object. 
As if perception always had to be translated or transformed into thinking in order to grant us 
knowledge. But we have perception, and it is not a form of thinking, it does not always need 
to become thinking in order to grant us understanding. Nietzsche invites the metaphor of the 
“inner image” to describe what thoughts are. But thoughts are not necessarily images. With 
this, I do not want to deny that thoughts might consist of images. I can imagine things and 
286  Friedrich Nietzsche In Ruth F. Chadwick (ed.) 1992, p. 87.
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have representations in my mind and so forth, but the concept of inner image is significantly 
different from the concept of external image (I will return to this discussion in chapter 6). My 
point is that thoughts are not recreations or reproductions of sense-perception, because thought 
and perception are not straightforwardly compatible faculties. A picture cannot represent a 
thought; if it could, it would become superfluous. Wittgenstein notes: “one cannot follow 
one’s own mental images with attention.”287 We can for example not trace the outlines in our 
mental representations or move further away or closer to a mental representation, as we can do 
when we are dealing with perception and “external” images. Attention, the act of  attending 
to something, is an action in which one is turned toward the world. Visual attention requires a 
spatial world of space and time, i.e. a visual world. No photograph carries everything that the 
photographer or the viewer thinks about the photograph. The photograph does not carry all the 
sentiments that we project on to it. Our thought does not carry all the visual information that 
is in a photograph. Our thoughts do not need to carry the visual information, since we have 
perception guided by our attention and external images to perform this task. The discrepancy 
here is not primarily due to a conflict between objective fact and subjective judgment (although 
this example fits this description as well), it stems from the difference in the actions of perception 
(as attention) and thought (as rationalization).
This is a big topic in philosophy288 and I can barely scrape the surface of this discussion 
here. But, as I have pointed out in the earlier chapters, this difference is not a clear-cut 
287  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, edited by G.E.M Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Basil Blackwell 1967), § 81, p. 16e.
288  If we look into the origins of how perception became conceived as a form of thought, this development can be traced to the 
philosophy of Descartes. Daniel Heller-Roazen, writes: “Within a few years, the classical doctrine of sensation was to be famously 
contested by the thinker who has been regarded, more often than any other, as ushering in the modern age in philosophy. Starting with 
the Regulae ad directionem ingenii, which are thought to have been composed before 1628, Descartes asserted that the indubitable 
foundation of all knowledge could lie nowhere other than in the representative activity of the rational being, which he called, with a 
term at once old and new, cogitation, “thought” [Reference: Descartes, Ouvres, vol 10, pp. 359-62, ed Charles Adam and Paul Tannery 
(Paris: Vrin 1996)]. He would later explain that such a “cogitation” could not be opposed to perception as the “intellection” of the 
medieval doctors had been distinguished, at least in principle, from “sensation.” The reason was that perception, for Descartes, was 
in every sense an act of the representing, conscious and thinking “I”; for him every human sensation was, in other words, an act of 
cogitation. “By the term ‘thought’ [cogitationis nomine],” the philosopher would thus explain in the ninth principle of the first part of 
his Principia philosophiae, “I understand everything which we are conscious of as happening within us, isofar as we have conscious-
ness of it […].” in the second set of Replies he was even more explicit. Speaking of the expression cogitation, he declared: “I use this 
term to include everything that is within us in such a way that we are immediately conscious of it. Thus all operations of the will, the 
intellect, the imagination, and the senses are thoughts”.” Daniel Heller-Roazen, The inner Touch – Archaeology of a Sensation (Zone 
Books 2009). P. 165.
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epistemological difference, as the main dialectical movements in philosophy have described 
it. Neither thought nor perception have any pre-given, context-independent priority as a 
means of knowing. This, however, does not mean that perception and thinking would be 
interchangeable. 
In our common experience of vision, we are not usually surprised by how the world looks, 
it does not clash with our thought. But when we pay attention to how the world looks, it 
might sometimes surprise us. It might perhaps show that we are too set in our ways of seeing 
and that the world can reveal things unknown. What I have tried to highlight in this chapter 
is how the documentary image can guide us in this visual task. In images we encounter 
novel visions because they correspond both with thought and vision, they inhabit the tension 
in-between. Also the visual record, the photograph and the documentary image should be 
placed on the axis of this tension. When we want to understand what makes these forms of 
depiction specific and meaningful, it is helpful to acknowledge that they inhabit the part of 
the axis that is closer to vision, and further from thought, without abolishing the tension.
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5. The Other, the Image and the Self in the Documentary 
Pluralism – the incommensurability and, at times, incompatibility 
of objective ends – is not relativism, nor, a fortiori, subjectivism, nor 
the allegedly unbridgeable differences of emotional attitude on which 
some modern positivists, emotivists, existentialists, nationalists and, 
indeed, relativistic sociologists and anthropologists found their ac-
counts.289 
Isaiah Berlin
… the agent is awash with many images, many excitements, merging 
fears and fantasies that dissolve into one another. To sort things out to 
a point at which they seem like an assembly of definite and identifiable 
voices is already an achievement.290   
Bernard Williams
One important function of art is that it transforms our perception. When art transforms 
the way in which I perceive, then it is of utmost importance that this change is not put into 
play by force, indoctrination, oppression or domestication. In his Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
emphasizes this function of art when he writes: “Judgment itself undergoes metamorphosis 
in the artwork. Artworks are, as synthesis, analogous to judgment”291. If we lose track 
of the way in which an image can influence our judgement, our skill to determine and 
negotiate how our perception can or should be transformed, then the image becomes a tool 
289  Isaiah Berlin, “Alleged Relativism in Eighteenth-century European Thought”, in The Crooked Timber of Humanity (John Mur-
ray 1990), p. 87. 
290  Bernard Williams, Truth and Thruthfulness (Princeton University Press 2002), p. 195.
291  Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (Continuum 2004), p. 163.
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of power and domestication. The process through which an image becomes something that 
guides my perceptions in a lived life, that includes both my view on the external world and 
my self-understanding (my “internal” world), has to be a process in which I, my “self ”, has 
to be informed of what is at stake in this potential transformation of my perception. When 
we speak of “the documentary” it is important to understand that also the documentary 
image is part of this moral dynamic. What makes us sometimes forget this aspect is that 
the concept of the documentary often alludes to neutrality and transparency. It is designed, 
sometimes malignantly, to display the world as it is, as if we would view the world through 
a transparent window instead of a transforming machine, a technology that is designed to 
alter our perceptions. By technology, I do not solely here refer to the technologies of film, 
the camera and photography. The concept of image that I have scrutinized throughout 
this thesis, is a result of an intricate development, the image is by itself already a tool that 
entails the framing, fixating, transforming and cultivating of our perception. 
In this chapter, I will continue to explore how the documentary image is based on the 
tension between visual registration and our conceptions. I will base my discussion on the 
body of work of filmmaker and scholar Trinh T. Minh-ha, whose contributions consist 
in maintaining this tension, in order to make this tension the focus of discussion. This 
tension is the dynamics of the process through which art is able to revise our perception. 
By refraining from giving an explanation to every single visual sign, Minh-ha strives to 
construct a documentary cinema that lets otherness prevail. What is specifically interesting 
for my project is how Minh-ha helps us acknowledge how questions about documentary 
representations of the other always also are connected to questions about the self, about 
the portrayer’s or the viewer’s openness towards what lies beyond one’s own conceptions. 
In the previous chapter I emphasized the reciprocity that knowledge requires. 
Furthermore, I pointed out how Nietzsche’s focusing on knowledge as becoming, on the 
uncertainty that action brings to epistemology, should be seen as a healthy revision of the 
classical theory frame. This aspect of uncertainty needs to be examines more closely. The 
aspect of uncertainty in Minh-ha’s work in film and theory is comparable to the revision 
of the concept of mimesis in Theodor Adorno’s aesthetic theory. In brief, for Adorno, 
mimesis consists of a moral understanding in which the subject embraces the otherness 
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of the other, i.e. an understanding of a morality in which one refrains from projecting292 
one’s personal will and concerns on the other. This movement acknowledges that the other 
is understandable without domestication. We do not have to transform the other so that 
she fits our own frames of reference, in order to understand her. As a matter of fact we 
cannot understand the other through domestication. If we want to understand the other, 
we should refrain from domesticating her, since through domestication the other becomes 
something that she was not from the start. In this sense the transformative power of the 
image seemingly poses a problem for the understanding of the other. The documentary, 
because of its presupposed neutrality, introduces itself as a remedy for this problem. But 
this neutrality is in this case the wrong remedy. In his thinking Adorno explores a non-
domesticating form of knowing the other, without falling back on the problematic notion 
of neutrality. In this moral philosophy, which has its origins in Kant’s aesthetics and has 
influenced thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, Emmanuel Lévinas and Hannah Arendt, the 
moral is entwined with the epistemological (and the aesthetic). 
In order for me to understand the other I have to comprehend how the other understands 
herself. My knowledge has to be able to stretch itself beyond the personal, beyond my 
projections and achieve what Hannah Arendt calls a common sense (and what Adorno calls 
“the transsubjective”293), through which we look upon the world, the same world as the other 
looks upon.294 Michael D. Jackson writes: “In Hannah Arendt’s view, judgement presupposes 
our belonging to a world that is shared by many. Unlike pure reason, judging does not consist 
in a silent Platonic dialogue between me and myself, but springs from and anticipates the 
presence of others.”295 This hybrid or extended concept of knowledge builds then upon, in 
Adorno’s words, “an attitude towards reality distinct from the fixated antithesis of subject 
and object”296. In this sense Adorno’s redefinition of the concept of mimesis and Arendt’s 
292  Our psychological tendency to project grants the camera a domesticating power, a power that adheres to the conception of 
knowledge as domestication.
293  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 146.
294  Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future (Penguin Books 2006), p. 219. 
295  Michael D. Jackson, “Where Thought Belongs: An Anthropological Critique of the Project of Philosophy”, in Anthropological 
Theory, Vol 9 (3), 2009, p. 237.
296  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 145.
171
redefinition of Kantian aesthetics are a redefinition of the concepts of subjectivity, objectivity 
and knowledge (I will return to the discussion on Arendt’s idea of the common sense in 
chapter 6). With this development in philosophy, the moral questions concerning the notion 
of the documentary that have established themselves as a counterweight to the predominantly 
purely epistemological theoretical discussion on representation are highlighted. Although 
neither Lévinas (whom I will return to later in this chapter), Adorno or Arendt directly 
address the subject of documentary film, their redefinition of epistemology serves well 
as a backdrop when discussing the specifically moral questions concerning documentary 
depiction. The documentary, when it works properly, does not domesticate the other, neither 
does it depict neutrally, how should we then describe what the documentary does?
Mimesis: Attending to the Other
As I showed in the preceding chapter, the expression of documentary film gains its significance 
in relation to the non-scripted ephemeral material which it mediates. Without directly 
discussing film, Adorno investigates the moral dimension of this practice of attending to the 
natural and social world without domesticating it. Hauke Brunkhorst describes Adorno’s 
notion of mimesis as follows:
[Mimesis] means an attitude to one’s natural and social environment 
and to other people and other things that does not compel this other-
ness to be under one’s own will. Mimesis in the sense Adorno is using 
the word here means to do justice to the otherness of the other, and 
to react adequately to the latter’s own aptitudes and concerns. ‘False 
projection’ conversely means the projection of an image that does not 
fit with the otherness of the other, one’s own egocentric image of the 
world. False projection makes everything its own image.297 
297  Hauke Brunkhorst, Adorno and Critical Theory. (University of Wales Press 1999), p. 62.
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The documentary easily lends itself to an exploitative attitude in which the director 
projects collective conceptions or subjective, personal views on the world. In this way the 
documentary becomes a projection, it fails in adhering to the other, and produces an image 
from preconceptions. On the other hand the notion of the documentary alludes to an 
attitude in which the author is sensitive towards features, gestures and material traces that 
cannot be constructed or directed, i.e. the documentary is, in its non-domesticating form, 
concerned with that which is beyond personal and collective projections. The camera can 
reveal things that the author of the image did not intend to reveal.298 The material traces – 
gestures, expressions and features that end up on the record, with or without the intention of 
the author – are by no means neutral. They bear witness to a world outside the conceptions 
of the author. These traces are highly relevant, but their meaning is neither transparent nor 
fixated. They are emergent in the images, awaiting the attention of the viewer. The ambiguity 
of the recording opens up a possibility for new ways of making sense of our experience. This 
way of attending to the world that I relate to the visual record, is essentially what Theodor 
Adorno calls “mimetic comportment”299.
Instead of seeing mimesis as a relation of likeness in which the artwork stands as a go-
between between subject and object, Adorno advocates an understanding of mimesis as 
something beyond the fixed relation of subject-object. He advocates the Nietzschean idea 
of becoming and applies it to aesthetics.300 For Adorno mimesis is a way in which human 
judgement and works of art behave, and behavior is not a fixed relation, but a dynamic process 
that enables the artwork to communicate. In emphasizing that which is in the becoming in 
the artwork, Adorno paves way for an aesthetics that include the processes of production. 
He writes:
The aesthetic force of production is the same as that of productive labor 
and has the same teleology; and what may be called aesthetic relations 
of production – all that in which the productive force is embedded and 
298  See Stanley Cavell, “What Photography Calls Thinking” in William Rothman (ed.), Cavell on Film (State of New York Press 
2005), p. 131.
299  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 145.
300  Ibid., p. 3.
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in which it is active – are sedimentations of imprintings of social rela-
tions of production. Art’s double character as both autonomous and fait 
social is incessantly reproduced on the level of its autonomy.301 
I relate this statement to what I have said so far about the use of the image. Here Adorno 
reminds us of the social and material aspects of depiction that often are hidden away in a 
certain realistic tradition. In the context of documentary film, what Adorno calls relations of 
production, can be understood as certain features of recording. The acknowledgement of the 
process involved in the making of art, points at the medium itself and the technique that is 
used. Film as a medium, the different technical operations, the apparatus and the different 
stages of production – pre-production, shooting and editing – provide certain conditions for 
depiction. Furthermore, the social event of making a documentary film, the element that 
the presence of the camera inevitably brings into a social situation, will also condition the 
resulting film-recording. These elements will, in one way or another, be present as traces 
in the resulting recording. In acknowledging these material and social aspects, Adorno 
expresses a certain understanding of the morality of depiction. This involves an ethics where 
the portrayer refrains from erasing the different material and social traces that reveal the 
mediating purpose of depiction.
According to Adorno the artwork mediates by participating in the historical world, it 
does not communicate an image of something beyond its boundaries.302 When the director 
preserves or even highlights the material and social traces in the film recording, traces that 
bear witness of a world beyond the projections, intentions or conceptions of the author, he/
she accepts that the cinematic space, just like the social and historical world, is not completely 
controllable or manoeuvrable. If we want to find a proper significance for the concept of 
the documentary it becomes clear in this context since the forte of the documentary film-
movement has throughout its history been that it has been able to capture the contingent 
301  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 6.
302  Amresh Sinha, “Adorno on Mimesis in Aesthetic Theory”. In Briel, Holger and Kramer, Andreas (eds.), In Practice: Adorno, 
Critical Theory and Cultural Studies (Lang 2000), p. 158.
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features, the event as they unfold in front of the camera. The documentary thrives from the 
uncertainty that this unfolding brings to the resulting image. 
The documentary feature of depiction that I describe above is hard to acknowledge, since 
it goes against the grain of a classical definition of the image as a way of fixating the perceived 
world. Here Adorno’s redefinition of the concept of mimesis becomes helpful. Contrary to 
the Aristotelian line of thought, the aesthetics of Adorno is not based on a relation of likeness 
between the representation and the object that is represented.303 In his reading of Adorno 
and Lacoue-Labarthe, Martin Jay notes that there is something contradictory or nonsensical 
in the notion of mimesis of Aristotle. The concept splits up: on the one hand mimesis refers 
to the imitation of nature, a duplication that is based on the idea of the sufficiency of nature. 
Another meaning of mimesis is the substitution (recreation, simulation) of nature, this 
entails a change or a refinement of that which already exists, a domestication and cultivation 
of nature. In the first case we can speak of reproduction and in the second case of production 
– transformation.304 Adorno’s running argument is that Art as we understand the concept, 
cannot be said to fit into the categorization that the Aristotelian concept of mimesis entails. 
The paradox in the classical mimetic understanding of art is revealed in the question; “how 
can making bring to appearance what is not the result of making; how can what according 
to its own concept is not true nevertheless be true?”305. That is, if the making of an artefact 
entails copying the natural object – making one more object that is like the natural object 
– then the difference between these two objects still remains due to the fact that the first 
object is natural and the second, produced object, is manufactured. If we see nature as the 
source of truthfulness (empiricism), art will always then be a distortion of that natural truth. 
If we on the other hand stick to the idea that art, by definition, is domestication of the 
natural (positivism), and that art’s truthfulness lies in what we add to the natural, in how we 
transform it, then another question announces itself: how can art refer to the natural – the 
world as it exists despite our involvement in it – if we always, in order to understand it, have 
303  Martin Jay, “Mimesis and Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe” in Huhn, Tom and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.) The 
Semblance of Subjectivity (The MIT Press 1997), p. 32-33, 37.
304  Martin Jay in Huhn, Tom and Lambert Zuidervaart (eds.) 1997, p. 39.
305  Theodor Adorno 2004, p.141.
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to transform it into something else? Adorno sees the meaning of art to reside in the fact that 
it is able to transcend this paradox. He writes:
Artworks are alive in that they speak in a fashion that is denied to natu-
ral objects and the subjects who make them. They speak by virtue of the 
communication of everything particular to them. Thus they come into 
contrast with the arbitrariness of what simply exists. Yet it is precisely as 
artifacts, as products of social labour, that they also communicate with 
the empirical experience that they reject and from which they draw 
their content.306
The point here is simply that the natural/artificial divide does not apply to art in a 
straightforward way. An aesthetics that is based upon the mimetical reference to the external 
object makes us forget that we are viewing a picture: “One paints a painting, not what it 
represents”307. In this sense there is nothing natural in art, art is by definition not nature, but 
at the same time arts subject matter is the natural and material world, and furthermore art 
is made of materials from the natural world, in this sense the artwork is embedded in our 
natural and historical world. As Adorno points out, realistic depiction has since the middle 
of the 19th century, under the influence of the positivistic scientific paradigm, aspired to erase 
all traces of production in the actual picture.308 The picture is always something material 
and a result of production, of manufacture, despite the attempts of the realistic tradition to 
conceal these traces of labour in the picture. In this way realism should be held accountable 
for the concealment of the mediating task of the picture. What happens in this concealment 
is that we as viewers are not invited to remind ourselves of the event of the production 
of the picture, which inherently is part of the event that is being recorded. In this way 
in classical realist production of images, not only are the technical processes involved in, 
306  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 5.
307  Here Adorno paraphrases Schoenberg. Theodor Adorno, 2004, p. 5.
308  Ibid., p. 135.
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for example, the shooting of a film concealed, but all the different social and mediating 
aspects of documentation are also left off screen.  In this realist method, the moral aspects 
of depiction are easily lost. 
The moral question is not primarily concerned with what art communicates, but with how 
it communicates, with how it reveals its relation to the world. My claim is that this is the 
moral standard by which we as viewers accept it as a true representation (and we as viewers 
are corruptible). Adorno sees the potential of art in its ability to express the otherness of the 
other in a way that brings forward that which is beyond our personal projections and collective 
culturally determined ideology309. This redefinition of the questions concerning art’s likeness 
with the world is a starting point in clarifying the moral questions of documentary depiction.
The Many Makers of the Film
What I have established so far is that the classical mimetic understanding of representation 
is not sufficient when we want to grasp the moral aspects of depiction instead I propose that 
we have to recognize that our images as well as our perceptions are results of a negotiation, 
of a hybrid or extended form of knowledge. Many voices are part of this negotiation process. 
This is not a discussion between me and an image and an image and the world, but a field 
of tension between many distinguishable voices, perceptions and images. There are several 
subjects involved; the author, the subject in the film, and the viewer. In this chapter I will 
concentrate primarily on the role of the author, but it is important to note that the three 
different categories overlap. The boundary between the subject in the film, the author and the 
viewer is not a stable one. All these subjects are usually required in order to produce a film, 
they are all in their own ways makers of the film. 
Laura U. Marks points out how the relation between the observer and the observed 
is not necessarily a one sided affair, although the documentary film conventionally 
309  Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 5.
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maintains such a hierarchy.310 In her book The Skin of the Film, Marks examines alternative 
documentary strategies that aim at abolishing the hierarchical and exploitative tendencies 
within documentary film. When a film reflects upon its means of production, for example 
by showing the different obstacles and problems that filmmakers were faced with during the 
production, the viewer also gets a sense of “the films that could have been”311. With the help 
of such reflective strategies, as viewers we are reminded that the film is never a recording 
of a clearly defined or readymade situation, but a result of different choices, obstacles and 
possibilities. The camera not only records an event, it also creates an event. In his insightful 
article Professional Vision, Charles Goodwin investigated what he calls “coding schemes” (what 
I refer to later as conventions of documentary film language) in documentary recordings, he 
writes: “However the definitiveness provided by the coding scheme typically erases from 
subsequent documentation the cognitive and perceptual uncertainties that the students 
are grappling with, as well as the work practices within which they are embedded.”312 The 
reflective strategies within documentary film that Marks describe aim precisely at making 
the “cognitive and perceptual uncertainties” conspicuous, in order to shatter the illusion of a 
definitive or transparent representation of a readymade event. 
When we understand how the subject-object dichotomy is put into play in documentary 
film and furthermore that this divide is something that is conventionally maintained, we 
also understand that there are alternatives to this hierarchical divide. In the next part I 
will look primarily at Trinh T. Minh-ha’s understanding of the role of the subject, in a 
documentary film theory that is predominantly fixated on the notion of objectivity. Minh-ha 
is regarded as a pioneer of the experimental documentary film movement of the mid 80’s. 
What was common for this movement was that the filmmakers often worked with a minimal 
budget and that they were from multicultural backgrounds. Like the postcolonial movement 
within cultural theory, it aimed at deconstructing the dominating film language in order 
310  Laura U. Marks, The Skin of the Film: Intercultural Cinema, Embodiment, and the Senses (Duke University Press 2000), p. 
192-193.
311  Ibid., p. 65.
312  Here Goodwin writes about certain schemes and practices that are used in making archeological maps. The point he makes is 
applicable to the practice of documentation in general. Charles Goodwin, “Professional Vision”, in American Anthroplogist, 96 (3), 
1994, p. 612. <http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/clic/cgoodwin/94prof_vis.pdf>
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to give room for new expressions and narratives that circled around the problems of living 
in-between two or several cultural identities.313 The so called intercultural film movement 
reacted against a double form of colonialism; partly against the discourse of the dominating 
culture and partly against the conception of a shared homogenous minority culture.314 This 
did not mean a privileging of the subjective on the expense of the objective. It was an attempt 
to redefine this dichotomy. 
Here, it is important to note that Minh-ha and the intercultural film-movement is part 
of a long legacy of critical voices within documentary and experimental film. There is an 
interface between the intercultural film movement of the 80’s and 90’s and a former critical 
tradition within the anthropological documentary film. Diane Scheinman regards, among 
others, Jean Rouch’s film Les Mâitres Fous315 as an early example of a critical questioning of 
the anthropological film tradition in which the perspectives of Western scientists always 
define the culture explored.316 In the same way as Bakhtin regards Dostoyevsky as an 
example of dialectic authorship in which several voices and dialects are given room without 
being subjugated by the narrator’s voice, Rouch has, according to Scheinman, questioned the 
privilege of the anthropologist to speak on behalf of others.317 For Rouch, the presence of the 
camera was never neutral. Rouch acknowledged the way in which the camera transforms a 
situation, he understood that the documentary film set is a social event that is not the same 
as the situation would be without the presence of the camera and the venture of recording 
an event. Instead of maintaining the power hierarchy between observer and observed, that 
usually is present in traditional anthropological film, Rouch tried to create a space for several 
voices or perspectives in his films, without a clear hierarchy, i. e. without singling out a 
privileged voice. In this way Rouch wanted to create a shared anthropology, with several 
observers and several objects of observation – the question ‘who is examining whom?’ was 
313  Laura U. Marks 2000, p. 2-5.
314  Ibid., p. 65.
315  Les Mâitres Fous, France 1954.
316  Diane Scheinman, “The Dialogic Imagination of Jean Rouch: Covert Conversations in Les Maîtres Fous”, in Barry Keith Grant 
and Jeanette Sloniowsky (eds.), Documenting the Documentary: Close Readings of Documentary Film and Video. Wayne State 
University Press 1998, p. 188.
317  Diane Scheinman, in Barry Keith Grant and Jeanette Sloniowsky (eds.), 1998, p. 202.
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problematized. These strategies aim at accomplishing a reflective form of documentary film.
During the 1960’s Rouch pointed out that by this time there had not been one single sub-
Saharan African full-length feature film produced (i. e., a film produced and directed etc. by 
Africans, in an African language). 65 years after the birth of film, the production of filmic 
representations of Africa was still solely a privilege for Westerners.318 Despite the obvious 
cultural differences between Rouch as a Frenchman and his African subjects, Rouch saw it as 
his task to make films that Africans accepted as representations of themselves. He describes 
how he arranged screenings of his films for the people who were the subjects of the film. 
Through their reactions he could interpret whether he had succeeded.319 For him a successful 
film was capable of showing the particularity of a certain event. He understood that this was 
achievable when he set aside generic conventions of film and anthropological theories and 
became present in the actual event, with the help of the film camera.320 For Rouch the success 
of an anthropologic documentary was directly dependent on the anthropologist’s openness 
before a certain group of people and his/her participation in a certain situation. He writes: 
“Knowledge is no longer a stolen secret, devoured in the Western temples of knowledge; it 
is the result of an endless quest where anthropologists and those whom they study meet on a 
path that some of us now call ”shared anthropology””.321
Another comparable example here is Claude Lanzmann’s film Shoah322. It is an attempt 
to describe the holocaust through several different perspectives and narratives – that which 
somebody has seen and the way in which somebody saw, and the tension between these. 
Lanzmann does not see it as his task to investigate the actual historical events or  factual 
318  Jean Rouch, Ciné-Ethnography. University of Minnesota Press 2003, p. 47.
319  Elisabeth Edwards makes a very interesting observation concerning the photographs that were taken during the first anthropologi-
cal expedition that used a camera for motion pictures – the Cambridge expedition to the Torres Strait in 1898. This early expedition 
already included the practice of showing their photographs to the locals as a part of their anthropological fieldwork. So the method 
of Rouch was preceded by earlier anthropological expeditions. Edwards writes about the expedition: “This encompasses not only 
the making of photographs but the considered showing of photographs, not as ephemeral illustration, but as central to the Expedi-
tion’s positioning of itself with the Islanders during fieldwork and with the scientific community on its return.”  Elizabeth Edwards, 
“Performing science: still photography and the Torres Strait Expedition”, in Anita Herle and Sandra Rouse (eds.): Cambridge and the 
Torres Strait – Centenary Essays on the 1898 Anthropological Expedition (Cambridge University Press 1998), p. 106.
320  Jean Rouch 2003, p. 99-100.
321  Ibid., p. 101.
322  Shoah, France 1985.
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history. Instead he wants to show how distinctions, for example between the expressions 
“train” and “special train”, can express considerable gaps between different experiences. 
These differences in the details bear witness to the positions and experiences of the different 
subjects in the film.323 For Lanzmann the documentary is not a registration of a certain 
event, since the past cannot be authentically present in the film except through traces and 
the traces of traces that certain details reveal.324 What Rouch, Lanzmann and Minh-ha, 
among others within a certain documentary film-movement bring to the table is comparable 
to the redefinition of epistemology that starts with Kant and is later picked up by Nietzsche, 
Levinas, Arendt and Adorno. These movements aim at redefining a problematic positivistic 
understanding of knowledge. 
When this positivistic observational mode is put into play in anthropological 
documentation it invites a domesticating and rationalizing scientific gaze that disregards the 
self-understanding and the concerns of the other. Consider the following quote by Charles 
Hercules Read from the article Photography for Anthropologists, by M. V. Portman that was 
published in 1896:
The best plan seems to be to devote as much time as possible to the 
photographic camera, or to making careful drawings. By these means 
the traveler is dealing with facts about which there can be no question, 
and the record thus obtained may be elucidated by subsequent inquirers 
on the same spot, while the timid answers of natives to questions pro-
pounded through the medium of a native interpreter can be but rarely 
relied upon, and are more apt to produce confusion than to be a benefit 
to comparative anthropology.325
323  Ilona Reiners, Taiteen Muisti (The Memory of Art). Tutkijaliitto 2001, p. 216-217.
324  Ibid., p. 211.
325  Charles Hercules Read as quoted in M. V. Portman, “Photography for Anthropologists”. In The Journal of the Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, vol. 25, 1896, p. 76.
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The quote above exemplifies the positivistic and classical form of the documentary, an 
observational mode that is put into play in order to unify all perceptions of the other so 
that an compartmentalized, categorical and fixating language of representation is achieved. 
This is understandable, because, as I have pointed out in chapter 3, science requires a form 
that orders our perceptions into a rationalized encyclopedic order. But the quote above also 
speaks of how the observational mode of positivism, when it is turned on another human 
being, caters to something else, something sinister. In this quote the visual record serves 
as the reliable source, while the oral testimonies of the natives (who are the subjects of the 
anthropological research) are considered unreliable. The photographic picture is regarded as 
not being prone to the same potential distortions and misunderstandings as the answers of 
the natives in their native languages. Read, who was among other things elected as President 
for the Anthropological Institute of Britain and Ireland in 1899, expresses a near xenophobic 
attitude disguised as a scientifically sound method. When the object of examination is 
another human being this logo- and ocularcentric attitude and the trust in the camera 
becomes a moral problem. The natives are described by the means of a technological and 
visual language that is foreign to them. The anthropologist uses a means of expression that 
the subjects of the inquiry do not master themselves. In this way the hierarchy between 
subject and object/observer and observed is established. 
This is the tendency that Rouch criticizes within anthropology. In the hands of a positivist 
anthropologist the camera becomes a tool of domestication and colonization. As Claude 
Lévi-Strauss puts it: “Anthropology is not a dispassionate science like astronomy, which 
springs from the contemplation of things at a distance.”326 Rouch takes this idea one radical 
step further by showing that the whole premise of positivist science – that there is a clear 
boundary between the observer (passionate or dispassionate) and the observed – is eradicated 
when our discipline is anthropology. 
If we now object and think that this hierarchy between observer and observed is 
necessarily established by the presence and use of the camera, that making a documentary 
326  Claude Levi-Strauss, ”Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future”, in Current Anthropology, Vol. 7, No 2 (April 1966), p. 126.
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by definition means to domesticate – to make an incomprehensible, other world, into a 
rationalized, ordered and fixed image – we condone these kinds of documentary practices. 
My aim in what follows is to show that this is not necessary. When we want to understand 
how the documentary image shows us the world, we have to understand that it does not 
necessarily strive toward neutrality or transparency. Neither does it necessarily show us the 
world through domesticating it. The dichotomy of knowledge through neutral observation 
or rationalization and domestication, although this is the generic model for how philosophy 
describes the dynamics of knowledge, does not apply here. This is one further reason for 
why it is important to find an understanding of the visual record and the documentary 
that provides an alternative role for this kind of image. I will continue by investigating the 
reflective documentary strategies, as forms that permit us to attend to the other. 
Trinh T. Minh-ha: Toward a Hybrid Point of View
A conversation of ‘us’ with ‘us’ about ‘them’ is a conversation in which 
‘them’ is silenced. [...] Anthropology is finally better defined as ‘gossip’ 
(we speak together about others) than as ‘conversation’ (we discuss a 
question).327
I do not intend to speak about
Just speak near by328 
Trinh T. Minh-ha’s first film Reassemblage329 came about after Minh-ha had lived in Senegal 
for 3 years, teaching music at the Institut National des Arts in Dakar.330 Her aim with the 
film was to show what her experiences in Senegal had taught her, without falling back on an 
327  Trinh T. Minh-ha, Woman, Native, Other. Indiana University Press 1989, p. 67-68.
328  Line from the manuscript for the film Reassemblage, in Trinh T. Minh-ha, Framer Framed. Routledge 1992, p. 96. 
329  Reassemblage, Senegal 1982.
330  Trinh T. Minh-ha 1992, p. 112. 
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anthropological tendency to define a culture as a unified objective entity. She describes this 
aim: “What seems most important to me was to expose the transformations that occurred 
with the attempt to materialize on film and between the frames the impossible experience 
of “what” constituted Senegalese cultures.”331  By exposing “the attempt” of transforming 
experience into film, Minh-ha criticizes the way in which filmmakers presuppose that they 
have to present us with a readymade picture of, for example Senegalese culture. She is not 
critical of the transformative qualities of film per se, but she is wary of how this transformation 
easily turns into a question of power. 
The film begins with the line: “Scarcely twenty years were enough to make two billion 
people define themselves as underdeveloped.”332 During the mid-80’s, this was a common 
Western perspective on Africa. Africa was consequently presented as the underdeveloped 
continent in news-broadcasts, reportages and documentary films. What Minh-ha points out 
is that this projection on a whole continent, also affects the Africans’ image of themselves. 
The representation of Africa as the underdeveloped continent becomes a tool of power that 
transforms. This is the outset of the film, but it is hard to describe the rest of it as a narrative 
with a definite end. The structure of the film is fragmented and non-narrative. The film 
proceeds with different scenes of village life, we see people in their daily practices, in work 
and leisure, we see spaces and details of landscape and architecture, in this sense it consists 
of the same elements as an traditional anthropological documentary film, but these elements 
are not parts of a unifying picture or a coherent narrative. The sum of the scenes are more 
like the opposite, like a deconstruction of a positivist anthropological documentary film. The 
deconstruction reaches even the synchronicity of sound and image that is common for most 
cinematic representations. We do not hear the sound of the actual film-recording that we see, 
but different recorded sound-fragments (Minh-ha’s poetic commentary, sound-recordings 
of background noise, dialogues in local tongues), as if recorded sounds and recorded images 
were disjoined. 
331  Ibid., p. 113.
332  Ibid., p. 96. 
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Already the title Reassemblage (reassembly) suggests that the film will reorganize something, 
in this case our pre-conceptions of Africa, but also our pre-conceptions of documentary film-
language. Reassemblage is an attempt to make a documentary from a perspective from which 
the author refrains from defining the meaning of what is seen. She made several conscious 
choices in order to break the domesticating conventions of documentary film. She wrote the 
manuscript during the shooting and editing of the film (i.e. not before, but during and after 
the recording of the material). Her intention was not to depict the preconceived, to make 
her preconceptions into recorded images. Here is an aspect that I believe is crucial for the 
concept of the documentary. How things unfold in a lived-life cannot be predetermined. The 
strength of the documentary relies partly on this ability to present us with the uncertainty of 
what the outcome will be in a situation where the camera records an ongoing, non-scripted, 
event. In this sense it becomes problematic to talk about Minh-has “intentions” in the case 
of Reassemblage, since the concept of intention is used ordinarily to mean a presupposition. 
In Minh-has case the chronology of intention-manuscript-recording-editing-film, is not 
linear. The process involves uncertainty, the acceptance of not knowing what will come next. 
Instead of accepting and reproducing predetermined definitions of the alien culture, the 
question ’how should this be represented?’, is made visible in the actual film. The film aims at 
enabling the viewer to reflect upon different ways of seeing an alien culture – if something is 
alien it is absurd to argue that one knows how it should be represented, or as Phil Hutchinson 
puts it: “Before one imagines that one understands a culture better than its inhabitants do, 
one ought to be confident that one understands it at least as well as its inhabitants do”.333 In 
this way the film is part of a negotiation about how the life in a village in Senegal could be 
represented, it is not the end product of such a negotiation.  
In order to achieve this uncertainty, Minh-ha uses several unconventional filmic solutions. 
She arranges sequences so that they consist of several shots of a Senegalese woman, taken from 
different perspectives. One perspective concentrates on her breasts, another on her skin, a third 
on her eyes etc. In this contrasting of different looks the viewer is encouraged to reflect upon 
333  Phil Hutchinson, Rupert Read and Wes Sharrock, There Is No Such Thing as a Social Science: In Defence of Peter Winch. 
Ashgate 2008, p. 131.
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different possible ways of seeing a person. This is not about choosing one correct look, but an 
affirmation of the many different looks of the subject. In the film she also uses several takes 
of the same shot. The viewer sees a repetition of the same shot with slight variations. We do 
not only see the perfect shot, but also the incomplete and halting ones. In addition she uses 
intentionally jerky panning shots, where the irregular movement of the camera reminds us that 
we are looking through a rectangular screen – a frame. These methods could be seen as technical 
shortcomings, but the use of unconventional methods have a context. The jerky panning shot 
is a trace of the bodily movement of Minh-ha (what she calls “body writing”334) – it reminds us 
of the embodied presence of the author, the framer is framed. The same idea lies behind the use 
of several takes of the same shot. She writes: “Its [the camera’s] erratic and unassuming moves 
materialize those of the filming subject caught in a situation of trial, where the desire to capture 
on celluloid grows in a state of non-knowingness and with the understanding that no reality 
can be “captured” without trans-forming.”335. By refraining from picking out, or emphasizing 
one shot of a scene, Minh-ha turns our attention to the number of possibilities that film, even 
documentary film, can utilize in order to contest the streamlined ideal of film language that 
conceals the bodily presence of the author from the attention of the viewer. These techniques 
are used to make visible the ‘filming subject’ among the other subjects, in the film. Moore 
importantly, they are used in order to make conspicuous the transformative power of film, the 
potential it carries in transforming our perceptions. 
In an interview with Tina Spangler, Minh-ha describes her filmmaking as a process 
where method and technique are politicized. The choice of camera objective, choices in the 
editing process or the choice of camera angle are all aspects of the machinery that affect 
how something is depicted. In her work Minh-ha reveals how to work within a certain 
predetermined visual language without reflecting upon how this language determines the 
expression, potentially results in the reproduction of certain collective conceptions. The 
breach with convention is therefore a strategy that aims at gaining thorough knowledge 
of the implications (moral, political) of these conventions. Scott MacDonald points out in 
334  Trinh T. Minh-ha 1992, p. 115. 
335  Ibid., p. 115. 
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an Interview with Minh-ha: ”The subject stays in its world and you try to figure out what 
your relationship to it is. It’s exactly the opposite of “taking a position”: it’s seeing what 
different positions reveal”.336 That is, it is not being unconventional for the sake of abolishing 
convention, but an attempt to deconstruct the conventions in order to distinguish what 
these rules, systems and structures entail. Here it is crucial to understand these implications 
correctly. Charles Goodwin writes: “It is not possible to work in some abstract world where 
the constitution of knowledge through a politics of representation has been magically 
overcome.”337 By deconstructing the conventions of film-language, Minh-ha does not try to 
step outside the politics of representation, she rather tries to find another position in relation to 
the conventions of film language, in this way she is still speaking within that same language. 
Abstraction or transcending will only result in formlessness, in incomprehensibility, and 
admittedly this is a risk for Minh-ha, but if we try to distinguish the forte of her practices, it 
resides in the attempt to make the common features of documentary-film language visible in 
the film, in order to scrutinize them. In this case breaking a convention within film-language 
is an act in relation to that convention, this act is a way (among others) of applying the rule, 
working against the grain of the rule. This is the way I believe that Minh-ha’s project should 
be understood. To work against the grain of a certain rule, but still be clear about that one 
acts in relation to that rule, makes the rule in question conspicuous. 
What is tangible in Reassemblage is how different looks bear witness to certain 
conceptions of, in this case, Africa. With the aid of the camera Minh-ha examines her own 
and consequently also others’ conceptions of Africa. She does not position herself above the 
viewer by representing a fixed perspective. On the other hand she does not accept any given 
perspective. When she manages to reveal a certain perspective towards the other, she tries 
to clarify what this perspective can mean by reflecting upon both affirmative and critical 
readings of the picture. One of the audio tracks in Reassemblage includes Minh-ha’s poetic 
commentary. On the track she reflects upon the choice of different objects in the sequences 
and the different camera perspectives. In some cases she puts a certain perspective in question 
– in a comment on the audio track she scrutinizes a sequence in the film. This sequence 
336  Ibid., p. 115. 
337  Charles Goodwin 1994, p. 607. 
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consists of a series of shots of women’s breasts. In the voice-over she tries to figure out what 
impulses made her react, particularly on the breasts; “Filming in Africa means for many of 
us, colourful images, naked breast women, exotic dances and fearful rites. The unusual”.338 
This comment could be understood as a self-critical note. She is surprised by the fact that 
even she herself possesses an exoticizing look. Here she strays from the conventional path of 
the documentary in which the viewer is excluded from taking part in the different choices 
and questions that the author tussles with. By being honest about that which is alien to her, 
she creates a critical space for the viewer. This is the space that enables or even encourages the 
viewer to use her own judgement in accepting or discarding the film as a real representation. 
Minh-ha notes in a voice-over in the film: “One of the villagers is telling a story, another 
is playing music on his improvised lute, the ethnologist is sleeping next to his switched-on 
cassette recorder. He thinks he excludes personal values. He tries to believe so but how can he 
be a Fulani [the name that the natives use to signify their own people]? That’s objectivity”.339 
Neutrality in this context is not the opposite of domestication as some positivistically 
inclined anthropologists and scientists in general seem to believe, it is an integral part of the 
domesticating power of the record. Neutrality is one domesticating strategy among others, 
but it becomes a rhetoric force, when its modus operandi is to hide the power of transformation 
that it carries. The ethnologist that sleeps next to his switched-on cassette recorder seems 
oblivious to the fact that by recording a story told by the natives, he transforms it, he takes it 
from its original context. This is not an act of taking something from a certain context and 
making it neutral, it is taking something from a context of a culture, a lived life experience, 
and putting it into another context, the context of an anthropological record. Whether this 
leads to domestication, whether this act is immoral or not, differs for every case, it depends 
on what the record is used for and on how it is used, what it is made to signify. However, 
the failure to acknowledge the transformation that is at play poses a problem within itself. 
Simply put film, even documentary film, is always a kind of transformation or reassembly, 
film is not even conventionally a mimetic (in the Aristotelian sense) art-form because it 
reorganizes time, sound and image. 
338  Trinh T. Minh-ha 1992, p. 98. 
339  Ibid., p. 103. 
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The Colonializing View
Minh-ha does not solely criticize a certain convention within documentary film. What is at 
stake here is literally a moral difference. Behind her choices lies an awareness of the power 
and politics of representation. As Michael Azar points out in his book Frihet, jämlikhet, 
brodermord (Liberty, Equality, Fratricide) about France’s colonial rule in Algeria, colonialism 
is dependent on the concept of representation. He writes:
      
A fundamental meaning of the word colonialism or colonization is par-
ticularly organization, or arrangement (from lat. Colere, which means to 
cultivate or to design), with Valéry’s terms we can speak about France (he 
speaks actually about Europe) as a “large factory; a factory in its actual 
significance, a transforming machine” that transforms other territories, 
social organizations and expressions into representations of France.340 
The logic of a certain mimetic understanding of representation – to transform the natural 
into something cultural – is used in the project of colonialism: to transform the other into a 
representation that fits the domestic frame of reference. Colonialism is in this sense entwined 
with certain conventions within positivist anthropologic documentation. The anthropologist 
is interested in the exotic, the alien, in examining a culture without ever acknowledging it 
as an equal to one’s own culture. If it were considered as equal to the “own” culture, then 
domestication would not be required. In her essay The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Political 
Significance, Hannah Arendt acknowledges the concept of “culture” as another derivative of 
colere, she points out that for the Romans colere meant: “to cultivate, to dwell, to take care, 
to tend and preserve – and it relates primarily to the intercourse of man with nature in the 
sense of cultivating and tending nature until it becomes fit for human habitation. As such, 
it indicates an attitude of loving care and stands in sharp contrast to all efforts to subjugate 
340  Michael Azar, Frihet, jämlikhet, brodermord: Revolution och kolonialism hos Albert Camus och Frantz Fanon (Liberty, Equal-
ity and Fratricide: Revolution and Colonialism in Albert Camus and Frantz Fanon).  Symposion 2001, p 38. My translation.
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nature to the domination of man.”341 The difference that is important here is that of on 
the one hand,  “nature” conceived as alien, something that needs to be domesticated and 
colonized in order to be known and, on the other hand,  “nature” as something that we share, 
that we tend to as the realm that is the home to us all. We could say that anthropology has 
historically moved between these two definitions of “nature”, from positivism to what can 
be called shared anthropology.342 But there is something within the concept of anthropology 
itself that gravitates toward the exploitative relation. This becomes clear in a certain use 
of the words ethnography and anthropology. In line with Lévi-Strauss and Minh-ha we 
could ask; ‘why is a certain scientific perspective void of reciprocity?’. Levi-Strauss writes: 
“When it is practiced by members of the culture which it endeavours to study, anthropology 
loses its specific nature and becomes rather akin to archaeology, history, and philology. For 
anthropology is the science of culture as seen from the outside.”343 
If Anthropology is ‘the science of nature of man’ and it distinguishes itself from the 
practices of history and philology, then the concept of “nature”, refers to something that 
is external to the anthropologist. What ends, other than a will to control by defining, can 
such a division serve? Colonialism entails a power structure in which everything is defined, 
341  Hannah Arendt, “The Crisis in Culture: Its Social and Political Significance”, in Between Past and Future. Penguin Books 
2006, p. 208. 
342  Consider the following statement by Bronislaw Malinowski, as an illustration of this ambiguity: “Our considerations thus indi-
cate that the goal of ethnographic field-work must be approached through three avenues: 
1. The organization of the tribe, and the anatomy of its culture must be recorded in firm, clear outline. The method of concrete, statisti-
cal documentation is the means through which such an outline has to be given.
2. Within this frame, the Imponderabilia of actual life, and the type of behavior have to be filled in. They have to be collected through 
minute, detailed observations, in the form of some sort of ethnographic diary, made possible by close contact with native life. 
3. A collection of ethnographic statements, characteristic narratives, typical utterances, items of folk-lore and magical formulate has to be 
as a corpus inscriptionum, as documents of native mentality.
These three lines of approach lead to the final goal, of which an Ethnographer should never lose sight. This goal is, briefly, to grasp the 
native’s point of view, his relation to life, to realize his vision of his world. We have to study man, and we must study what concerns him 
most intimately, that is, the hold which life has on him. In each culture, the values are slightly different; people aspire after different aims, 
follow different impulses, yearn after a different form of happiness. In each culture, we find different institutions in which man pursues 
his life-interest, different customs by which he satisfies his aspirations, different codes of law and morality which reward his virtues or 
punish his defections. To study the institutions, customs, and codes or to study the behavior and mentality without the subjective desire of 
feeling by what these people live, of realizing the substance of their happiness – is, in my opinion, to miss the greatest reward which we 
can hope to obtain from the study of man.” Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the Western Pacific – An Account of Native Enterprise 
and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd. 1950), p. 24-25.
343  Claude Levi-Strauss, ”Anthropology: Its Achievements and Future”, in Current Anthropology, Vol. 7, No 2 (April 1966), p. 126.
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within the frames of reference of the dominant culture. In order for colonialism to succeed it 
has to be made clear what (or who) should be defined as alien. This classification is dependent 
of a conception of identity where every divergence poses a problem.344 Representations of the 
third world are in a way also representations of what we see as primitive, chaotic and exotic. 
In this way they are also self-images of the first world – an attempt to find oneself through 
the other. The problem here is that in alienating the other, we eradicate our uncertainties 
concerning the self. In denying our uncertainties we project them on the other, a classical 
psychological dynamic at play. These uncertainties can not be resolved by defining or fixating 
a factual and definable identity (as nationalists do). 
The unifying and fixating tendency of positivism that has given us the camera, relates, 
in my view, to an unwillingness to accept the many voices, the hybridity of the self. Here 
hybridity should be understood as the opposite to the fixed, the unified or predetermined. 
When we understand that the concept of “ the other” resists categorization and fixation, we 
are also reminded of the fact that our selves rarely show themselves as fixed or unified. This is 
where the moral and the epistemological become contrary to one other.   As Lévinas points 
out in an interview with Philippe Nemo, “the other” stands beyond the definable, it does not 
consist of fixed qualities or discursive knowledge. He writes:
The face is significant, and signification without context. I mean that the 
Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a context. 
Ordinarily one is a “character”: a professor at the Sorbonne, a Supreme 
Court justice, son of so-and-so, everything that is in one’s passport, the 
manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all signification in the 
usual sense of the term is relative to such a context: the meaning of some-
thing is in its relation to another thing. Here, to the contrary, the face is 
meaning all by itself. You are you. In this sense one can say that the face 
is not “seen”. It cannot become a content, which your thought would em-
brace; it is uncontainable, it leads you beyond. It is in this that the signifi-
cation of the face makes it escape from being, as a correlate of a knowing. 
Vision, to the contrary, is a search for adequation; it is what par excellence 
absorbs being. But the relation of the face is straightaway ethical.345 
344  Compare, Trinh T. Minh-ha, When the Moon Waxes Red – Representation, Gender and Cultural Politics. Routledge 1991, p. 73.
345  Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity. Duquesne University Press 1985, p.86-87.
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This passage can be interpreted as a disassociation from depiction, and consequently, in line 
with the iconoclastic tradition that condemns both representations and sense perception. 
But when we read the passage carefully it becomes clear that it deals with the temptation of 
giving a significance to every visual sign, in order to gain control over the visual. This desire 
to domesticate the visual in order to fixate it, is what Minh-ha reacts against in her texts and 
films. In Reassemblage the narrator calls this “the habit of imposing a meaning on every single 
sign”.346 Her strategy is to pay attention to something without imposing meanings on the 
visual, without fixating its meaning. This reflexive method reveals that the material creates a 
tension in relation to personal conceptions. The difference that it is important to notice here 
is two different ways to deal with this tension:
1: To domesticate the other so that it becomes a fixed content, an object 
of knowledge for the subject, and thus to dissolve the tension.
2: To preserve the tension, and allow hybridity in depiction.
When does transformation become domestication? To answer this question we need to keep 
in mind the different possibilities given by these two strategies. The first one in which the 
tension is dissolved is prone to result in domestication. The second one correlates with the 
tension between thinking and perceiving that I outlined in chapter 4. In acknowledging the 
different forces at play within ourselves, we also invite, and are less hesitant to accept, the 
uncertainties that the addressing by others brings in to the picture.       
In Reassemblage, Minh-ha reveals the (social/material) traces of the process that has 
produced the expression, in order to preserve the otherness of the object in the film. Minh-
ha’s way of speaking close by, instead of speaking about and Lévinas’ notion of the subtle 
human face, point towards the challenge in capturing the specific, the particular or the 
non-reproducible – the recording of the facial expressions and the gestures of the body. It is 
346  Trinh T. Minh-ha 1992, p. 96. 
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this feature that Minh-ha tries to revitalize by going against the grain of a more and more 
streamlined and fixed documentary form. 
The I of the Documentary and the Hybridity of the Self
We inherently possess different voices and different ways of seeing. Film is for Minh a means 
of exploring these voices and gazes. In this way there is an element of autobiography in her 
films. They explore what her gazes reveal about her social self.347 Minh-ha compares film 
with poetry where the self is not personified. She writes:
It’s amusing that the feedback I often get from my relatives or close 
friends of my book of poems tends to be something like: ”We are far 
from suspecting that you could be what you are in your poetry!” For 
them all the feelings and situations depicted in poetry are Personally 
true. They immediately associate you with the “I” who speaks your po-
etry and assume it’s “real”, which is not wrong, but it is not accurate 
either. In poetical language, there is no “I” that just stands for myself. 
The “I” is there; it has to be there as the site where all other “I’s” can 
enter and cut across one another.348 
Similarly, the camera-perspective is not only the perspective of a given author, it is also the 
perspective through which every viewer of the film is invited to see the world. In this sense 
the perspective of the camera does not determine how we should view something, we do not 
see with the eyes of the author of the film, but through the gaze of the camera. In this way 
the recording cannot by itself be biographical. It cannot imitate the psychological mood or 
the world view of the author. In his essay ”Getting to know you …” Bill Nichols points out the 
discrepancy between seeing something in the light of this or that (having a view or an image 
347  Trinh T. Minh-ha 1992, p. 114, 117 and 119. 
348  Ibid., p. 121-122. 
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of something) and the fact that something looks like this or that. According to Nichols, 
theories and world views are implicit in what we see. “Seeing” involves our experience, 
conception, memory, and judgement. How I see something reveals something about who I 
am. But a picture cannot carry with it a theory of how it is to be viewed, a concept cannot 
be illustrated.349 The perspective of the camera is special since it both enables us to see an 
image and at the same time it invites us to consider this image as if it would be a part of our 
phenomenal world, a perception. The camera is able to present us with something that could 
be characterized as a “common sense”.350 We know that the camera is supposed to present 
a perspective that can be accepted as a perception, not only for me, but for many viewers. 
Hannah Arendt writes: 
The ability to see things not only from one’s own point of view but in 
the perspective of all those who happen to be present […] The differ-
ence between this judging insight and speculative thought lies in that 
the former has its roots in what we usually call common sense, which 
the latter constantly transcends. Common sense […] discloses to us the 
nature of the world insofar as it is a common world; we owe to it the 
fact that our strictly private and “subjective” five senses and their sen-
sory data can adjust themselves to a nonsubjective and “objective” world 
which we have in common and share with others. Judging is one, if 
not the most, important activity in which this sharing-the-world-with-
others comes to pass.351 
Note how Arendt redefines the subjective-objective dichotomy. Objectivity in this Kantian 
sense, does not stand in contrast to judgement, but to the personal, to our “private feelings”352. 
349  Bill Nichols, “’Getting to know you . . .’: Knowledge, Power and the Body”, in Renov, Michael (ed.) Theorizing Documentary. 
Routledge 1993, p. 181.
350  Adorno makes similar statements about art in general. He writes: “Art judges exclusively by abstaining from judgment: this is 
the defense of naturalism”, and “Expression approaches the transsubjective; it is the form of knowledge that – having preceded the 
polarity of subject and object – does not recognize this polarity as definitive.”, Theodor Adorno 2004, p. 164 and 146.
351  Hannah Arendt 2006, p. 218. 
352  Ibid., p. 219. 
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By “ judgement” Arendt refers to the ability to use one’s senses as if they were common to 
everyone present. This idea is important because it reveals in which sense the discussion 
about the author’s role in documentary film gets misunderstood if we conceive “objective” to 
mean a neutral view without judgement. We can conclude that the perspective of the camera 
is neither a view from nowhere, nor is it somebody’s subjective, i.e. personal, perception of 
the world. The idea of a subjective outlook gives room for an extreme relativism where all 
utterances and expressions are true in the same sense. In this way, subjectivism is based on 
the same structure and it poses the same dilemma as the positivist notion of a view from 
nowhere, as it promotes the visual to something that exists per se, without a subject with her 
judgement, her self and her corporeal body. Judgement is, in this Arendtian sense, the faculty 
that either succeeds or fails to accommodate a common understanding of the world. In this 
way a common understanding requires the reflexive capacity of judgement: hybridity.
Hybridity does not entail a classical form of moral relativism. Accepting the fact that the 
self consists of several different voices, looks and perspectives does not necessarily undermine 
its accountability. On the contrary, in the contrasting of looks and perspectives, the urgency 
of the moral questions become clearer. Taneli Kukkonen writes: 
The dialogue is inter- as well as intrapersonal: by recognizing the tug 
and pull of various forces within ourselves, we become better able to 
appreciate the way in which such forces are at work in the outside world 
and vice versa.  The point of artistic endeavour, in particular, is to afford 
souls insight into themselves and each other.353 
The “tug and pull” within ourselves is what moral concerns essentially are about. There is no 
answer-book that we can consult in order to decide which force we should go with in these 
kinds of situations. In this way there is no image or identity that can function as a moral 
backbone for us, the judgement we need in order to make decisions has to reside in ourselves. 
The image’s transformative power aids us in cultivating this faculty. 
353  Taneli Kukkonen, “Truth in the Making, Or, can we mean what we say?”, in Finnish Art Review 3, 2005, p.  8-12.
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6. Sharing a View 
If one wants to talk about ‘priority’ at all here, I should regard it as 
less misleading to say that men’s understanding of each other is more 
fundamental than (and in that sense prior to) their understanding of 
the world.354
Peter Winch 
“Lars von Trier describes his films as a walk with a friend in an un-
familiar forest: ‘if one has somebody to walk hand in hand with, one 
willingly sees what one has never seen before’”.355
Lars von Trier
354  Peter Winch, Ethics and Action (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1972), p. 3. 
355  Nils Thorsen and Lars von Trier as quoted in Philip Teir, “Den sista konstnären” (the last artist), Hufvudstadsbladet, 2 July 
2013, p. 18.
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In the installation Dream (image above356), by Beninian artist Romuald Hazoumè 
we encounter a ghost ship. It is a metal vessel constructed of petrol canisters that are 
commonly used as material for various constructions in third world countries. The vessel 
stands in front of a panoramic image of a desolate beach that, for Western sensibilities, 
perhaps portrays something exotic, calm and sublime. The contrast between the rugged 
and clumsy vessel and the beach-landscape tells a narrative of the circumstances of many 
African emigrants, who risk their lives in dodgy boats and ships in order to escape the 
social and economical hardships of the third world. They sacrifice everything for a dream 
that is both dangerous and unrealistic. The vessel in the piece is full of holes (for the lids 
in the canisters), it is an antithesis of a safe vessel.
The viewer senses a corporeal and a dangerous object in relation to the image of the 
beach. In this juxtaposition we comprehend more than mere facts about the African 
emigrants. In a sense we usually know these facts already, to give one example of 
such facts: “The Mediterranean is one of the busiest irregular mixed migration routes 
into Europe through Greece, Italy and Malta. Last year [2011] was a record in terms 
of the number of arrivals in Europe via the Mediterranean, with more than 58,000 
people making the crossing. According to UNHCR estimates, more than 1,500 people 
drowned or went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe 
in 2011.”357 These facts are communicated to us via different media, but Hazoumè’s 
installation appeals to something other than facts. It communicates an understanding 
of the experiences that are present in the pressing social circumstances of the third 
world. A text on the floor next to the vessel states: “Damned if they leave and damned if 
they stay: better, at least to be gone and be doomed in the boat of their dreams”. Dream 
leaves a trace in my understanding of a certain mindset, certain material and emotional 
limitations, within certain experiences. These limitations are made conspicuous by the 
presence of certain objects.  
My encounter with the installation had a severe effect on me. Initially it awakened 
356  Romuald Hazoumé, Dream, 2007, mixed media installation. Photo Romuald Hazoumé. Collection Museumslandschaft Hessen 
Kassel - Neue Galerie Copyright Artist. Image Courtesy October Gallery, London.
357  The UN Refugee Agency: <http://www.unhcr.org/4ff2c63e9.html>
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questions concerning distant sufferings – the challenge of communicating suffering, 
uncertainty and pain via images. I would claim that we can understand at least some aspects 
of the experience of the refugee’s life-world through this artwork. For example, I felt strongly 
that I understood the limitations of the refugee experience, the limitations that their lives 
have in a comparison with my life and perhaps vice versa. I would not claim, although the 
installation is a representational object, that I only imagined what the refugees experience 
is like. Was this only imagination? Instead I would propose that the installation invited 
me to share some aspects of refugee experience. For the moment that I am affected by the 
artwork I do not simply view a representation, I do feel a sense of sharing an experience. 
Here our words start to play tricks on us. My experience is not the same experience as the 
one the artwork portrays. My experience is about visiting an exhibition space where I am 
confronted with an art object, the refugees experience is about sitting in a unsafe vessel that 
transports him/her over the Adriatic sea – then what do I mean when I claim that I do share 
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an experience, that I do not simply imagine what it would be like? This is the key question 
for this last chapter. 
The thoughts and questions that are provoked in me by Hazoumè’s installation 
lead to general philosophical questions concerning the relationship between image and 
experience. As related to the two previous chapters, my point of entry into this discussion 
is that the primary moral question regarding images is concerned, not only with what is 
shown in images, but with how images communicate, how they reveal their relation to the 
historical and material world. In this sense images are moral agents. Their agency resides 
in that images are able to change and transform my perception and understanding of the 
world. In Hazoumè’s installation I am confronted with certain features of the immigrants’ 
experience that I perhaps know about on a factual level, but I get the sense of knowing 
something further, of sharing something or being offered an understanding of something, 
an understanding that I perhaps have not had before. The images role here is not simply to 
200
represent something, it has an effect on me, and thus becomes an agent. 
If we address this question of communicating an experience, as a question of 
representation, we will end up in the conundrum concerning what it is to have the same 
experience. The problem that I want to get at here resides in a conception in which content 
of an image is comparable with a content of experience. As I have shown, the traditional 
mimetic understanding of art builds on such a reduction. And, as I will point out, 
skepticism towards the ability of art – iconoclasm – builds on a negation of this same 
mimetic understanding. In a nutshell, iconoclasm points out that there is a discrepancy 
between image and experience and therefore states that art is deceptive by definition. 
What I claim is that both the mimetic understanding of art and the negation of this 
mimetic understanding, will leave us with an insufficient understanding of the concept 
of image. The whole comparison between image and experience, that for example the 
medieval notion of species, Locke’s conception of experience as an image inside a Camera 
Obscura, and Plato’s iconoclasm, largely build upon, is misguided. 
What I will show in what follows is that, whereas we can talk of content of images, we 
cannot, in the same sense, talk of a content of our experience.  My experience is not a content 
for me, I do not have the privilege of taking a distanced observational perspective towards my 
own experience, therefore my experience cannot be, strictly speaking, a content for anybody 
else. When we talk of images they may have a content in the same way for me, as for a person 
standing next to me. In this sense images grant us a distanced observational perspective, and 
therefore images can be said to have a content. This distinction is important to understand 
when we want to dissolve some of the uncertainties concerning our conceptions of knowledge, 
communication and images, since it also shows that experience, strictly speaking, is not 
representable in any straightforward sense. This is not an iconoclastic conclusion. I do not 
claim that we should not trust images, but rather that we should neither see the likeness 
between image and experience as a criteria for truthfulness, nor see the discrepancy between 
image and experience as a criteria for deceptiveness. In order to make this discussion clearer 
I will proceed by scrutinizing the concept of iconoclasm.
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The Problem of Iconoclasm
The classical mimetic theory of images explains the relation between experience and image 
as a relation of likeness. According to this theory, art signifies because it resembles an object 
in the world, to perceive an image is then an experience like perceiving the actual object. This 
also entails a classical moral problem concerning art. Plato writes in The Republic: 
The art of representation, then, is a long way from reality; and appar-
ently the reason why there is nothing it cannot reproduce is that it grasps 
only a small part of any object, and that only an image. Your painter, 
for example, will paint us a shoemaker, a carpenter, or other worksman, 
without understanding any of their crafts; and yet, if he were a good 
painter, he might deceive a child or a simple-minded person into think-
ing his picture was a real carpenter, if he showed it them at a distance.358 
In this way Plato thinks that the artist can deceive the viewer by making mere likenesses 
of, for example a carpenter. The artist’s knowledge, due to his/her focus on visual likeness, 
lacks any proper understanding of the carpenter’s craft. If images are to escape this Platonic 
iconoclasm, we have to acknowledge that the image is not only a reflection of the world, 
that it is also a part of the world. Images alter our perception, a certain image can get me 
to view the world in a different light. In this sense images are not just semblances of real 
objects. But here it becomes problematic to explain how experience and image interact. 
When my understanding is changed by an image, what does this mean? When we conceive 
images as agents, as witnesses of the realities of life, we have to enter a discourse in which 
“likeness” stands for more than a graphic (visual) likeness between two objects (the image 
and the objects depicted). What I claim is that, as long as we are absorbed in this discourse 
of likeness we will not be able to address the moral questions concerning the relationship 
between the image and our experience.  
358  Plato, The Republic of Plato, translated by Francis MacDonald Cornford (Oxford University Press 1955), p. 321.
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Here it is important to understand that my objection to Plato is not concerned with 
the fact that he points out that images are potentially harmful for our understanding. 
Admittedly, images can be harmful, they can distort our understanding of the world. They 
can do so, not because of their ability (or inability) to resemble the objective world, but 
because of their agency, their ability to act within, and change our perception of this world. 
Iconoclasm, rightly, points out the potential harmfulness of image, but at least the simplified 
platonic iconoclasm tends to give a somewhat deceptive explanation for the source of this 
harmfulness. In order to make this clearer let us try to understand how images act upon us 
when they act harmfully. 
One example that lets us in closer on the issue of iconoclasm is a certain change of heart 
that can be detected in Susan Sontag’s writing on the morality of the image. In her collection 
of essays On Photography (1977) Sontag scrutinizes our contemporary cultural relationship 
with images. Her conclusion in the book is the idea of an ecology of images. She advocates 
the same kind of care towards images as we have in our relationship with the environment. 
As we commonly understand that different chemicals and toxins may disrupt the balance of 
our ecological system, Sontag claims that we should also be able to comprehend the negative 
effects of images on our conception of reality.359 In Regarding the Pain of Others (2002), which 
turned out to be her last book, she has given up on this idea. Not only is it, according to 
Sontag, impossible to control in what contexts or in what quantities we encounter images 
of violence, suffering or injustices in our daily lives, it is also questionable whether such 
an effort is morally advisable. Certain unnerving or emotionally disturbing images that 
occupy the arts and the media bear witness to a world that is in itself off track. Should we 
then be protected from these kinds of images?360 And if we are, do we not then lose touch 
with the realities of contemporary life? I think there is something illustrative in Sontag’s 
change of heart concerning the morality of images. It is a shift from iconoclasm toward an 
acknowledgement of the fact that images, by themselves, do not carry a morally corruptive 
power, they get their morally harmful role within a context of communication. 
359  Susan Sontag, On Photography (Penguin Books 2008), p. 180.
360  Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (Hamish Hamilton 2003), p. 94.
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In her later book Sontag analyses the morally pacifying role that we sometimes project 
on images:  “People don’t become inured to what they are shown […] because of the quantity 
of images dumped on them. It is passivity that dulls feeling.”361 Here, Sontag points out how 
the, in this case negative pacifying moral effect of images, is not dependent on the quantity 
of images, but on the agency of images; with what they do with our perception. The image 
conditions our way of understanding in a certain sense and one possible effect of this is that 
the conditioning may amount to passivity. We can become inured to violent images, at the 
same time this inuring is a dulling of our senses, something that demoralises us and severs 
the ties between our experience and the realities of the historical world. Sontag’s statement 
resonates with Plato’s iconoclasm in the sense that she points out how a possible negative 
effect of the image is passivity towards the events in the world. But she does not, like Plato, 
blame this passivity, this inuring, on the image. For Sontag this passivity is a consequence of 
us being forced to confront violent and unjust events, i.e. the passivity or the dulling of feelings 
that one can experience when confronted with an image of some atrocity is qualitatively the 
same effect that we are exposed to in direct experience, she writes: “Something becomes 
real – to those who are elsewhere, following it as ‘news’ – by being photographed. But a 
catastrophe that is experienced will often seem eerily like its representation”362. Here Sontag 
refers to certain reactions after 9/11. People who were witnessing the attack on the World 
Trade Center, described the experience as if they were watching a movie, they experienced 
it as unreal or surreal. Sontag points out the common psychological reaction of repression. 
We dispose of an ability to distance ourselves in distressing situations. I cannot here go 
further into the manifold psychological discussion on repression, but simply note that in this 
example there is a kind of similarity between repression and a certain influence that images 
can have on us. This connection is important when we try to understand iconoclasm, since 
this repression that images potentially enable, is what makes them potentially harmful. 
On the other hand, Sontag writes: “Images cannot be more than an invitation to pay 
attention, to reflect, to learn”.363 Images cannot grant that we react or behave in a certain way 
361  Ibid., p. 91.
362  Ibid., p. 19.
363  Ibid., p. 104.
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towards suffering in the world. They sometimes invite us to react or even get us to act and 
try to rectify injustices, but their power stretches no further than to this invitation. We use 
images to inure, repress, disengage and as invitations to attend to, to engage with the world. 
In this respect iconoclasm is flawed, since, although it points out the morally harmful effect 
of repression, it does so by simply ignoring the beneficial uses of images.     
When Plato claims that an image is harmful due to it not being able to portray the reality 
of for example what it entails to be a carpenter, he paves way for the classic form of iconoclasm 
in which the image is problematic because it harms or diminishes our understanding of the 
realities of our experienced life. Sontag alludes to an understanding in which the realities of 
our experienced life are themselves often harmful to us, in this case the blame is not on the 
image. On the contrary the image might, in cases of us having to face atrocities, grant us a 
distance that is necessary in order for us to be able to even start to grasp what is going on. 
This “distance” that we assign to the image follows both from the distance that our vision 
grants us and from the distance that our vision necessarily requires. We cannot see without 
distance, in this sense vision as a mode of perception is a different form of engagement than 
for example touching (when I touch my eye, I stop seeing and start feeling). Secondly vision 
gives room for observation, attention, judgement and inference. This, as I noted in chapter 1, 
is not a spatial distance. Because of this (double) feature of distance in vision, it is, as a mode 
of perception, both criticized for the disengagement that it in a certain sense requires, and 
welcomed for the space that it grants us. Sontag writes: “Images have been reproached for 
being a way of watching suffering at a distance, as if there were some other way of watching. 
But watching up close – without the mediation of image – is still just watching”.364 The 
benevolent feature of this mode of “only watching” is that it enables us to step back “from the 
aggressiveness of the world which frees us for observation and for elective attention”365 and 
“there is nothing wrong with standing back and thinking”366.
Philosopher Raymond Gaita writes about literary descriptions of atrocities along the 
same lines: 
364  Susan Sontag 2003, p. 105.
365  Ibid., p. 106.
366  Ibid.
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The descriptions of the Holocaust by Martin Gilbert and by Primo Levi 
are written with disciplined restraint. Those descriptions are dispas-
sionate in the sense I claimed for the prose of Gaudron and Deane: 
though informed by feeling, they are not distorted by it. We know when 
we read them that they are written by men whose souls were lacerated 
by what they knew. It shows in their prose which we read, as Nora 
Levin put it, with bleeding eyes. There is no other way to read them 
with understanding and no other way they can convey the reality of evil 
they describe.367  
In Gaita’s view, it is the knowledge and the actual experiences which have inured Gilbert 
and Levi, the act of describing what they know and what they have been through with 
disciplined restraint, is perhaps the one practice that actually might bring some sanity into 
their experience, that might mend some of the distortions that the actual experiences of the 
holocaust have caused in their emotional life. For the readers of these works the relation is of 
course different, the text is a way of exposing us to experiences of atrocities that we probably 
could not imagine. There is something puzzling and important present in Gaita’s example. 
On which side of the fence is the dispassionateness of Levi and Gilbert? Is it the negative 
pacifying effect of violent and unjust experiences (repression), or is it an act of taking a much 
required step back from the lacerated experiences that permits them to contemplate and 
perhaps confront their troubled past? I think that we should not try to pick one alternative 
as the right one.  Dispassion can facilitate both a negative consequence (repression), and an 
active step towards contemplation. To become inured might be a necessary consequence, but 
it can also be a product of dealing with ones troubled experiences. And we should not forget 
that both consequences are reactions at a world that is off track. 
In a passage in On Photography Sontag divides her life into before and after she saw 
photographs from Bergen-Belsen and Dachau. Sontag writes:
367  Raimond Gaita, A Common Humanity – Thinking about Love & Truth & Justice (Text Publishing 1999), p. 89-90.
206
One’s first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate hor-
ror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a nega-
tive epiphany. For me, it was photographs of Bergen-Belsen and Dach-
au which I came across by chance in a bookstore in Santa Monica in 
July 1945. Nothing I have seen – in photographs or in real life – ever cut 
me as sharply, deeply, instantaneously. Indeed, it seems plausible to me 
to divide my life into two parts, before I saw those photographs (I was 
twelve) and after, though it was several years before I understood fully 
what they were about. What good was served by seeing them? They 
were only photographs – of an event I had scarcely heard of and could 
do nothing to affect, of suffering I could hardly imagine and could do 
nothing to relieve. When I looked at those photographs, something 
broke. Some limit had been reached, and not only that of horror; I felt 
irrevocably grieved wounded, but part of my feeling started to tighten; 
something went dead; something is still crying.
To suffer is one thing; another thing is living with the photographed 
images of suffering, which does not necessarily strengthen conscience 
and the ability to be compassionate. It can also corrupt them. 368 
The impact of these images from Bergen-Belsen and Dachau had a demoralizing effect 
on Sontag. At the same time they awoke a kind of revelation and moral understanding. 
What is important in Sontag’s description of her experience of the encounter with the 
holocaust-images, is exactly this ambiguity, these two layers of emotion: the feeling of 
something going dead inside, and the sense of revelation. Although they led to experiences 
that are unwanted, the images spoke of acts, real acts of atrocity. Now if we cannot deal 
with the experiences that the photographs awaken in us, how can we then understand the 
victims that are depicted in these images? The experience that these images awaken can 
both be an opening toward understanding the horrible experiences of the victims and a 
beginning process of dulling of the senses and demoralisation. This example stands in 
stark contrast to Plato’s iconoclastic view, since Sontag’s reaction shows that a photograph 
368  Susan Sontag 2008, p. 19-20. 
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from a concentration camp can portray and even communicate real horrors perhaps even 
better than written descriptions. A Platonist might object that an image from Bergen-
Belsen or Dachau is still not able to portray the experience, the sufferings of a holocaust 
survivor. And the Platonist would of course be right. But what could communicate the 
actual sufferings of another person to me, what would this mean? My inability to take 
on another persons experience through an image, cannot be blamed on some inherent 
distorting quality of images, because this is in fact not an inability of any sort, but an 
impossibility (I will get back to this point later). 
When I look at the photographs from concentration camps I am not there, I am at a 
safe distance in time and space from these atrocities, but I do see what happened. These 
photographs do address me, have an impact on me, they tell me something about the 
condition of the world, and in the end the condition of myself in this world. My self is 
literally at stake in viewing these images. Can I accept that these images are real, or will I fall 
back on my own scepticism, passivity, dulling of the senses, repression. In this context it is 
not the image that will deceive my understanding, but my scepticism, and the scepticism can 
easily be maintained if we subscribe to iconoclasm. Can I accept that these images are a part 
of this world, that they are of this world?  If I accept this, at the same time I have to discard 
my sceptical inclinations and iconoclasm. On the one hand, it seems correct to claim that 
we have a duty to know what happened in Auschwitz. If we are presented with images that 
bear witness of the atrocities, we should perhaps feel obliged to see these pictures, in order 
to really know. On the other hand, if the effect of these images is that we become inured 
in the sense that our hearts become hardened, then how can it be right to claim that we are 
obligated to view them?  
It is too harsh to claim that we have to be able to confront any image regardless of 
its content only because it describes a real event. Sontag’s reaction on the photographs of 
Bergen-Belsen and Dachau is understandable and if we are demoralised for a period of time, 
due to an image, it cannot mean that we are morally weak or insufficient. On the contrary, 
our morality lies in our reluctance towards accepting that what these images show actually happened. 
This sensivity is what our moral faculty consist of. This sensitivity and the reluctance to 
accept atrocities is the opposite of scepticism and iconoclasm. If I feel reluctant towards a 
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violent image it is because I already understand the image as, not an appearance of the 
world, but as a part of this world. This requires moral courage, because it is not an innoxious 
venture. Sontag describes Virginia Woolf ’s stance: “Not to be pained by these pictures, not 
to recoil from them, not to strive to abolish what causes this havoc, this carnage – these, for 
Woolf, would be the reactions of a real monster. And, she is saying, we are not monsters, we 
members of the educated class. Our failure is one of imagination, of empathy: we have failed 
to hold this reality in mind.”369 If this failure of attending to the realities of experienced life 
leads to scepticism towards images, towards a dulling of the senses, then both I as a viewer 
of the image and the image have failed. When the image fails its agency is disqualified. 
In this sense our understanding of reality is tied up with morality. Scepticism concerning 
images – iconoclasm – enters into the picture, not because of some innate mendacious quality 
of images per se, but because the world that they sometimes portray and the way they portray 
this world, is off track. It is in this kind of context that we should understand Adorno’s 
famous statement about there being no poetry after Auschwitz.370 What Adorno points out 
in this essay (Cultural Criticism and Society), is how the breaking down of communication is 
a consequence of the evils of the world, he writes: “Even the most extreme consciousness of 
doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter.” The same sentiment can be found in a quote 
369  Susan Sontag 2003, p. 7.
370  This, perhaps the most famous quote by Adorno, is constantly misinterpreted. In order to understand in what context it belongs 
within Adorno’s own thinking it is important to note that he was not completely satisfied with his own formulation: “To write 
poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric “. The gist of the essay in which the statement appeared, Cultural Criticism and Society, cannot 
be boiled down to these few words. Here are the last sentences of that essay: “The more total society becomes, the greater the 
reification of the mind and the more paradoxical its effort to escape reification on its own. Even the most extreme consciousness of 
doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter. Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and 
barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to 
write poetry today. Absolute reification, which presupposed intellectual progress as one of its elements, is now preparing to absorb 
the mind entirely. Critical intelligence cannot be equal to this challenge as long as it confines itself to self-satisfied contemplation.” 
Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society”, in Prisms (The MIT Press 1982), p. 34.
Later Adorno returns to this quote, and reassesses his own sentiment in Negative Dialectics: ”Perennial suffering has as much right 
to expression as a tortured man has to scream; hence it may have been wrong to say that after Auschwitz you could no longer write 
poems. But it is not wrong to raise the less cultural question whether after Auschwitz you can go on living – especially whether one 
who escaped by accident, one who by rights should have been killed, may go on living. His mere survival calls for the coldness, the 
basic principle of bourgeois subjectivity, without which there could have been no Auschwitz; this is the drastic guilt of him who was 
spared. By way of atonement he will be plagued by dreams such as that he is no longer living at all, that he was sent to the ovens 
in 1944 and his whole existence since has been imaginary, an emanation of the insane wish of a man killed twenty years earlier.” 
Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (Routledge 1973), p. 362-363.
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by Henry James that Sontag finds significant: 
One finds it in the midst of all this as hard to apply one’s words as to 
endure one’s thoughts. The war has used up words; they have weak-
ened, they have deteriorated like motor car tires; they have, like mil-
lions of other things, been more overstrained and knocked about and 
voided of the happy semblance during the last six months than in 
all the long ages before, and we are now confronted with a depreca-
tion of all our terms, or, otherwise speaking, with a loss of expression 
through increase of limpness, that may well make us wonder what 
ghosts will be left to walk.371 
The trust or distrust toward words or images is in this way entwined with our trust or distrust 
in the world itself. In this sense the evil of the world works to eliminate the possibility of 
communication, words and images become idle in the wake of evil times. 
A starting point when we want to understand the question concerning the relation 
between experience and image is then to acknowledge that images have the power to 
transform my experience when they are able to latch onto and be a part of this world. If they 
were mere reflections, solely a part of an image-world, how could they affect me one way or 
the other? The image can condition me and even address me. This is then not a relation in 
which, I see the image as a reflection, a copy, a semblance or a representation of the world. 
When the image gets real, it is a part of the world and the experiences that are awakened in 
me are not fantasies, they are real and they will condition me and perhaps even determine 
how I view the world. It is through this kind of process that my knowledge comes about. 
And conversely, the real harm and the serious threat toward our moral faculty and our 
knowledge is a situation in which images lose their ability to communicate experience. 
Images can be used to enable us to repress, to betray our understanding, imagination and 
empathy. In this sense the failure or the harmfulness of the image is a failure of attending to 
371  Henry James in an interview by Preston Lockwood, New York times, March 21, 1915. <http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdf?res=F00C12F73F5D1A728DDDA80A94DB405B858DF1D3>
210
the realities of the others experience, of communication. One might argue that I deny the fact 
that images can distort or lie, but I do not deny this, quite the opposite. My point is simply 
that these distortions and lies fall under the same general evil: a failure of communication. 
In this sense when we talk about documentary depiction, it also includes a moral aspect: the 
extent to which the image engages or disengages us from the realities of contemporary life. 
This aspect is beyond the mimetic or representative relation, the likeness between image 
and object. The moral aspect of realism is not concerned with representation, but with 
communication.
How does the Image Communicate Experience? 
We tend to conceive of images as representational, but whether we by this mean that images 
represent natural objects or subjective experience, the likeness of the image does not explain 
how it communicates. There is still an issue concerned with the ability or inability of the 
image to communicate experience that requires explanation. When I, for example, enter an 
exhibition space and view Romuald Hazoumè’s installation, it is clear that my experience in 
this situation is in no way like the experience of a refugee that the piece portrays. It tells me 
something about the refugee’s experience, but not through involving any criteria of likeness. 
When I feel that the piece communicates with me I do not become a refugee, nor do I 
become like a refugee. In order to clarify this point further it is important to acknowledge, 
once more, in what sense a theory that proposes that our experience consist of content – 
species, projections, sense-data, images – is misguided. 
Recall the quote in which Donald Evans reminds us that questions concerning how 
it is possible for us to communicate by means of images are; “naturally bound up with 
considerations of how it is possible to communicate at all”372. If we stick to an idea in 
which experience consist of a content we easily end up in a certain philosophical skepticism 
372  Donald Evans, “Photographs and Primitive Signs”, Aristotelian Society Proceedings 1978/79, New Series – volume LXXIX 
(The Compton Press 1977), p. 215.
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concerning the possibility of communication. If, for example my pain, or Martin Gilbert’s 
or Primo Levi’s tortured experiences are something we could call “a content”, then how 
can somebody else access this content? This is a generic philosophical question concerning 
communication and skepticism thereof.373 But what we need to understand is that this 
question is wrongly constructed. This deceptive way of questioning is present in many of our 
contemporary discourses. Dirk Lauwaert writes in a comment on Susan Sontag’s Regarding 
the Pain of Others: “Imagination is the unique ability to reverse roles. […] You can never 
literally take the other’s view […] it is the result of distance and aesthetics”374. This way of 
speaking seems to point out something obvious: that another person’s experience is always 
another experience from my own (experience). I cannot take or have another persons view 
since I inhabit my own body, to have another’s view, is in this sense, impossible. This inability 
to have another person’s experience becomes obvious especially in cases of suffering. Olli 
Lagerspetz writes: ”The only way for me to have your pain, in the sense discussed, is by 
somehow being you while, at the same time, remaining me. If that is the problem, telepathy 
is just as useless as the telephone.”375 The same point is valid when we talk about sharing a 
view. We cannot “have” the same view, which does not mean that we could not share a view.
It is one thing to state that we have (numerically376) different experiences since we have 
different bodies, and another thing to say that our experiences cannot be communicated. 
Again we have to scrutinize our concepts. If we by communication mean that my experience 
is a certain content, a certain view, and that the only way another person can have this view 
373  In his essay One’s Knowledge of Other Minds A.J. Ayer calls this a “text-book problem in the theory of knowledge”. A.J. Ayer, 
Philosophical Essays (Macmillan & Co Ltd. 1952), p. 197.
374  I found this quote in Inge Henneman’s essay Beyond Compassion – How to Escape the Victim Frame in Social Documentary 
Photography Today. Henneman describes Lauwaert’s stance as an expression of a view in which the ability to empathize with the 
other is seen to consist of fictions. Here I use Hanneman’s way of quoting Lauwaert, because it so precisely catches an, in my view, 
typical skeptic attitude. I am not here concerned with Lauwaert’s text, but with the exact wording in the quote. The expression 
catches perfectly the duality in skepticism. It states something obvious: that my experience is different from any other experi-
ence. This obvious fact is used as a explanation for our inability to communicate our experiences to the other, and our inability to 
understand the other’s experience. Henneman’s essay can be found in Jan Baetens and Hilde van Gelder (eds.)  Critical Realism in 
Contemporary Art – Around Allan Sekula’s Photography. Leuven University Press 2006, p. 104. 
375  Olli Lagerspetz: My Pain in Your Tooth? Wittgenstein on ‘My Pain’ and ‘His Pain’, unpublished, p. 2. Here Lagerspetz para-
phrases A.J. Ayer, Philosophical Essays (Macmillan & Co Ltd. 1952), p. 194.
376  A.J. Ayer 1952, p. 194.
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is if this content can be externalized, for example through me painting a picture or taking a 
photograph, and that then this picture is internalized by that other person through him or 
her looking at it, then “communication” will entail that my experience is a transference of a 
certain content from within me to within another person. If this sounds strange, think of the 
theory of species that I analyzed in the beginning of this thesis, or Locke’s idea of our soul 
as a camera obscura. These theories maintain exactly this idea of experience as content and 
communication as transference of content from one mind/soul to another, or more commonly 
from the natural object to the subject. 
Another more modern theory could be characterized as a kind of variation of this. In the 
modern philosophy of mind experience is still characterized as content, as for example in the 
notion of sense-data.377 If we simplify, the notion of sense-data still entails a theory in which 
the object affects our sense-perception, but here the cause and effect is not a simple process in 
which a content is moving from one mind to another, or from the natural object, by the means 
of species, to the perceiver. For Descartes, the natural world, the thing in itself, is different 
from how we experience it, our perceptions are transformations, perception transforms nature 
into experience.378 In this theory perception still consists of a kind of semblance or data, it is 
an approximation of something. In this sense the natural object is translated to something 
else, i.e. sense-data (“sensation (Berkeley), impression (Hume), representation (Kant), sense-
datum (G.E. Moore”379). Against the backdrop of this theoretical framework external images 
are then a way of communicating my inner experiences. When I make an image from my 
experience, the image is a translation of experience into visual representation. According to 
this theory the idea of “imagination” becomes an explaining factor. Imagination becomes 
377  See D. W. Hamlyn, Understanding Perception – The Concept and its Conditions (Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 1996), p. 9-10.
378  Descartes writes: “Now although this picture, in being so transmitted into our head, always retains some resemblance to the ob-
jects from which it proceeds, nevertheless, as I have already shown, we must not hold that it is by means of this resemblance that the 
picture causes us to perceive the objects, as if there were yet other eyes in our brain with which we could apprehend it; but rather; 
that it is the movements of which the picture is composed with, acting immediately on our mind inasmuch as it is united in our 
body, are so established by nature as to make it have such perceptions”. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, 
and Meteorology translated by Paul J. Olscamp (Hackett Publishing Co. 2001), p. 101. Here Descartes discards the mimetic theory 
and proposes instead a kind of mechanic causal process, in which through movement and pressure, the objects affect the senses into 
perceiving what there is to be perceived.
379  D. W. Hamlyn 1996, p. 9.
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the faculty that transforms experience to image. For example, Lauwaert seems to think that 
imagination is a way of constructing a view that is similar to my own personal ‘inner’ view, 
i.e. experience when it becomes content, is then always something different from ‘the actual 
experience’. ‘Imagination’ is what makes communication possible, according to this theory.380 
Here the door is opened for skepticism, because in this understanding imagination is always 
fictional, since it does not access the actual content of the other persons experience, but rather 
imagination creates a representation of the content of the others experience. This theory-
structure also nourishes an understanding in which communication by necessity consists of 
creating a fictional content in order to grasp an actual first person experience.   
What is important to note here is that the idea of ‘experience as content’, although it 
has taken another form in which the content is not literally transferred from one person to 
another, is still at play and still invites the same philosophical problems. The problem here is 
that the statement “You can never literally take the other’s view”, if it is uttered as a skeptical 
remark, builds on a misconception concerning experience, image and communication. There 
is no barrier here to start with. When we think that a person never can take another persons 
view, and therefore conclude that we need, once more, a go-between, in this case the faculty 
of imagination, in order to overcome this problem, then we are bound to end up in skepticism 
and iconoclasm. Scepticism points out that there is a material and natural world beyond my 
experience, my phenomenal world of inner representations, sensations or ideas, and states that 
this gap is one of the main sources for problems within philosophy. However, the problem 
here is quite simply a consequence of mixing up image with experience, or perhaps, of not 
being able to distinguish these two concepts from each other sufficiently.  My view cannot be 
a content for somebody else, since, and this is the fundamental point here, “my view” is not a 
content for me, it is not a content at all, and thus cannot be had (by me or anybody else). My 
view is not an object and my consciousness is not a container of objects. When I am engaged 
in a view, I am not occupied by an inner image, I am engaged with an object in the world. 
Merleau-Ponty writes: ”Everything that exists exists as a thing or as a consciousness, and 
380  This is how the role of imagination is defined in classical aesthetics. Luc Boltanski writes: “In Smith, as in Hume, distance is 
overcome by a deliberate act of imagination. The spectator represents [my emphasis] to himself the sentiments and sensations of the 
sufferer.” Luc Boltanski, Distant Suffering – Morality, Media and Politics (Cambridge University Press 1999), p. 38. 
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there is no half-way house. The thing is in a place, but perception is nowhere, for if it were 
situated in a place it could not make other things exist for itself, since it would repose in itself 
as things do.”381 
Whereas we can talk of images as having a content, since we can have a situated spatial 
and observational relation to an image, we cannot talk of experience as consisting of a 
content. To have a pain is in fact to be in pain, likewise to have a view is in fact to be 
in the act of viewing. As I have pointed out in the first part of this thesis, philosophy 
has maintained this idea of experience as content. In medieval philosophy the concept of 
species, in Renaissance philosophy the idea of the soul as a camera obscura, and later on up 
until this day the idea of our experience as consisting of sense-data, all these views commit 
the fallacy of mixing up the concepts of image and experience. It is immensely important 
to understand why this is a fallacy. In a nutshell, the concept of experience is disparate 
from that of image since an image is an object for us in a sense that our experience is not. 
Ayer writes: “It is not to be supposed that one can number people’s feelings as one can 
number the things they may carry in their pockets.”382 
To be in pain, or to have a traumatic memory is a state in which you cannot choose not to 
attend to that pain or memory. In this sense the concept of attention is not viable when we 
talk of having an experience, because for one thing, we cannot turn away our attention from 
something that we are experiencing at the moment, we cannot take an observational stance 
toward our living experience, since it is a part of what we are at that moment. If we conceive 
of experience as consisting of content, then we are talking of content in quite a different sense 
than when we talk of the content of an external image, since an inner image is a different 
concept than that of the external image. Ludwig Wittgenstein writes in Zettel:  “one also 
cannot follow one’s own mental images with attention.”383 I can follow the outlines of a 
picture that is in front of my eyes. An external picture has outlines, it has a frame that I can 
point at, follow with my finger or my eye etc., but when I speak of an inner experience the 
relation is different, an inner experience has literally neither outlines nor a frame. I cannot 
381  Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception (Routledge 2007), p. 44.
382  A.J. Ayer 1952, p. 195.
383  Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel, edited by G.E.M Anscombe and G.H. von Wright (Basil Blackwell 1967), p. 16e. 
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focus my attention on the outlines of a memory. I cannot acknowledge its frame, where it 
ends, how it is located, what the scale of the objects represented are compared to the real 
object because it is not “located” in any sensible meaning of the term. To be in pain is to 
be absorbed by the pain, ones attention is in a sense occupied by that pain, or even, ones 
attention is for that moment pain.
With this I do not want to deny that we can meaningfully speak of an “inner image”, rather 
I want to point out that it, as a concept, is significantly different from that of an external image. 
An inner image cannot be said to represent volume or scale because it is another kind of image 
than the external image, essentially, because it is not an optical image. Therefore it is also a 
stretch to claim that an inner image has content, that it is representational. The same point can 
be applied to the experience of seeing. In The Blue Book, Wittgenstein makes this point clear 
when he writes: “We easily forget that the word ‘locality’ is used in many different senses […] 
I can say ‘in my visual field I see the image of the tree to the right of the image of the tower’ 
or I see the image of the tree in the middle of the visual field”. And now we are inclined to ask 
“and where do you see the visual field?”384 This issue relates to the question concerning agency, 
since: “… if we think by imagining signs or pictures, I can give you no agent that thinks”385.  
Let us track back to Kepler’s dialectic of the image, Kepler writes: ”Since hitherto an 
Image has been a Being of the reason, now let the figures of objects that really exist on paper 
or upon another surface be called pictures.”386 There is something completely sensible in this 
dichotomy, since there are differences between external images and inner experiences. For 
one, an external image is shareable. I can look at an image with you and point out the features 
of it and in most cases you would be able to follow my pointers and my focusing of attention 
on certain details. In this sense the external image is “to be shared”. Wittgenstein is not 
explicit about this issue, his focus is elsewhere. But the fact that external images are shareable 
is a fundamental point that follows from his scrutiny of the philosophy of mind. 
384  Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books (Harper Torchbooks 1960), p. 8. 
385  Ibid., p. 6.
386  Johannes Kepler, Optics: Paralipomena to Witelo & Optical Part of Astronomy translated by William H. Donahue (Green Lion 
Press 2000), p.  210. 
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The important point that I want to bring forth here can be boiled down to the following: 
My experience is not a content for me, therefore it cannot be a content for anybody else. An 
image has a content for me, it can be the focus of my attention, and when it is, it is also in the 
exact same way a content for anybody else. For something to reside somewhere there has to 
be an observer, an agent that can determine where this something resides in relation to other 
objects. My experience lacks this quality of being detached from me, and therefore it cannot 
grant me an observational viewpoint. I cannot trace the outline of an inner experience, since, 
in a literal sense, there is no agency at work here, i.e. I am not detached from my inner 
images. An external image is a surface through which we can share a view upon the world. 
This is the aspect that distinguishes external images from inner images. The inner image is 
not something we look at (neither is it something we look through). Or as Comte put it: “The 
mind may observe all phenomena but its own.” because “In order to observe, your intellect 
must pause from activity; yet it is this very activity that you want to observe. If you cannot 
effect the pause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe.”387 Comte 
drew the wrong conclusions from this statement, but he was right about the fact that, in the 
case of my own experience, in one sense I am not in a relation to it that permits me to observe 
it, since here the me and the it are the same. 
Let us now return to my original question concerning the discrepancy between the 
refugee’s experience that could be said to be portrayed in Hazoumè’s installation and my 
own experience of observing a piece of art in a exhibition space. The discrepancy here does 
not tell us anything about the installation’s ability or inability to communicate, since the 
likeness of experiences is not a proper criterion for the success of communication (the piece 
tells me perhaps as much about being a refugee as it tells me about being European, about 
the institutions of art, about manipulation of materials, and so forth). Neither is, then, the 
discrepancy in likeness of experiences (the refugee is on a boat in circumstances that could 
prove fatal, I am at an art-exhibition, etc.) something that makes communication impossible. 
The observational view granted by the image, is not like my relation to my own suffering, 
in images I can see another suffer whereas I myself am possibly in a relatively comfortable 
387  Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, volume 1 (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co. Ltd. 1893),  p. 9.
217
mood and situation. Adam Smith writes: “My companion does not naturally look upon the 
misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury that has been done to me, from the same point 
of view in which I consider them. They affect me much more nearly. We do not view them 
from the same station, as we do a picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy, and are, 
therefore, apt to be very differently affected by them.”388 This observational position is also 
possible when I see a person next to me that suffers. Whether we stay in this comfortable 
observational mode or permit the other to condition us, this is the moral question that certain 
images and first hand experiences of situations in which another person suffers, address 
us with. Through my engagement with, and attention to, another person’s predicament, in 
direct experience or by the means of images, I will be able to understand the other person’s 
suffering as suffering, and this will entail discomfort. This does not however mean that the 
other persons pain, would be inflicted on me, rather it means that I myself understand the 
reality of the other person’s pain and thus acknowledge that we share a world, that also my 
world is prone to suffering and pain. My relation or empathizing with the other is not a 
way of accessing that person’s actual experience (content of experience). Neither is empathy, 
if this term is to hold any deep moral meaning, a fictitious practice in which I project or 
construct an experience in resemblance of the others experience, through imagination. Or, 
let me rephrase, imagination is not only a faculty that makes up fictitious representations. 
Hannah Arendt makes a beautiful redefinition of the task of imagination, when she writes: 
Imagination alone enables us to see things in their proper perspective, 
to be strong enough to put that which is too close at a certain distance 
so that we can see and understand it without bias and prejudice, to be 
generous enough to bridge abysses of remoteness until we can see and 
understand everything that is too far away from us as though it were 
our own affair. This distancing of some things and bridging the abysses 
to others is part of the dialogue of understanding for whose purposes 
direct experience establishes too close a contact and mere knowledge 
erects artificial barriers. 
388  Adam Smith as quoted in Luc Boltanski 1999, p. 36. 
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Without this kind of imagination, which actually is understanding, 
we would never be able to take our bearings in the world. It is the only 
inner compass we have. We are contemporaries only in so far as our 
understanding reaches.389 
In Arendt’s view, understanding ties together epistemology and morality. It is such an 
inclusive account of knowledge, image and communication that I have described in this 
second part of this thesis. My emphasis has been on the visual record and on the documentary. 
The example that I begun this chapter with, Romuald Hasoumè’s installation, might be 
considered an exception, since formally it is neither a visual record, nor a piece that strictly 
speaking could be called a documentary, it is not even an image. Nevertheless I would not be 
comfortable with calling it fiction either, since it latches on to a very real and current tragedy 
of the experiences of African refugees who want to enter Europe. This is communicated, not 
through showing what an actual refugee actually sees on his/her journey over the Adriatic 
sea, but through establishing an understanding of some aspects of how the refugee sees. The 
installation’s reality and its place in, and relation to, the historical world is not dependent on 
its status as a record, but on its competent agency, its way of communicating, of sharing a 
view. Here the meaning of realism does not build upon a relation of likeness between image 
and object, but on a relation of trust between subject and subject.
It is something like this, an understanding that stretches to the other, that I claim the 
documentary as a moral category can establish. If we understand the documentary strictly as 
a formal and epistemological category, it seems to offer us a possibility in which we see what 
someone saw at a certain time and in a certain place. But in order for the image to become 
something that we respect as a real image in the actual historical world, something further is 
required. The documentary image should also be able to show us how someone else views the 
world, and this does not happen through the feature of photographic recording. 
389  Hannah Arendt, “Understanding and Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)” in Essays in Understanding 1930-1954 – 
Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism (Schocken Books 1994), p. 323.
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The twist that the documentary supposedly ads to depiction is that a record can capture a 
real experience. For example if person x witnesses the attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001 and makes a visual recording during the experience, we might think that 
we can share his/her experience through this recording. This is not completely incorrect, but 
it is, on the other hand, a very inaccurate description of what happens in the relation between 
an image and an experience. This complicated relation between image and experience is what 
I have articulated in this last chapters. What I have said above points out that when I see 
the recording, I do not experience the event. I can share something by the means of a visual 
record with somebody else with functioning eyes, but I do not share an experience in any 
straight forward meaning of the term. What is shared is a focus on the same thing, but the 
actual experience is not shareable because of the recording, since experience is not reducible 
to something like an image. 
Communion
Lastly I will briefly elaborate on how the image enables two persons to see the same thing. 
One of the underlying goals for this chapter has been to describe how the trust or distrust 
toward images is entwined with our trust or distrust in the world itself. This relation is 
often understood in traditional philosophy as a relation between man and a metaphysical 
world of ideas. However this view can obscure the relation. Our trust or distrust toward 
the world manifests itself most clearly in our trust or distrust in other people and our 
common social world.
 In the first part of this thesis I concentrated on the images relation to the object and 
criticized certain common misunderstandings of this relation. What I have pinpointed in 
this chapter is that the alternative view, that the image is like our experience, should also be 
scrutinized. If likeness is not the criterion based on which the image communicates, then 
we have to redefine what this communication is about. What I find significant in Adorno’s 
aesthetics is a certain critique of the very persistent dialectic within aesthetics – the idea 
that images are copies either of the external object or of subjective views (experiences). 
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Neither of these positions within a certain aesthetic discourse are able to account for how an 
image communicates. In order to shift the focus of this discourse, Adorno writes:  “Mimetic 
behavior does not imitate something but assimilates itself to that something”390. In Adorno’s 
aesthetics the important relation is not that between an observing subject and the image, but 
of the image as an agent that shows me the otherness of the other. It permits the depicted to 
utter: “Here I am or This is what I am”391. In this sense the image does not imitate, its behavior 
is different. If the image imitates anything, it imitates our human capacity to transcend our 
own “inner” knowledge and stretch out to the other. Michael Jackson writes along the same 
lines on Hannah Arendt’s epistemology:  
Unlike classical empiricism, where the observer makes himself a tabula 
rasa in order to register his impressions of the observed, judging requires 
active engagement and conversation – allowing one’s own thoughts to be 
influenced by thoughts of others. Accordingly, judging implies a third 
position, reducible to neither one’s own nor the other’s: a view from 
in-between, from within the shared space of intersubjectivity itself.392 
If we talk of the image as a go-between, it is exactly this meaning that I condone here. The 
image is something in-between the views of my own and the views of the other. When we 
look at images we do see something that potentially everybody else can see. The concept of 
image is based on an idea in which the surface of the image is an “outlook”, a surface through 
which we can share a view upon the world with others and see the same thing. In this sense 
the image is never personal, it is always a shared view. If I would be the only one to see 
what an image shows it would not communicate properly. Or conversely, if we use Cavell’s 
390  Here I quote the earlier edition and translation, Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, translated by C. Lenhardt, edited by Gretel 
Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1984), p. 162. In the newer version the same sentence is translated, as 
follows: “If mimetic comportment does not imitate something but rather makes itself like itself […]”. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic 
Theory (Continuum 2004), p. 145.
391  Ibid., p. 147.
392  Michael D. Jackson, “Where Thought Belongs: An Anthropological Critique of the Project of Philosophy”, in Anthropological 
Theory, Vol 9 (3), 2009, p. 238.
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expression, if the image reads me, it is never personal in a literal sense, since it also has to 
be able to address somebody else in order for it to be an image. The image is “a view” that is 
dislocated from every observers body. Whereas another person cannot “literally” share my 
view, she is invited to have the same outlook on the world through the surface of the image. 
In this sense “communication” does not mean that a certain content is communicated from 
me to another person via a mediating image, but that we share a certain view in looking at a 
picture. Communicating is like taking “communion”. Luc Boltanski writes:
The Communion of Saints is precisely that form of union which brings 
the baptized together, beyond the constraints of space and time […] in 
such a way that ‘everything received in holiness by each belongs some-
how to all’ and ‘what each must do and suffer is not gauged by his needs 
alone, but on the needs of all’ so that we cannot say who receives and 
who gives.393 
In order to take this discussion to a more everyday level, I want to bring in another example 
in which this “sharing” of a view is central, here the emphasis is on a bond between two 
people. Patti Smith writes: 
One evening, having read my notebook, he designed a totem for Brian 
Jones. It was shaped like an arrow, with rabbit hair for the White Rab-
bit, a line from Winnie the Pooh, and a locket-sized portrait of Brian. 
We finished it together and hung it over our bed. ”Nobody sees as we do 
Patti”, he said again. Whenever he said things like that, for a magical 
space of time, it was as if we were the only two people in the world.394 
393  Luc Boltanski 1999, p. 7. 
394  Patti Smith, Just Kids (Harper Collins 2010), p. 103-104.
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This quote refers to an earlier passage in her biography Just Kids in which Patti Smith describes 
how she met photographer Robert Mapplethorpe.395 Smith worked in Brentano’s bookshop 
in New York that also carried an assortment of ethnic jewellery and crafts. In her mind she 
had picked out one of the pieces on display as her absolute favorite. A Persian necklace made 
of two enameled metal plaques held together by heavy black and silver strings. Later, when 
Mapplethorpe visited the shop and they met for the first time, he wanted to purchase exactly 
this necklace. For Smith this revealed that she and Mapplethorpe saw the same thing. Their 
attention, their aesthetic eye and their judgment picked out the same piece of jewellery and 
through this shared judgement they also shared a world. 
What is important in this example is how the quote “nobody sees as we do”, makes 
conspicuous how two persons can share a view. Smith’s and Mapplethorpe’s views are not 
two copies of “one view”, but a shared view that is no more Smith’s than Mappletorphe’s. In 
this example communication as communion has lost its theological emphasis (without losing 
the holy aspect of sharing). 
The statement “you can never take the other’s view”, indicates that there is “a view”, 
but that it cannot be transferred to another person, that ‘the view’ is something personal, 
only accessible to one’s own self. What does this entail? Solipsism? The possibility of 
communication is then obstructed because “the view” can only reside in a specific person 
with a specific body. However this line of thinking already presupposes that there is “a 
view”. And the closest that I can get to that view is to make or attend to a copy of that view. 
Is this the task of the image? I would claim something else, that the image helps us share 
an experience with the other. It helps us in sharing a view upon the world so that sensation 
literally becomes a form of communion.396
395  Ibid., p. 36. The connection between this passage in Just Kids and the practice of making documentary film was made by 
documentary filmmaker and friend Lotta Petronella.




The story I have told here is from the start one of reduction. In order for philosophers to 
understand how knowledge comes about, the relation between us and the world was reduced 
to an abstraction of a relation between a subject and an object. A key part in this reduction 
was played by the concept of representation, that which stands as an interface between 
subject and object. Here the image, and later on, the visual record, steps into the narrative. 
As I have shown, the reduction was fruitful in many ways. By focusing on this very simple 
relation between an object, a record that works as a trace of the object, and the subject, an 
immense evolution was achieved in pictorial arts, science and philosophy. 
The second part of this story in my work is a narrative of inclusion as opposed to reduction, 
one of reconstruction as opposed to deconstruction. Knowledge is not solely achieved 
through representation. It is not solely achieved through vision, and it is not solely reached 
by turning to the objective world. In order for us to understand the meaningfulness of the 
reduction we have to understand what this project of reduction and rationalization left out 
of the equation. By showing how there early on was a tight competition between the sense 
of touch and vision for the primacy in the hierarchy of epistemological senses, I have also 
indicated that sense perception is multimodal. We need all our five sense to work beside each 
other and in connection to one another in order for us to understand the world. These five 
senses need a consciousness, a thinking and reflecting mind in order to work with each other; 
a common sense if you will. The senses also inhabit a body: without a corporeal body they 
would not have a home and locality in this world. I hope that these points have become clear 
throughout this thesis. The most fundamental entity that has been sidelined in the reduction 
is, however, the other subject and our relation to other subjects. This is the endstop in this 
narrative. But actually it is the beginning. Without other subjects the need for images, visual 
records and documentary films would be superfluous. The reason for their existence is our 
need to communicate, to share our views and thoughts. It is because we share a world that we 
need images. And it is because we share a world that we have knowledge. In order for us to be 
able to see, we need other people and other pairs of eyes. It is in this connection that images 
become helpful aids. They are not primarily aids in the same sense as a telescope is an aid for 
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our vision. Images do in many ways help us see better, but not primarily by amplifying our 
visual perception or by making it more acute, but through communicating and connecting 
our vision with other people’s vision. 
The practice of sharing our views with each other is born from the realization that alone, 
without the views of others, we are foreign to this world. Jakob Meløe writes, describing the 
landscape of Saami reindeer herders:
We are foreign to this landscape. Walking the same tracks as the rein-
deer herders and looking where they look, we see little of what they see. 
(There is a sense in which we all see the same when looking in the same 
direction or at the same lump of matter. But, standing alone, this sense 
of ‘seeing the same’ is devoid of practical and moral implications, and so 
of little use, whether in the moral sciences or in our daily life.)397 
When I read these lines, although I agree with Meløe, my intuition reacts and tells me 
that there is something wrong with this idea. I would like to add that I also have profound 
moments when I am being alone with the world, and contemplate and attend to the objects 
that I see. I would like to claim that we, each one of us, have this kind of primal relation to 
the world, somewhere in our past or at least latently as a possibility somewhere within our 
reach. And, that this kind of contemplative and attentive relationship between a lonely man/
woman and a natural world is fundamental to our process of feeling at home in this world. 
The whole legacy of Western philosophy is a celebration of such a solitary contemplative 
attitude, as the basis for finding our existential grounding in life, and for receiving true 
unbiased knowledge of the world. The reason why I tend to subscribe to this solipsistic idea 
is, at least partly, that it has been indoctrinated into me through philosophy. Throughout the 
process of writing this thesis, however, a resistance towards this solipsistic inclination has 
grown stronger. 
397  Jakob Meløe, ”The Two Landscapes of Northern Norway”, in Inquiry, vol. 31, 1988, p. 400.
226
The important question here is: what happens with this relation between an I and the 
world when another subject steps into the situation? Does the world become less clear or 
does the world speak to me less directly, when another subject is present? Along with Meløe, 
I would claim the opposite:  I need other subjects in order to understand my relation to the 
world, in order to understand “how little we know about what our relation to reality is, our 
complicity in it”398. The presence of other persons can help me realize this. 
Are my relations to images less profound than my relation to the actual world? I do not 
see this question as very meaningful anymore, since images are part of the continuum that is 
my relation to the world, that is, when they work as they should. 
Images and our practices that involve them are the negotiation concerning what my 
relationship to this world is. 




Swedish summary – Svensk sammanfattning
Varifrån härstammar tanken om att det personliga eller det subjektiva står i vägen för vår 
kunskap? Den här frågan kunde vara en öppning till flera viktiga filosofiska diskussioner, men 
i min avhandling används den för att undersöka en specifik historia om bilden. Hur uppstod 
fotografiet och den dokumentära bilden? Hur kom det sig att den visuella världen började 
uppfattas som objektiv och vad innebar denna övergång? Man kan säga att den västerländska 
filosofin under upplysningen behövde en form av representationer som var objektiva, man 
ville etablera en slags ”blick från ingenstans”. Då vi kommer fram till 1800-talet och 
positivismen har fotografiet åtagit sig den här rollen som en bild som förbigår det subjektiva, 
våra mänskliga omdömen och vår psykologi. Det som jag gör i min undersökning är att visa 
på de spänningar som den här utvecklingen innefattar. Då man går in på detaljerna blir 
det tydligt hur skör och konstruerad uppfattningen om en objektiv bild egentligen är. Den 
objektiva bilden är en oerhört fruktbar konstruktion, den gav oss den moderna kosmologin, 
det perspektivistiska måleriet och fotografiet, å andra sidan döljer konstruktionen bildens 
egentliga moraliska uppgift.    
De tre kapitlen i den första delen av avhandlingen utformar en bildbegreppets genealogi. 
Undersökningen behandlar det perspektivistiska måleriets uppkomst och rationaliseringen 
av vårt synfält, samt den medeltida uppfattningen om mentala bilder (kapitel 1), camera 
obscura (kapitel 1 och 2) och uppfinningen av fotografiet och dess relation till positivismen 
(kapitel 3). Det essentiella för den här genealogin är den begreppsliga diskussionen. Bildens 
roll definieras av hur begreppet är relaterat till andra begrepp som seende, kunskap och jaget. 
När bilden vid en viss tidpunkt börjar uppfattas som en kopia av vårt synfält, ett slags visuellt 
facit, fungerar den här utvecklingen inte i isolation från andra händelser. För att belysa 
hur visuell registrering och dokumentation kom till, undersöker jag olika visuella metaforer 
som härstammade från en viss ocularcentrism inom västerländsk filosofi. De här visuella 
metaforerna är sammanflätade med förändringar i uppfattningar, en kultivering av vissa idéer 
och övertygelser, samt av vissa handlingar som utförs av seendet. I min läsning behandlar 
jag uppfattningar av seendet, jaget och bilden hos några av den västerländska vetenskapens 
och filosofins grundgestalter: Leonardo da Vinci (1452 – 1519), Francis Bacon (1561 – 1626), 
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Galileo Galilei (1564 – 1642), Johannes Kepler (1571  – 1630), René Descartes, (1596 – 
1650), John Locke (1632 – 1704) och Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 – 1716). 
I den andra delen av avhandlingen diskuterar jag bildens kommunikativa roll. Med 
”kommunikation” avser jag inte att ett innehåll förmedlas med hjälp av bilden från mig till en 
annan person, utan att vi delar en gemensam vy då vi ser på en bild. Kommunikation syftar i 
det här avseendet på att uppgå i en gemenskap, bilden är ett medel med hjälp av vilket vi kan 
etablera ett gemensamt sinne. Det här innebär en revidering av vår förståelse av begreppen 
bild, seende och kunskap. Kunskap, även kunskapen som vi får genom dokumentära bilder, 
föds genom en intersubjektiv dialog. De traditionella epistemologiska teorierna, empirismen 
och rationalismen, försummar inte enbart i det ena fallet (empirismen) vår subjektivitet, 
uppmärksamhet och omdömesförmågan, och i det andra fallet (rationalismen) objektivitet, 
observation och neutralitet, utan även relationen mellan två subjekt. Den här diskussionen är 
ett resultat av min läsning av centrala verk av Friedrich Nietzsche, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
Hannah Arendt, Theodor Adorno och Ludwig Wittgenstein. 
Historien som jag berättar här är från början en berättelse om uteslutning. För att förstå 
hur vår kunskap blir till, reducerade den tidiga moderna filosofin relationen mellan oss 
och världen till en relation mellan ett subjekt och ett objekt. I den här reduktionen spelade 
representationen, den entitet som fungerar som mellanhand mellan subjektet och objektet, 
en central roll. Här stiger bilden och senare den visuella registreringen – fotografiet och 
den dokumentära filmen – in i berättelsen. Jag kommer att visa hur den här reduktionen 
gav upphov till en enorm utveckling och framgång. Genom att fokusera på det här väldigt 
enkla förhållandet mellan ett objekt, en registrering som fungerar som en representation av 
objektet, och subjektet, uppnådde man enorma framsteg inom bildkonsten, vetenskapen och 
filosofin. 
Den andra delen av den här berättelsen handlar om inkludering i kontrast till reduktion, 
det är en rekonstruktion i kontrast till dekonstruktion. Kunskap uppnås inte enbart med 
hjälp av representationer. Kunskapen är inte huvudsakligen något vi får kontakt med genom 
seendet, och den nås inte enbart genom att vi vänder oss till den objektiva naturliga världen. 
För att förstå meningen med reduktionen och rationaliseringen, måste vi förstå vad som 
förbisågs, vad som lämnades bort från ekvationen, då den uträttades. Genom att visa hur 
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det i den tidiga moderna filosofin uppstod en hård tävlan mellan känselsinnet och seendet, 
angående vilketdera var det primära kunskapande sinnet, vill jag exemplifiera hur vår 
sinnesförnimmelse är mångformig. Då vi vill förstå världen krävs det att alla våra fem sinnen 
fungerar sida vid sida och i växelverkan med varandra. De här fem sinnena behöver ett 
medvetande, ett tänkande och reflekterande förstånd för att kunna samspråka med varandra, 
låt oss kalla det ett samfällt sinne. Sinnen befolkar en kropp: utan en materiell kropp skulle 
de inte ha en lokalitet i den här världen.
Den mest förbisedda entiteten i reduktionen som jag beskriver är sist och slutligen det 
andra subjektet, vår relation till den andra. Det här är slutpunkten för berättelsen. Men 
egentligen är det början. Utan andra subjekt skulle bilder, visuella registreringar och 
dokumentärfilmer vara överflödiga. Skälet till att dom finns är att vi behöver kommunicera 
och dela våra förnimmelser, åsikter och tankar. Det är på grund av att vi delar en värld med 
varandra som vi behöver bilder. För att kunna se behöver vi inte enbart ett par fungerande 
ögon utan även andra människor, ett annat par av ögon. Det är i det här sammanhanget som 
bilden fungerar som hjälpmedel. Bilden är inte i först hand ett medel som hjälper oss att se 
bättre, så som teleskopet eller mikroskopet. Bilden hjälper oss att se bättre, men inte genom 
att förstärka vår optiska förmåga, utan genom att kommunicera och sammankoppla vårt 
seende med andra människors seende. Den här praxisen av att dela vårt seende med varandra 
föds ur en moralisk insikt om att ensamma, utan andra människors åsikter, är vi främmande 
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The first part of this thesis delivers a genealogy of the image. It chronicles how the concepts of image, 
vision and the self evolved in relation to one another in a specific scientific and philosophical context, 
starting with the early Renaissance, which saw the invention of the perspectivist painting, up to the 
birth of Positivism and the photographic image. This development entailed a form of reductionism 
in which “the self ” – the role of human psychology, our judgement, our attention and our will – was 
sidestepped. Within this intellectual tradition there is only a short step, from the understanding of 
the image as a representation of three-dimensional space on a two-dimensional surface, to the idea 
of the image as a transparent picture, a window towards the world. By taking this short step one 
would easily lose sight of the role of the self in the practices of making and viewing images. 
In the second part the author offers an alternative to the intellectual tradition described in the first 
part. The idea of depiction as a neutral “view from nowhere” would support a skeptical attitude 
towards communication, dialogue and human testimony, and therefore our reliance upon each other 
and consequently our reliance on ourselves. What was forgotten in this understanding of the image 
as a view from nowhere, was that the image is an aid in the task cultivating our visual field, an aid in 
sharing our views. Due to this function of sharing, the image becomes a guide as we find our 
orientation in this world. I might stand beside another person and see what she sees, but I do not 
necessarily know her reading of it. The image adds a dimension to this relation, since it does not only 
show me what the other sees. When an image works properly it also shows how that other person 
sees, and thus the image becomes an agent.
While the present thesis combines the fields of philosophical epistemology, history of science and 
visual studies, its main interest is philosophical. It engages with philosophical misconceptions of depiction 
as a mimetic art form, of knowledge as domestication and of perception as reception of data.
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